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Abstract 
Although attentional biases to threat (ABT) are thought to contribute to the development and 
persistence of anxiety disorders (e.g., Matthews & Mackintosh, 1998; Mogg & Bradley, 
1998), it is not clear whether such biases in high trait and clinically anxious individuals are 
characterized as vigilance in directing attention towards threat (i.e., vigilance hypothesis) 
and/or a delay in disengaging from threat once it has been detected (i.e., maintenance 
hypothesis; Weierich, Treat, & Hollingworth, 2008). Furthermore, some researchers have 
suggested that anxiety disorders are maintained when vigilance for threat is followed by 
avoidance over time (i.e., vigilance-avoidance hypothesis; Mogg & Bradley, 1998).  Thus, 
further research clarifying the nature of anxiety-related ABT over an extended time course is 
needed. In the current program of research, I conducted three studies using a free viewing 
eye movement paradigm where participants were presented with pairs of images, one that 
was threat-related and one that was neutral, while their viewing behaviour was monitored 
over time. Study 1 indicated that while all participants showed a general vigilance-avoidance 
pattern to threat over time, trait-anxiety was not associated with ABT over a 3000 ms time 
course. However, in Study 2 when state anxiety was elevated, HTA individuals showed a 
greater proportion of viewing time assigned to threat stimuli than those low in trait anxiety 
when averaged over the 3000 ms time course, indicating a greater maintenance of attention 
following threat detection. Vigilance for threat was found in all participants for emotional 
stimuli in general. In Study 3, the relative contribution of trait and state anxiety on ABT was 
assessed by manipulating state anxiety levels within-participants and the data indicated that 
state anxiety, rather than trait anxiety, was associated with an increase in the maintenance of 
attention on threat over a 5000 ms time course. Overall, the results suggest that early 
vigilance for threat and the maintenance on threat over time are likely more normative 
process involved in an effective threat detection system rather than maladaptive processes 
that predict vulnerability to anxiety and anxiety disorders. Further theoretical and clinical 
implications, as well as areas for further study, are discussed.  
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Chapter 1 
The Time Course of Anxiety-Related Attentional Biases to Threat 
1.1 Introduction 
Leading models of anxiety propose that preferences for attending to threatening relative to 
neutral information, or attentional biases towards threat (ABT), are associated with the 
development and maintenance of anxiety and anxiety disorders (Beck & Clark, 1997; 
Eysenck, 1992, 1997; Eysenck, Derakshan, Santos, & Calvo, 2007; Matthews & Mackintosh, 
1998; Mogg & Bradley, 1998; Wells & Matthews, 1994; Williams, Watts, MacLeod, & 
Mathews, 1988, 1997). A large body of research supports these models, demonstrating that 
high trait-anxious (HTA) individuals and/or those with clinical anxiety are more likely than 
low trait-anxious (LTA) to selectively attend to visual threat-related relative to non-
threatening information (for reviews see Armstrong & Olatunji, 2012; Bar-Haim, Lamy, 
Pergamin, Bakermans-Kranenburg, & van IJzendoorn, 2007; Mathews & MacLeod, 2005; 
Yiend & Mathews, 2005). However, the nature of these attentional biases is still being 
debated. Some argue that attention is facilitated towards threat-related information, such that 
anxious individuals are faster at detecting threat and have a greater probability of attending to 
threat-related compared to non-threatening information (e.g., Matthews & Mackintosh, 
1998). Additionally, some argue that facilitated attention followed by attentional avoidance 
of threat is responsible for the maintenance of anxiety (Mogg & Bradley, 1998). However, 
other researchers contend that highly anxious individuals have greater delay in disengaging 
their attention from threat (Fox, Russo, Bowles & Dutton, 2001; Koster, Cromzez, 
Verschuere, & De Houwer, 2004). While these varying hypotheses are not mutually 
exclusive, and may all contribute to the development and persistence of anxiety disorders, the 
exact nature of anxiety-related attentional biases is still unclear (Weierich et al., 2008). 
In addition to the disputed disposition of anxiety-related attentional biases, research in this 
domain has yielded findings that are often inconsistent, and indeed the effects are “actually 
less solid than would be desirable” (p. 448; Calvo & Avero, 2005). There are a number of 
critical factors that likely contribute to the varying inferences in this debate, and more 
generally, to the inconsistencies in the literature. The most notable factors requiring further 
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investigation are the attentional components and time course of attention. Attention can be 
separated into a number of distinct processes (e.g., Posner, 1980) including initial orienting 
or shifting of attention, engagement, and disengagement, with the potential for engagement 
and disengagement to vary over time. Assessment of these components and the time course 
of attention have been limited by a number of methodological factors (Calvo & Avero, 2005; 
Koster et al., 2004; Mogg, Holmes, Garner, & Bradley, 2008). However, more recently, eye 
tracking technology has been used to elucidate these components and has the potential to 
clarify the complex nature of anxiety-related attentional biases (Armstrong & Olatunji, 2012; 
Clarke, MacLeod, & Guastella, 2013; Richards, Benson, Donnelly, & Hadwin, 2014; 
Weierich et al., 2008).  
The current program of research extends the previous literature by evaluating the 
phenomenology of anxiety-related attentional biases to threat-related and emotional images 
by monitoring eye movements in an attempt to understand the nature of these biases and 
more generally how people allocate their attention when presented with threat-related 
information over time. Do all individuals show a bias towards threat-related information or 
are such biases only found in those high in trait anxiety? Do HTA individuals show greater 
ABT than low or mid trait anxious? How does attention towards threat shift over time? Are 
anxiety-related ABT characterized as pre-attentive facilitated orienting to threat, maintenance 
of attention on threat over time and/or attentional biases away from threat (e.g., avoidance)? 
These are the primary research questions that initiated my program of research and that are 
addressed in the three eye movement studies reported in this dissertation.  
The purpose of this chapter is to critically evaluate the current literature on anxiety-related 
ABT, highlighting the factors that may account for the inconsistencies and debate regarding 
the nature of these biases, and to introduce a program of study that addresses the current 
lacunae and several limitations in this past research. First the constructs of state anxiety, trait 
anxiety and anxiety disorders will be introduced to provide the basis for understanding the 
leading models of anxiety-related ABT. Then, the paradigms used to measure ABT will be 
reviewed briefly, followed by a critical review of the eye movement literature to date that has 
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attempted to advance the measurement of attentional biases by distinguishing multiple 
attentional component and processes over time.  
1.2 Anxiety and Anxiety Disorders 
Anxiety is generally thought to be a mood state involving activation of the autonomic 
nervous system and subjective feelings of nervousness, tension, apprehension, and worry 
(Spielberger et al., 1983) that is related to and based on the same defense system as fear 
(Öhman, 1993), but also distinct from the more basic emotional experience (see Craske, 
1999). Craske (1999) proposed a continuum based on the perceived imminence of a threat 
that places anxiety and worry (associated with the potential for threat) at one end and fear 
and panic (associated with imminent threat) at the other, with anticipatory anxiety (associated 
with approaching threat) falling in between. As the threat imminence decreases from fear to 
anxiety, the motivation of the emotional states shifts from an immediate urgency to escape 
the threat that is relatively automatic and “noncognitive” (Izard, 1992) to more cautious 
behaviours and complex cognitive processing.  
It has long been recognized that anxious states are experiences that occur at a relatively 
short period in time, but when such states are predictably elicited over the course of time and 
one’s life, this tendency is characterized as a personality trait (Cattell & Scheier, 1961; 
Spielberger, 1966). Spielberger and colleagues (1983) defined trait anxiety as a relatively 
stable individual difference in “anxiety-proneness, that is, to differences between people in 
the tendency to perceive stressful situations as dangerous or threatening and to respond to 
such situations with elevations in the intensity of their state anxiety” (p. 1). They argue that 
HTA individuals are more likely to experience states of anxiety than those low in trait 
anxiety because they appraise a broader range of situations as threatening and/or dangerous. 
More recent conceptualizations of anxiety as a personality trait extend this work and 
highlight the complex integration of state and trait factors in a multilevel information 
processing framework that incorporates affective, behavioural, cognitive and motivational 
factors (Wilt, Oehlber & Revelle, 2011). 
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Our understanding of anxious states and trait anxiety has, in part, been motivated by our 
desire to understand how individuals develop pathological anxiety, in order that we may 
ultimately be able to treat such conditions most effectively (Mobini & Grant, 2007). Anxiety 
disorders are conceptualized generally by the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental 
Disorders (DSM-5, American Psychiatric Association, 2013) as “disorders that share features 
of excessive fear and anxiety and related behavioral disturbances” (p. 189, APA, 2013) that 
like other disorders, are associated with significant distress and/or interference in daily life. It 
was estimated that world-wide, between 1980 and 2004, the lifetime prevalence of any 
anxiety disorder was 16.6% (95% confidence interval = 12.7 – 21.1%; based on DSM-III and 
DSM-IV criteria; Somers, Goldner, Waraich, & Hsu, 2006) and more recently, 
approximately 29% for individuals in the United States (Kessler et al., 2005) based on DSM-
IV-TR classification criteria (APA, 2000; see Afifi, Cox, & Sareen, 2010 for Canadian 
estimates by anxiety disorder).  
Moreover, many more individuals develop problems that may not reach diagnostic criteria 
(i.e., subclinical) or develop disorders where anxiety may be a central experience and 
maintenance factor (e.g., sexual dysfunction, eating disorders, etc.). Researchers have sought 
to understand what factors put people at risk for developing an anxiety disorder and have 
identified trait anxiety (or neuroticism and the tendency to experience negative affect more 
generally) as highly associated with anxiety disorders (Bieling, Antony & Swinson, 1998) 
and a vulnerability factor among other biological, psychological and social factors (APA, 
2013). 
Leading models of anxiety propose that a central factor in the development and 
persistence of anxiety disorders is the way that individuals process information from their 
environment. That is, HTA individuals are thought to interpret situations and stimuli as more 
threatening than others and relatedly show biases in attention towards threat-related 
information (e.g., Beck & Clark, 1997). The following section will briefly review the 
prominent models of anxiety-related ABT and the roles that trait anxiety, state anxiety, and 
the attentional components play in the development and persistence of anxiety and anxiety-
related disorders. 
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1.3 Models of Anxiety-Related Attentional Biases to Threat 
Early cognitive models (e.g., Beck, 1976) proposed that clinically anxious individuals are 
most likely to show biases in information processing towards threat in attention, 
interpretation and memory, similarly to how those who are clinically depressed would show 
biases in all three cognitive processes towards depressive stimuli. However, the data began to 
indicate that anxiety was largely associated with information biases in attention to threat-
related information, while depression was associated with biases in memory for mood 
congruent information. Thus, more specific models of information processing biases in 
anxiety were needed to account for these results.  
1.3.1 Williams, Watts, MacLeod and Mathews, 1988 
Williams and colleagues (1988, 1997) proposed one of the first models to account for the 
information processing biases in emotional disorders (anxiety and depression). This model 
purported that there is an initial stage of processing during which the valence of stimuli 
(including threat value) are assessed pre-attentively by an Affective Decision Mechanism 
(ADM). The term “pre-attentive” was conceptualized similarly to Graf and Mandler’s (1984) 
concept of priming, in which there is evidence of influence by a stimulus in the absence of 
awareness of the stimulus. Thus, Williams and colleagues proposed that all individuals assess 
the valence and threat value of stimuli in their environment whether or not there is intent, or 
perhaps even awareness, of so doing. Once the threat level has been appraised, a Resource 
Allocation Mechanism (RAM) then either directs attention towards or away from the 
stimulus. They argue that “high trait anxiety reflects a permanent tendency to react to the 
affective decision at the pre-attentive stage by orienting resources towards the source of 
threat” (p. 176, Williams et al., 1988), and thus results in biases best characterized as 
facilitated orienting of attention in HTA individuals. LTA individuals, on the other hand, are 
proposed to direct attention away from threat. Moreover, Williams and colleagues proposed 
that state anxiety acts to increase the output of the ADM, similar to that of increasing the 
threat value or intensity of a stimulus. They suggest an interaction between trait and state 
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anxiety, such that when state anxiety increases, HTA individuals are more likely to show 
early, pre-attentive biases towards threat.   
1.3.2 Öhman, 1996 
Öhman’s (1993, 1996) evolutionary model of fear and anxiety views biases in attention to 
threat as highly adaptive processes that also occur relatively automatically and non-
consciously. In this model, stimuli are evaluated in a two-step process, first by feature 
detectors and then by a significance evaluator. The feature detector mechanism, if primed by 
features that have been associated with aversion and/or threat through an evolutionary 
process (e.g., features of spiders, angry faces), can have a direct effect on the arousal system. 
The arousal system can also impact the significance evaluator, such that elevations in state 
anxiety would increase the significance level of a stimulus. The processes described thus far 
are considered “bottom-up” or stimulus driven attentional processes that occur through 
priming. “Top-down” processing, according to Öhman (1996), can also bias attention 
towards threat through the expectancy system, “which contains memorial representations of 
past experience with the stimuli involved, as well as of their covariations and associations 
with threat. This is the route addressing the data on attentional bias in anxiety…” (pp. 280-
281). Thus, the expectancy system would be associated with trait anxiety that is thought to 
directly influence a stimulus’ appraised level of significance. The conscious perception of 
threat is then a result of the output from the significance evaluator and the expectancy and 
arousal systems. In the current model, ABT are primarily describing early facilitated 
orienting of attention to threat.  
1.3.3 Beck and Clark, 1997 
Beck and Clark’s cognitive model of anxiety (1997) proposes three stages of information 
processing to account for the cognitive-affective-physiological-behavioral patterns of 
anxiety. The first stage is termed initial registration involving the orienting mode which is 
thought to involve fast, automatic, and involuntary identification of stimuli and to determine 
the level of priority for processing in an early detection system. The second stage, termed the 
immediate preparation involves activation of the primal mode and a range of cognitive (e.g., 
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automatic thoughts and images), affective (fear), physiological (e.g., autonomic arousal), and 
behavioural (e.g., escape, avoidance) processes that generally serves to aid survival by 
minimizing threats and maximizing safety. This “goal-directed response pattern” (p. 57) 
involves both relatively automatic and strategic processing. The third stage, termed 
secondary elaboration involves the metacognitive mode and is associated with relatively 
effortful and slow elaborative semantic processing, including the evaluation of the 
individual’s ability to cope with a potential threat. Beck and Clark (1997) argue that “the 
central cognitive problem in anxiety is the excessive and/or inappropriate generation of threat 
meaning assignment in response to stimuli or situations that are innocuous” (p. 56). This 
appraisal of relatively mild threat stimuli directs attentional resources in the orienting mode 
towards the threat and then maintains attention onto threat-relevant schema-congruent 
information over time. Thus, this model hypothesizes trait anxiety-related facilitated 
orienting towards threat and the maintenance of attention on threat over time, but provides no 
specific predictions about the role of state anxiety in these processes.  
1.3.4 Mogg and Bradley, 1998 
Mogg and Bradley (1998) proposed a cognitive-motivational model of emotional disorders 
that argued for an adaptive and normative function of facilitated orienting of attention 
towards highly threatening stimuli, drawing from cognitive and neurobiological research 
(e.g., Ledoux, 1996) and the notion that an effective system for threat detection necessary for 
survival must assure that attention is directed at imminent threats and dangers in all 
individuals. In this model, anxiety-related biases in attention are the result of two systems.  
First, the valence evaluation system assesses the threat value of stimuli. This evaluation 
process is done by assessing stimulus features as well as the contextual factors and previous 
experience in a relatively pre-attentive and automatic fashion. The output from the valence 
evaluation system is then processed by the goal-engagement system that allocates cognitive 
resources, including attentional focus, and action plans. Thus, if a stimulus is evaluated as 
high in threat, a current task/goal will be interrupted and attentional and cognitive resources 
will be allocated to the stimulus, resulting in facilitated orienting towards threat. In this 
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model, “trait anxiety reflects the reactivity of the Valence Evaluation System to aversive 
stimuli” (p. 817) such that HTA individuals are more likely to rate ambiguous and trivial 
stimuli as more threatening than those low in trait anxiety. Furthermore, state anxiety is 
thought to influence the valence evaluation process by increasing the appraised level of threat 
of a stimulus. Thus, the cognitive-motivational model proposes that all individuals will show 
a bias towards highly threatening stimuli, but that only HTA individuals will show a pre-
attentive bias towards mild threat stimuli. It is this latter bias that they propose is a sign of 
vulnerability, but not the cause, of anxiety disorders. 
Moreover, while this model primarily proposes that facilitated orienting of attention 
towards threat is an indicator of vulnerability to clinically anxious states, they also note that 
the model does not dismiss the possibility that attentional processes are centrally involved in 
the maintenance of anxious states. That is, pre-attentive biases in orienting towards threat 
may be followed by attentional avoidance away from threat, a pattern termed “vigilance-
avoidance.” Directing attention away from threat may serve to interfere with habituation to 
the relatively mild threat, and consequently maintain the elevated threat appraisal over time. 
Despite this proposition, the model does not propose under what conditions a vigilance-
avoidance pattern is likely to occur. 
1.3.5 Matthews and Mackintosh, 1998 
Matthews and Mackintosh’s cognitive model of selective processes in anxiety (1998) 
proposed two opposing systems that determine whether an ABT will occur. First, the Threat 
Evaluation System (TES), similar to Williams et al., (1998) ADM and Öhman’s (1996) 
significance evaluator, assesses the threat value of stimuli in a bottom-up fashion that occurs 
prior to awareness. They note that biologically prepared (innate) or learned associations 
between stimuli and past aversive events are stored in the TES, and when activated, will 
facilitate the orienting of attention towards the perceived threat. In opposition to this stimulus 
driven process is an Effortful Task Demand (ETD) that involves top-down processing. The 
ETD accounts for the influence of increased effort and strategic processing to be used to 
counter the stimulus driven processes when individuals are able to prevent distraction from 
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threat. In this model, state anxiety is argued to lower the threshold of the TES, such that 
stimuli that previously would not have been assessed as threatening enough to trigger the 
TES and attentional resources are more likely to when under elevated state anxiety 
conditions. Furthermore, trait anxiety is thought to be associated with more permanent 
individual differences in TES thresholds, such that HTA individuals would have lower 
thresholds than those low in trait anxiety. In addition, they propose that those with greater 
trait anxiety would also contain a wider range of threat-related representations that would be 
stored in the TES, making them more likely to demonstrate attentional biases to a range of 
stimuli. Similar to Mogg and Bradley (1998), they also propose that all individuals will 
demonstrate attentional biases to highly threatening stimuli, but only relatively weak cues 
will result in such biases specifically in highly anxious populations.   
1.3.6 Wells and Matthews, 1994  
Unlike the majority of models that predict pre-attentive anxiety-related ABT, Wells and 
Matthews (1994) argue that the evidence for automatic, pre-attentive biases in attention is 
limited and in contrast, emphasize the contributions of top-down processes such as plans and 
goals in producing ABT in their Self-Regulatory Executive Functions Model of emotional 
disorders. They propose three levels of cognitive processing that continuously interact: a 
low-level associated with automatic processing, a level involving controlled conscious 
appraisal and regulation of actions (i.e., Self Regulation Executive Function or SREF), and a 
long-term memory store of self-knowledge and strategies for self-regulation. They propose 
that all stimuli undergo some “low level” processing that may intrude into consciousness and 
activate the SREF. The SREF appraises the stimuli and then directs an action plan, which 
could involve directing attention to stimuli if fitting with the individual’s goals and self-
knowledge. Thus, this model proposes that an ABT results from having a threat monitoring 
plan that is voluntary and that primes stimuli at a low level of processing. Furthermore, they 
view trait-anxiety (similar to neuroticism) as being associated with greater access to negative 
self-knowledge which influences the threat appraisals and strategies used to cope with threat. 
A threat monitoring plan can also be activated by state anxiety, but Wells and Matthews 
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(2004) argue that emotional states only weakly influence biases in information processing 
relative to trait factors that are associated with clinical pathology.  
1.3.7 Eysenck, Derakshan, Santos & Calvo, 2007 
Eysenck and colleagues’ attentional control theory (2007) was developed to account for the 
effects of trait anxiety on performance on cognitive tasks. This model proposes that anxiety 
impairs the ability to control attention that consequently reduces the efficiency of information 
processing on tasks requiring central executive functioning (Baddeley, 1986). The term 
control is described as being “determined in a goal-driven, top-down fashion” relative to “a 
stimulus-driven, bottom-up fashion” (p. 337, Eysenck et al., 2007) with anxiety decreasing 
the influence of the goal-driven attentional system and increasing the sensitivity of the 
stimulus-driven attentional system. Thus, increased sensitivity of bottom-up processing 
results in facilitated attention towards distracting stimuli, particularly if these stimuli are also 
threat-related. Furthermore, the attentional control theory hypothesizes that anxiety disrupts 
the central executive functions of inhibition, the ability to inhibit or prevent a dominant and 
automatic response, and shifting, the ability to shift or move attention between tasks, 
processes or mental sets. Deficits in these functions are thought to result in a difficulty to 
disengage from stimuli once captured by attention. Of note, the attentional control theory 
primarily attributes the effects to trait anxiety, but recognizes the difficulty in separating trait 
and state effects on performance (Eysenck, 2010). 
1.3.8 Bar-Haim, Lamy, Pergamin, Bakermans-Kranenburg & van IJzendoorn, 2007 
More recently, Bar-Haim and colleagues (2007) proposed an integrative model based on 
results from a meta-analysis of response time tasks assessing anxiety-related ABT given that 
the results were not fully accounted for by the leading models. In their model, they argue that 
anxious populations could show attentional biases that are not only pre-attentive, but also 
attentional and post-attentional. More generally, they argue that maladaptive information 
processing (including attention) can occur at four different stages. The first stage involves the 
preattentive threat evaluation system (PTES) that like previous models (e.g., Williams et al, 
1988, Öhman, 1996) involves a system for evaluating the threat value of a stimulus that 
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occurs relatively automatically and does not require awareness. If a stimulus is tagged as 
having a high threat value, the resource allocation system (RAS) activates a state of alert, 
increases physiological arousal and directs attentional and cognitive resources to process the 
stimulus. The outcome from the RAS (e.g., direction of attention) is then processed by the 
guided threat evaluation system (GTES) where the current context, access to prior experience 
and memory, as well as the assessment of coping abilities are evaluated in a more elaborative 
manner. If the stimulus is still considered to have a high threat value, then an anxious state is 
likely to result and the goal engagement system (GES) will continue to direct attention 
towards the threat. However, if this evaluation results in a low threat value, a feedback 
system will override the PTES and reduce the alerted state of the RAS and attention will be 
redirected away from the minor threat and towards an alternative source associated with their 
current goal.  
Therefore, according to Bar-Haim and colleagues’ model (2007), HTA populations may 
be at risk for developing an anxiety disorder if they show one or more of the following 
biases: 1) an automatic pre-attentive bias to evaluate benign or mild threat stimuli as highly 
threatening, 2) a bias to direct resources (e.g., attention) to mildly threatening stimuli, 3) a 
bias to misinterpret signals of an alert state as highly threatening and 4) deficits in the ability 
to override the state of alert after elaborative and conscious processing has concluded that the 
actual threat value is low.  
1.3.9 Summary of Models 
The models that attempt to account for anxiety-related ABT to date all have focused on early, 
pre-attentive biases in facilitated orienting to threat (Beck & Clark, 1997; Eysenck, 1992; 
Matthews & Mackintosh, 1998; Mogg & Bradley, 1998; Wells & Matthews, 1994; Williams 
et al., 1988, 1997), with only a few models accounting for continued maintenance of 
attention and/or delays in disengaging from threat (Beck & Clark, 1997; Bar-Haim et al., 
2007; Eysenck et al., 2007). In general, the majority of the models are consistent with the 
vigilance hypothesis that contends that high anxious populations will show greater facilitated 
attention to threat than non-anxious populations. Mogg and Bradley (1998) extend this notion 
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in the vigilance-avoidance (VA) hypothesis by proposing that following facilitated orienting, 
high anxious populations later direct attention away from threat in order to avoid the 
associated distress with continuing to maintain attention on threat. The second central 
hypothesis made by more recent models is referred to as the attention maintenance 
hypothesis (see Weierich et al., 2008) which proposes that once threat is detected, high 
anxious populations maintain or delay the disengagement of attention from threat, resulting 
in greater biases in attention to threat than to neutral stimuli. The maintenance hypothesis 
incorporates Fox and colleagues (Fox et al., 2001) delayed disengagement hypothesis and the 
proposal that anxious individuals have a delay in disengaging due to a deficit and/or 
difficulty in shifting attention away from threat. Thus, the delayed disengagement hypothesis 
assumes motivation or an attempt to disengage from threat but an inability to do so. Rather, 
the maintenance hypothesis makes no specific claims about why anxious individuals maintain 
their attention on threat, but simply predicts the sustained attentional behaviour. Moreover, 
the models also primarily focuses on the role of trait anxiety or between-subject differences 
in anxiety in contributing to biases in attention with relatively little attention to state anxiety 
or within-subject differences. Although only some models make predictions about the role of 
state anxiety (Matthews & Mackintosh, 1998; Mogg & Bradley, 1998; Wells & Matthews, 
1994; Williams et al., 1988, 1997), relatively little research has been done to distinguish the 
two highly related, but distinct constructs (see Quigley, Nelson, Carriere, Smilek, & Purdon, 
2012) to test the hypotheses made by the current models. 
1.4 Defining Attentional Bias to Threat 
Prior to reviewing the attentional bias literature, it is essential to first define the term 
attentional bias and clarify how it is measured given that there have been critical differences 
in how it has been operationalized that have led to confusion in interpreting the extant 
literature (Cisler, Bacon & Williams, 2009). Cisler and colleagues (2009) argue that an ABT 
is best conceptualized as a within-subjects comparison between attention toward threat 
relative to neutral stimuli. Such biases can be assessed by comparing the magnitude of the 
attentional bias score to chance levels, thus if a proportion is calculated between attention to 
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threat relative to neutral stimuli, then this value would be compared to a chance probability 
level of .5 if there are just the two stimuli (e.g., no bias). A score significantly above .5 would 
indicate a bias towards threat, while a score significantly below would suggest a bias away 
from threat. This analysis, thus, determines whether an ABT is present or not and the 
direction of the bias.   
Another way that researchers have conceptualized attentional biases to threat is with 
between-subject comparisons contrasting those who are high and low in anxiety. Some have 
concluded that if there are significant differences between two anxious groups, then the high 
anxious group is demonstrating a bias, whether or not the high anxious group exhibits a 
within subjects bias (e.g., Garner, Mogg & Bradley, 2006). Cisler and colleagues (2009) 
astutely note that these two types of comparisons address distinct research questions. Within-
subject comparisons, as noted, assess the presence and direction of biases and thus, can 
determine whether biases occur in all individuals or are specific to some anxiety groups. 
Between-subject comparisons of anxiety groups better illustrate whether observed biases 
vary as a function of individual differences in anxiety. Using both types of comparisons 
allows us to examine whether biases in attention to threat-related information occur in all 
populations, but are exaggerated in high anxious populations (diagnostic extremity), or 
whether biases in attention to negative information are specific to high anxious populations 
only (diagnostic specificity; Cisler et al., 2009).  
Given the variability in methodology and data analysis in the literature, it is challenging to 
interpret the results of the extant research in answering these distinct research questions. For 
instance, in the eye movement literature,  many studies have only conducted between-subject 
analyses (e.g., Armstrong, Bilsky, Zhao & Olatunji, 2013; Armstrong, Olatunji, Sarawgi, & 
Simmons, 2010; Buckner, Maner & Schmidt, 2010; Mühlberger, Wieser, & Pauli, 2008; 
Rohner, 2002; Pflugshaupt, Mosimann, von Wartburg, Schmitt, Nyffeler, & Muri, 2005; 
Wieser, Pauli, Weyers, Alpers & Mühlberger, 2009) while other studies have used both 
between and within-subject analyses (Calvo & Avero, 2005; Gamble & Rapee, 2010; Garner  
et al., 2006; Gerdes, Pauli, & Alpers, 2009; Hermans, Vansteenwegen, & Eelen, 1999; Mogg, 
Garner & Bradley, 2007; Rinck & Becker, 2006; Quigley et al., 2012; Waechter, Nelson, 
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Wright, Hyatt & Oakman, 2014; Miltner, Krieschel, Hecht, Trippe & Weiss, 2004). 
However, even studies that have used both within and between subject analyses have made 
conclusions about the presence of attentional biases based on between-group differences. For 
example, Garner and colleagues (2006) concluded that their high socially anxious group was 
faster to look at emotional faces relative to neutral faces, thus exhibiting vigilance. Based on 
the finding that the high socially anxious group spent less time looking at emotional faces 
relative to the low socially anxious group, they concluded that the high socially anxious 
group exhibited avoidance. But vigilance was determined through a within subjects 
comparison whereas avoidance was determined through a between subjects comparison. 
Garner and colleagues did not actually find a within subjects difference in amount of time the 
socially anxious group spent looking at emotional vs. neutral faces. This example illustrates 
that both within-subject and between-subject effects must be considered in order to 
understand the complex nature and specificity of anxiety-related attentional biases to threat 
(Cisler et al., 2009).  
1.5 Measuring the Components and Time Course of Attentional Biases to Threat 
A major limitation of the current attentional bias research is that attention has largely been 
measured as a unitary and static construct even though cognitive theory and research 
specifies that there are several components, or stages, in attention, which include initial 
orientation to a stimulus, engagement, and disengagement from a stimulus (Posner, 1980; 
Posner & Peterson, 1990). Relatively few studies of attentional deployment to threatening 
stimuli have actually examined the course of attention over time. Rather, to date, attentional 
biases have been studied using response time paradigms such as emotional Stroop tasks (see 
Williams, Mathews, & MacLeod, 1996 for a review), dot-probe detection tasks (e.g., 
MacLeod, Mathews & Tata, 1986), spatial cueing tasks (e.g., Fox et al., 2001), and visual 
search tasks (e.g., Rinck, Becker, Kellermann, & Roth, 2003). This body of work has 
provided some support for the notion that anxiety is characterized by an ABT, such that there 
may be an early facilitated orientation to threat (e.g., Bar-Haim et al., 2007), a maintenance 
of attention and/or delay in disengaging from threat (e.g., Fox et al., 2001) and a tendency to 
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avoid threat (e.g., Hermans et al., 1999; see Cisler & Koster, 2010 for a review). But, how 
can it be true that attention is both oriented towards, but also away from threat? The answer 
may lie in the limitation of the response time paradigms used to study attentional biases to 
date, which do not allow for the clear examination of the separate components of attention 
(e.g., Koster et al., 2004), and that assess attention at one particular point in time only as 
opposed to over the continuous course of time. The most common response time tasks 
followed by eye movement tasks will be briefly reviewed below. 
1.5.1 Emotional Stroop tasks. 
The emotional Stroop task (see Williams, Mathews, & MacLeod, 1996 for a review), a 
variant of the classic Stroop task (Stroop, 1935), was one of the earliest paradigms used to 
examine attentional biases towards threat. In this task, participants are shown threatening and 
non-threatening words printed in one of several colours and asked to identify the colour of 
each word as quickly as possible. To do well at the task, the semantic content of the word 
must be ignored, which is said to become more difficult to the extent that the word has salient 
emotional meaning. Greater latency to colour-name threatening words as compared to the 
non-threatening words would, then, be said to indicate an attentional bias towards threat. A 
number of studies have found that individuals high in trait anxiety demonstrated this bias, 
whereas those low in trait anxiety do not (see Williams, Mathews, & MacLeod, 1996 for a 
review). However, the results of this task are difficult to interpret given that it is influenced 
by factors other than attentional capture (e.g., Algom, Chajut, & Lev, 2004; MacLeod & 
Bors, 2002), such as a general slowing in responding to threat that may be due to 
requirements to make approach (rather than avoidance) responses (Chajut, Mama, Levy, & 
Algom, 2010). Moreover, even without such confounds, it is impossible to tell whether the 
greater latency reflects a bias in initial orientation, a delay in disengaging attention from 
threatening material once it has been detected, or a combination of the two processes.  
1.5.2 Dot-probe detection tasks. 
The dot-probe detection task was developed to provide a more direct measure of selective 
visual attention (MacLeod et al., 1986; Posner, Snyder, & Davidson, 1980). In this paradigm, 
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two stimuli (words or pictures) are presented, one threat-related and the other neutral in 
valence. The stimuli are presented in two different spatial locations on a computer screen, 
arranged either horizontally or vertically, and typically presented supraliminally (e.g., for 500 
ms) and then are replaced by a neutral probe, such as a dot or an asterisk. Participants are 
instructed to signal something about the probe, such as its location (e.g., left or right of 
center) or nature (e.g., one asterisk or two), using response keys. On congruent trials, the 
probe replaces the threat-relevant stimuli, and in incongruent trials it replaces the neutral 
stimuli. Response time will be faster if the probe appears in the visual area that is being 
attended to. Therefore, a faster response time on congruent trials is said to indicate an ABT 
(e.g., Mogg, McNamara, Powys, Rawlinson, Seiffer, & Bradley, 2000). The degree of 
attentional bias is measured by subtracting response latency on congruent trials from the 
incongruent trials. 
The dot-probe paradigm overcomes some confounds inherent in the Stroop task. However, 
as noted by Koster and colleagues (2004) and Fox (2004), once again the task does not 
determine whether the bias score indicates facilitated attention towards threat or a delay in 
disengaging from threat. To address this concern, Koster et al., (2004) included baseline 
trials featuring two concurrent neutral stimuli as a comparison against which to compare 
response times for the subsequent threat vs. neutral congruent and incongruent trials. 
Research using this particular variant of the dot-probe has found that high trait- anxious 
individuals are slower to respond to incongruent trails than baseline trials. Given that the 
stimuli were presented for 500 ms before the probe appeared, this effect was inferred to 
reflect a delay or difficulty disengaging from threat (Koster et al., 2004, Koster, Crombez, 
Verschuere, Van Damme, & Weirsema, 2006; Koster, Verschuere, Crombez, & Van Damme, 
2005; Salemink, van den Hout , & Kindt, 2007). Interestingly, there was no evidence of 
facilitated attention given that there was no significant difference in response time between 
congruent and baseline trails. A continued limitation of the previous dot-probe paradigm is 
that it only assesses attention at one point in time, which, in the research described thus far, is 
at 500 ms following the appearance of the stimulus.  
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Although researchers have argued that attention at 500 ms reflects initial orienting (see 
Bar-Haim et al., 2007), it is important to note that this is actually a comparatively long time 
when studying visual perception and response time. It is possible that attention may have 
shifted a number of times during the 0 -500 ms interval, with initial orientation being on the 
threatening stimuli or not. This issue has been addressed recently by varying the Stimulus 
Onset Asynchrony (SOA), or the length of time the stimuli are presented before the probe is 
displayed. Thus, research has varied the SOA to assess earlier time point, such as 14 ms (e.g., 
Mogg & Bradley, 1999) and 100 ms (e.g., Koster et al., 2005; Mogg, Bradley, De Bono & 
Painter, 1997). The findings from these studies have been mixed. Given that initial orienting 
of attention is not necessarily occurring at set points in time, the dot-probe detection task is 
not well suited to assess initial orienting of attention, despite these attempts at shortening the 
presentation durations (Weierich et al., 2008). Furthermore, the reliability of dot probe tasks 
is often unacceptably low (e.g., Waechter et al., 2014). 
Likewise, to assess later stages of attention with the dot-probe detection task, researchers 
have used longer SOAs (e.g., 1500 ms). While two studies using this paradigm have found a 
bias away from threat images in anxious individuals, consistent with attentional avoidance 
(Koster et al., 2005; Mogg, Bradley, Miles & Dixon, 2004), many studies have failed to find 
any bias in attention at longer stimulus durations with anxious populations (Mogg et al., 
1997, Mogg & Bradley, 2006; Mogg, Philippot, & Bradley, 2004; Mogg, Bradley, Miles, & 
Dixon, 2004; Bradley, Mogg Falla, & Hamilton, 1998). Interestingly, Mogg, Bradley and 
colleagues (2004) found a bias away from images involving injury, violence and death 
presented at 1500 ms in those self-reporting high blood-injury fears, but not in those high in 
trait-anxiety, suggesting that attentional biases may be more likely to emerge for stimuli that 
reflect a particular fear. Moreover, the one study that found evidence of a bias away from 
threat in HTA individuals (Koster et al., 2005) found that they were more likely to attend to 
the neutral images and away from the high and mild threat pictures at 1250 ms. It may be 
that, as with initial orienting, disengagement and avoidance of threat can occur at different 
time points, and there may be individual differences in this regard that are driven by 
motivational factors, such as aversion to the stimuli. Thus, using a response time paradigm 
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such as the dot-probe detection task at set time points may not be most effective in assessing 
biases away from threat, given that most studies have not found a bias in attention at time 
points greater than 500 ms.  
1.5.3 Spatial cueing tasks. 
 Another response time task that is thought to assess the components and time course of 
attention towards threat is the spatial cueing, or Posner task (Posner, 1980). In this paradigm, 
participants fixate on a center cross that is displayed between two rectangles on a computer 
screen. A single stimulus, typically threat-related or neutral in valence, is then shown in one 
of the two rectangles, usually for 500 ms, at which point a neutral probe appears in either the 
same rectangle as the stimuli (i.e., valid trials), or in the opposite rectangle (i.e., invalid 
trials). The task is to indicate the location of the probe by pressing one of two response keys. 
Facilitated attention to threat is determined by faster response times when the stimuli are 
threatening compared to neutral on valid trials (i.e., when the probe is in the same location as 
the stimuli), indicating that the threatening stimuli attracted attention more quickly than the 
neutral cues. Additionally, a delay in disengaging from threat is determined by slower 
response times when the stimuli are threatening compared to neutral on invalid trials (i.e., 
when the probe is in the opposite location as the stimuli), indicating that the threatening 
stimuli held attention away from the probe and delayed the response. Similar to the dot-probe 
detection task, the SOA can be varied to assess the time course of these attentional 
components. 
The majority of studies using the spatial cueing task suggest that, at least at time points of 
up to 600 ms, those high in trait-anxiety  appear to have a delay in disengaging from threat-
related stimuli, rather than showing an initial bias towards  threat (Amir, Elias, Klumpp, & 
Przeworski, 2003; Fox et al., 2001; Fox, Russo & Dutton, 2002; Yiend & Mathews, 2001). 
One exception is a study in which evidence for both facilitated attention and difficulty 
disengaging from threatening images at 100 ms was found, as well as a bias away from threat 
at SOAs of 200 and 500 ms in HTA individuals (Koster et al., 2006). However, Mogg and 
colleagues (2008) identified a major confound in this paradigm, recently demonstrating that 
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anxious individuals are slower to respond to threatening than to neutral faces in general, 
regardless of spatial attention, but nonanxious participants show no difference in their 
response times to centrally located threatening and neutral stimuli. When the general 
response time for centrally located stimuli is subtracted from the bias scores, the results 
suggest the opposite of what is typically reported. That is, the results imply that high anxious 
individuals show facilitated engagement with threat rather than disengagement difficulties. 
Mogg and colleagues argue that this confound creates problems when determining the 
components of attention with response time tasks (Koster et al., 2004), and thus they 
concluded that “the ‘delayed disengagement’ hypothesis remains untested” (p. 666; Mogg et 
al., 2008). These methodological complications make it difficult to draw conclusions about 
the nature of attentional biases towards threat.  
1.5.4 Visual search tasks. 
Visual search has also been used to assess anxiety-related attentional biases, but to a lesser 
extent than other paradigms. Nevertheless, it does allow for the distinction between 
facilitated attention and disengagement (e.g., Rinck et al., 2003). Visual search tasks 
generally require participants to detect target stimuli that are embedded in an arrangement of 
distracting stimuli. For example, participants may be asked to identify an image of an angry 
face (i.e., threat-related target) in a matrix of neutral faces (i.e., neutral distractors), or a 
butterfly (i.e., neutral target) in an arrangement of spiders (i.e., threat-related distractors). 
Facilitated attention is indicated by faster response times to detect threat-related targets in an 
array of neutral distractors compared to identifying neutral targets in an array of neutral 
distractors (i.e., baseline condition). Conversely, a delay in disengaging from threat is 
indicated by slower response times to detect neutral targets in an array of threatening 
distractors compared to detecting neutral targets in an array of neutral distractors.  
Research using visual search paradigms has found evidence that anxious individuals 
demonstrate both facilitated attention (e.g., Byrne & Eysenck, 1995) and difficulty 
disengaging from threat (e.g., Rinck et al., 2003). Other studies that have not used a baseline 
condition, but assessed for group differences in high and low anxious populations, have 
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found that high anxious individuals are faster at detecting threat-related targets and slower to 
disengage from threat-related distracters compared to low anxious individuals (e.g., Rinck, 
Reinecke, Ellwart, Heuer, & Becker, 2005) while others have found no differences between 
HTA and LTA when stimuli salience are equated (e.g., Notebaert, Crombez, Van Damme, 
De Houwer, & Theeuwes, 2011). However, one limitation of this approach is that it cannot 
provide information regarding the time course of these attentional components, and the point 
in time at which facilitated attention and disengagement take place may be important in 
understanding the nature of anxiety-related attentional biases. Given this central limitation, in 
conjunction with the methodological limitations noted above for the emotional Stroop tasks, 
dot-probe detection tasks and spatial cueing tasks, it is evident that other paradigms are 
needed to elucidate the specific nature of these biases.  
1.5.5 Eye movement tasks.  
An alternative method to using response time paradigms to infer visual attention towards 
threat is the direct observation of visual selective attention through measurement of eye 
movements (Armstrong & Olatunji, 2012). That is, the direction of visual focus (i.e., foveal 
vision assessing up to 2° visual angle) is a good indicator where in a visual array attention is 
being deployed and is thus termed overt attention (Findlay & Gilchrist, 2003). In contrast, 
covert attention is the directing of attention to a stimulus without shifting the eyes. While 
overt and covert attention can be dissociated (i.e., one can attend to a stimulus without 
moving their eyes), covert attention functions to direct overt attention and the purpose of eye 
movement is to select visual information for further processing (Findlay & Gilchrist, 2003; 
Hayhoe & Ballard, 2005; see Weierich et al., 2008). It seems likely that an effective threat 
detection system would rely on overt attention for detecting potential threat rather than solely 
on covert attention (Armstrong & Olatunji, 2012; Richards, Benson, Donnelly, & Hadwin, 
2014), thus the direction of eye movements may provide a more direct measure of selective 
visual attention than response time tasks.   
Researchers have used eye tracking in a variety of ways to asses for anxiety-related ABT 
(see Armstong & Olatunji, 2012 for a meta-analysis). Some studies have measured eye 
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movements concurrently with response time paradigms, such as the dot-probe (e.g., Bradley, 
Mogg & Millar, 2000; Garner et al., 2006; Mogg et al.,2007; Schofield, Johnson, Inhoff, & 
Coles, 2012) and visual search tasks (e.g., Pflugshaupt et al., 2005; Rinck et al., 2005; 
Miltner et al.,2004). The majority of studies have used free viewing paradigms that tracked 
selective visual attention to threat-neutral image pairs (e.g., Calvo & Avero, 2005; Gerdes et 
al.,2009; Gamble & Rapee, 2010; Quigley et al., 2012), or to 3 neutral images with one 
threat-related image (Armstrong, Hemminger, & Olatunji, 2013; Armstrong, Sarawgi, & 
Olantunji, 2012; Becker & Detweiler-Bedell, 2009; Buckner et al.,2010; Rinck & Becker, 
2006). Given this range of methodology and the complex nature of eye movements, 
researchers have made use of multiple indicators for the various attentional components and 
time course of attentional engagement and disengagement. Each attentional component will 
be discussed below.   
 Initial orienting and facilitation. 1.5.5.1
One of the main advantages of measuring eye movements over response time paradigms is 
that the first shift of visual selective attention can be observed directly. That is, in free 
viewing paradigms, participants often fixate at a central marked location prior to when the 
images are displayed and this procedure allows for the observation of the first shift and thus 
determine whether it is directed towards or away from a threat relative to a control stimulus. 
In this way, an index can be calculated to assess “pre-attentive” facilitated orienting, or more 
generally, attending to threat stimuli prior to full awareness of the stimuli content. Another 
index of facilitated orienting that has been less commonly used in free viewing tasks is the 
time taken to make the initial fixations on threat relative to neutral stimuli (i.e., latency of 
facilitation; e.g., Gerdes et al., 2009; Pflugshaupt et al., 2005). Both a greater probability of 
making initial eye fixations on threat-related stimuli and shorter time to make these fixations 
towards threat relative to neutral stimuli are thought to indicate facilitated attention.  
Although not often assessed, studies that analyze biases (from chance levels) in initial 
fixation probabilities have found some evidence for an attentional bias in HTA individuals 
towards images involving threat of injury (i.e., threat; Calvo & Avero, 2005; Quigley et al., 
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2012) and past injury (i.e., harm; Calvo & Avero, 2005) and to angry and fearful faces in 
socially anxious populations (Garner, Mogg, Bradley, 2006; Mogg, Garner & Bradley, 
2007). However, one study did not find this bias towards angry or disgust faces in socially 
anxious individuals (Waechter et al., 2014) and more generally, have not been found for 
spider stimuli in spider fearful populations (Gerdes, Alpers, Pauli, 2008; Rinck & Becker, 
2006). Moreover, some studies have found that low socially anxious individuals also show 
facilitated attention towards threat-related faces (Garner et al.,2006; Mogg et al.,2007) and 
that those low in injection fears make more first fixations on images of injection, physical 
attack and positive images relative to neutral (Armstong et al., 2013), indicating that an 
attentional bias at the initial fixations to negative (and perhaps positive) information may not 
always be limited to high anxious populations. Similarly, unselected samples generally show 
facilitated orienting biases for threat and emotional stimuli when assessed with eye 
movements (e.g., Calvo & Lang, 2004; Nummenmaa, Hyönä, & Calvo, 2006) suggesting that 
early facilitated biases to threat may be a normative selective process that is also biologically 
determined and prewired (LeDoux, 1995; Öhman, 1993).  
When comparing anxious groups, between-subjects differences have been found with high 
anxious individuals showing greater facilitated attention than the low anxious individuals 
towards potential threat and harm images in HTA populations (Calvo & Avero, 2005), to 
negative faces in socially anxious individuals (Mogg et al.,2007; Wieser, Pauli, Weyers, 
Alpers, & Mühlberger, 2009), to fearful faces (but not disgust) in those high in contamination 
fear (Armstong et al.,2010), to spider stimuli in spider fearful participants (Pflugshaupt et 
al.,2005; Rinck & Becker, 2006), to injection images in those high in injection fears 
(Armstrong et al., 2013), and to images of war in Veterans with greater posttraumatic 
symptoms (Kimble, Fleming, Bandy, Kim, & Zambetti, 2010). However, others have failed 
to find significant between-subjects differences (Armstrong et al., 2013; Armstrong et al., 
2010 for disgust faces; Garner et al., 2006; Schofield et al., 2012; Waechter et al., 2014; 
Quigley et al., 2012). Moreover, studies assessing facilitation through first fixation latencies 
in free viewing tasks have found limited support for anxiety group differences (Garner et al., 
2006, Study 2), with many studies showing no significant effects (e.g., Armstrong et al., 
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2010; Garner et al., 2006, Study 1; Waechter et al., 2014). A recent meta-analysis indicated 
that using the proportion of first fixations as an index of facilitated attention or vigilance for 
threat, differences between anxious and non-anxious samples resulted in a small to moderate 
effect size (k = 16, g = .58; Armstrong & Olantunji, 2012) despite the discrepancies in the 
literature.  
The current eye movement research provides preliminary support for facilitated orienting 
of attention to threat-related images in anxious populations as predicted by the prominent 
models of anxiety-related attentional biases (Beck & Clark, 1997; Eysenck, 1992; Matthews 
& Mackintosh, 1998; Mogg & Bradley, 1998; Wells & Matthews, 1994; Williams et al., 
1988, 1997). However, relatively few studies to date have assessed the presence and nature 
of ABT using initial fixation data (i.e., comparison to chance levels; Calvo & Avero, 2005; 
Garner et al., 2006; Gerdes, Alpers, Pauli, 2008; Mogg et al.,2007; Rinck & Becker, 2006; 
Quigley et al., 2012; Waechter et al., 2014).  Given the discrepant results between initial 
fixation data and some response time results (e.g., dot probe detection task; Gerdes et al., 
2008; Rinck & Becker, 2006) further research assessing initial orienting of eye movements is 
needed to understand the conditions under which facilitated attention to threat is most likely 
to occur and the extent that this index of ABT is influenced by anxiety. 
 Attentional engagement over time. 1.5.5.2
Given the focus on biases in facilitated attention towards threat (e.g., Matthews & 
Mackintosh, 1998; Mogg & Bradley, 1998) there has been less emphasis on assessing the 
maintenance of attentional biases or engagement with threat over time. Free viewing tasks 
allow for the presentation of stimuli for extended periods of time and this approach often 
involves measuring the proportion of fixation durations (e.g., Calvo & Avero, 2005; Quigley 
et al., 2012) and/or fixation frequencies (e.g., Gamble & Rapee, 2010; Hermans et al.,1999), 
on threat to overall durations and frequencies, respectively. In other words, a comparison can 
be made between how long and how often participants look at threat versus neutral 
information over time. To assess for these attentional factors, studies have frequently 
assessed eye movements for 3 to 5 seconds and divided this continuous time course into 
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equal intervals (e.g., 500 ms; Calvo & Avero; Wieser et al., 2009). Recent research has 
demonstrated that both the proportion of fixation frequencies and fixation durations are 
highly related and, when used over extended time frames (500 and 1000 ms intervals), have 
the greatest reliability (Waechter et al., 2014).   
Research using this approach to assessing attention over time has typically found 
preliminary evidence for an early attentional bias towards threat in the first 500 ms of 
viewing in anxious individuals. For instance, Calvo and Avero (2005) found that HTA 
participants showed a bias for harm-related images (but not threat-related images involving 
potential threat) in the first 500 ms of viewing. Similar results have been found for 
participants meeting DSM-IV criteria for social phobia with angry faces (Gamble & Rapee; 
2010) and for images of spiders in spider fearful participants (Hermans et al., 1999). This 
early bias in engagement towards threat in high anxious populations has not typically been 
found after the first 500 ms (Calvo & Avero, 2005; Gamble & Rapee, 2010; Hermans et al., 
1999), however, some studies have failed to find a bias towards threat in HTA samples even 
prior to 500 ms (e.g., Calvo & Avero, 2005; Quigley et al., 2012; Waechter et al., 2014). 
Moreover, Rohner (2002) found that HTA individuals demonstrated an early bias in viewing 
negative versus positive stimuli; however this bias was also found in LTA individuals and 
without a comparison to neutral stimuli, it is not known the direction of the bias. Similarly, 
other eye movement studies have found early biases to threat-related stimuli in low anxious 
individuals (e.g., Hermans et al., 1999; Quigley et al., 2012) indicating that greater 
attentional engagement with threat is a general phenomenon.   
Furthermore, anxiety group differences have been found with high anxious populations 
showing greater attention to threat than low anxious populations in the first 500 ms of 
viewing (Gamble & Rapee, 2010: Rinck & Becker, 2006; Wieser et al., 2009), as well as 
over extended periods of time (Armstrong et al., 2010). However, the results are mixed, for 
other studies have not found this anxiety group difference (Armstrong et al., 2012; Hermans 
et al. 1999; Rohner, 2002; Quigley et al., 2012; Waechter et al., 2014). A recent meta-
analysis of eye movement studies  (Armstrong & Olantunji, 2012) assessed relatively early 
maintenance of attentional biases in free viewing tasks (using the proportion of viewing time 
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between 1000 and 2000 ms and the duration of the initial fixations), but did not find evidence 
for differences between high and low anxious individuals. The results did indicate however, 
that anxiety group differences in maintenance was moderated by type of anxiety, such that 
spider fearful individuals showed much less maintenance on spider images while those 
studies assessing posttraumatic stress disorder symptoms (PTSD) found the opposite; that is, 
those with PTSD showed greater maintenance on threat-related stimuli over time. Therefore, 
research monitoring eye movements has provided some evidence for an anxiety-related 
attentional bias in early engagement of threat that appears to occur in the first 500 ms of 
viewing and does not seem to be consistently maintained over time. Nevertheless, relatively 
few eye movement studies assessing the time course of attention have been conducted and 
these studies have yet to be replicated.  
 Attentional disengagement.   1.5.5.3
Monitoring eye movements can also provide some indication of visual disengagement of 
attention from threat. Researchers have used a variety of approaches to assess attentional 
disengagement and there appears to be less consensus regarding how best to use eye 
movement data to assess this attentional component. Some have monitored eye movements 
during a visual search task (Rinck et al., 2005; Miltner et al., 2004), while others have used 
free viewing tasks (Rink & Becker, 2006; Garner et al., 2006; Quigley et al., 2012).  
Research monitoring eye movements concurrently with a visual search task generally 
involves presenting threat-related distractors (e.g., spider) in the search for a non-threatening 
target (i.e., mushroom). Longer gaze durations on the threat distractors compared to neutral 
distractors, using the same neutral target, would indicate delay in disengaging from threat. 
Studies that have used this approach have generally supported an anxiety-related delay in 
disengagement in spider phobic populations (Rinck et al., 2005; Miltner et al., 2004). 
Similarly, Schofield and colleagues (2012) monitored eye movements during a dot-probe 
task and found that social anxiety was positively associated with longer latencies to 
disengage from angry face stimuli.  
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Some free viewing tasks have indexed disengagement from threat by comparing the 
length of visual fixations (e.g., first fixation duration) on threat such that longer fixations on 
threat relative to neutral stimuli would be consistent with a delay in disengaging. However, 
Rink and Becker (2006) assessed the length of the initial fixations on spider images and 
found that individuals with spider phobia had shorter initial fixation durations, indicating 
faster disengagement than low spider fearful individuals. Statistical comparisons were not 
done to compare the initial fixation durations on spiders versus neutral stimuli, such as 
mushrooms, so it is not clear whether a bias in attention was present. While these results are 
seemingly contrary to the hypothesis that high anxious populations have a greater delay in 
disengaging attention from threat, it is not known whether the end of the initial fixation 
indicated a move of attention away from the threat image or to another fixation on the same 
image. Participants make multiple fixations and if they continue to fixate on the same image, 
the end of the initial fixation would not necessarily indicate disengagement from the stimuli.  
A more representative measure of disengagement using eye movements may be the length 
of time participants spend looking at the initially fixated threat images compared to neutral 
images. That is, once participants have made their initial fixation on a threat image, how long 
do they continue to look at it compared to when they initially fixated on the neutral image? 
Garner, Mogg and Bradley (2006) used this index, termed first fixation gaze duration, and 
found that under a social stress condition (Study 2), those participants low in fear of negative 
evaluation looked at emotional faces (angry and happy) longer than neutral faces, but those 
high in this fear did not show any bias. Of note, these results are also not consistent with the 
maintenance hypothesis (Weierich et al., 2008). Furthermore, Armstrong and colleagues 
(2012) found no differences in those high and low in contamination fear in the first fixation 
gaze durations for contamination or general threat images. Rather, Quigley and colleagues 
(2012) found more generally that state anxiety delayed the disengagement of eye movements 
from threat images in all participants (relative to neutral), regardless of trait anxiety. One 
possible explanation for the discrepancy between free viewing and other attention tasks may 
be that the former designs are assessing participants’ tendencies to engage and disengage 
from stimuli when viewing threat paired with neutral information, and not necessarily their 
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ability to disengage. Testing the delay in disengagement hypothesis (Fox et al., 2001, 2002) 
likely requires more explicit instructions for shifting of attention (e.g., Gerdes et al., 2009). 
Nevertheless, understanding both the viewing preferences and attentional control abilities 
associated with anxiety are important in understanding the specific potential maladaptive 
attentional processes that may contribute to the development and persistence of anxiety 
disorders. 
 Attentional Avoidance. 1.5.5.4
In the same way that engagement has been assessed in eye movement studies, a bias away 
from threat can also be indicated by a bias score significantly below chance levels (e.g., a 
proportion below .5). However, it has become common in the literature to describe an 
attentional bias away from threat as avoidance (e.g., Cisler & Koster, 2010; Mogg & 
Bradley, 1998). That is, in free viewing tasks, when threat and neutral stimuli are paired and 
participants are significantly more likely to attend to the neutral relative to the threat stimuli, 
researchers have concluded that participants are avoiding the threatening information. An 
equivalent conclusion using this logic is that when participants show a bias towards threat, 
they are avoiding the neutral stimuli. The term avoidance, as it is used in the anxiety 
literature, suggest that there is a motivation to shift attention away (or at least the eyes) from 
threatening information. It is reasonable to expect that when shown two stimuli that 
participants will look at both images, without any necessary intent to avoid any information. 
Before such an inference can be made, research will need to assess whether attention away 
from threat in these studies is indicative of a motivation to avoid. Thus, for the purposes of 
this research, I will refer to this result as a bias away from threat, rather than making 
inferences about motivation. Nevertheless, a bias away from threat is most likely to take 
place later in the time course when an individual seemingly has greater control over their 
attentional abilities (Cisler & Koster, 2010).  
To date, very few studies have assessed attentional biases over an extended period of time 
against chance levels separately for high and low anxiety groups (Calvo & Avero, 2005; 
Hermans et al., 1999; Gamble & Rapee, 2010; Waechter et al., 2014). Calvo & Avero (2005) 
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found that HTA participants demonstrated a bias away from images of harm at several time 
intervals (1500-2000, 2000-2500 and 2500-3000 ms), while Hermans et al., (1999) found that 
high spider fearful individuals show a bias away from spiders at intervals 2000-2500 ms and 
2500-3000 ms after stimuli onset. In contrast, other studies have failed to find any bias away 
from images of threat in those with high trait-anxiety over 3000 ms (Calvo & Avero, 2005), 
from angry faces in those meeting DSM-IV criteria for social phobia over 5000 ms (Gamble 
& Rapee, 2010), and to angry and disgust faces in high socially anxious participants 
(Waechter et al., 2014).  
More commonly, studies have assessed “avoidance” as a between-subjects factor 
indicated by high anxious groups directing less attention to threat than low anxious groups 
(refer to section titled Defining Attentional Bias to Threat above for problems with this 
operationalization). Some  studies have found that high anxious, compared to low anxious 
populations, were less likely to view images of harm at 2000-2500 and 2500-3000 ms after 
stimuli onset (Calvo & Avero, 2005), images of emotional faces (angry and happy) at 1000-
1500 ms (Weiser et al., 1999),  and spiders from 500 ms to 3000 ms (Hermans et al., 1999). 
Similarly, Rinck and Becker (2006) found that over six 10-second intervals (60 seconds), 
high spider fearful individuals were significantly less likely to view spider stimuli than low 
spider fearful individuals and Armstrong and colleagues (2013) found that over six 3-second 
intervals (18 seconds) those with high injection fears reduced their viewing of injection 
images over time while those low in injection fears showed a more stable viewing over time 
relative to other stimuli. However, no anxiety group differences of this nature were found in 
other comparable studies (Armstrong et al., 2010; Armstrong et al., 2012; Gamble & Rapee, 
2010; Calvo & Avero, 2005; Schofield et al., 2012; Quigley et al., 2012; Waechter et al., 
2014) as well as in a meta-analysis of eye movement studies (Armstrong & Olantunji, 2012 
2012). Other studies have found evidence consistent with avoidance of threat, but have 
varied in their methodology such that it is difficult to compare to the extant literature (e.g., 
Becker & Detweiler-Bedell, 2009; Mühlberger et al., 2008; Rohner, 2002). Nevertheless, 
research assessing eye movements has provided some support for attentional biases away 
from threatening information at later stages of attentional engagement, (typically after 2000 
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ms), while differences between anxiety groups may appear as early as 500 ms. However, this 
effect is not found consistently across studies, suggesting that a bias away from threat may be 
more likely to occur to certain types of stimuli (e.g., no imminent threat) and/or in select 
populations (e.g., phobic fears).  
In sum, eye tracking technology can be used to assess the components and time course of 
attention more directly than through inferences from response time paradigms, thus, this 
approach may provide a more accurate and sensitive analysis of attention to threat over time. 
To date, eye movement research evaluating anxiety-related attentional biases has provided 
some evidence that anxious populations can show early facilitated attention towards threat, 
maintenance of attention on threat, delays with disengagement and attentional biases away 
from threat at later points in time (Cisler & Koster, 2010). Nevertheless, the results are 
largely mixed and relatively few studies have monitored eye movements. Furthermore, the 
extant literature ranges greatly in many essential factors, such as the type of stimuli, anxious 
samples, methodology, indices of attentional bias and analyses (e.g., within and between 
subject comparisons) that make clear interpretations a challenge. For instance, very few 
studies have assessed ABT to complex scenes over time using eye movements as a function 
of trait anxiety (Calvo & Avero, 2005; Quigley et al., 2012). Therefore, more systematic 
research of this nature is required to further our understanding of the factors that influence 
the components and time course of attention in order to comprehend how and when anxiety 
is associated with ABT (Weierich et al., 2008) and ultimately, what potential pathological 
attentional processes may be contributing to the development and persistence of anxiety and 
anxiety-related disorders.  
1.6 Current Program of Research 
The current program of research was designed to evaluate a central question: What is the 
continuous time course of selective visual attention towards threat stimuli as a function of 
trait anxiety? While the focus of this research was on anxiety as a relatively stable trait (as an 
indicator of vulnerability to anxiety disorders), the current research also assessed the effects 
of state anxiety in order to identify normative attentional processes associated with anxious 
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mood states that may be distinct and/or interact with trait anxiety in the selective attention to 
threat. Threat stimuli involved scenes where there was potential danger either in the image or 
directed at the viewer (e.g., someone holding a knife to a person’s throat, a gun pointed at the 
viewer). Scenes may be more ecologically valid than other commonly used stimuli (e.g., 
faces and words) in that they more closely approach the complex environments in which 
threat occurs. To improve on past research, we monitored eye movements to assess several 
components of attention, including initial orienting as an indication of facilitated attention 
(i.e., vigilance), as well as visual engagement and disengagement of threat over time. 
Assessing these multiple components and time course of attention allowed us to evaluate the 
phenomenological nature of anxiety-related attentional biases and to test the assumptions 
made by multiple models (e.g., Matthews & Mackintosh, 1998; Mogg & Bradley, 1998; 
Wells & Matthews, 1994; Williams et al., 1997) regarding the nature of anxiety-related ABT.  
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Chapter 2 
Study 1: Assessing the Time Course of Anxiety-Related 
 Attentional Biases to Threat  
2.1 Introduction 
The purpose of Study 1 was to evaluate the time course of visual selective attention to 
complex threat-related images as a function of trait anxiety by monitoring eye movements. 
Prior to this program of research, only one study to my knowledge had assessed ABT to 
complex images as function of trait anxiety using a free viewing paradigm with two 
competing images (Calvo & Avero, 2005). In this study, participants viewed threat, harm and 
positive images paired with neutral images that were projected on a large screen and eye 
movement behaviour was captured by video camera and calculated by raters. All emotional 
images that depicted people were paired with objects. To control for biases in attention 
towards people over objects (e.g., Garner et al., 2006) they included neutral-neutral pairs 
with one image involving people and the other an object and then subtracted this bias effect 
from the emotional image pair to form their bias indices. The reliability of these difference 
scores were not reported and could be poor due to the use of subtraction (Crocker & Algina, 
1986). This approach could account for their null bias results involving threat images over 
time, contrary to their hypotheses. Such biases may not be additive and thus, a more accurate 
evaluation of ABT would involve a direct comparison of images that involve similar content, 
but vary primarily (as much as possible) in emotionality rather than in both regards. Thus, the 
current program of research first sought to replicate (see Pashler & Harris, 2012 for the 
importance of direct replication) and extend previous research by improving the 
methodology of Calvo and Avero (2005) with more advanced eye tracking technology to 
address the following research questions:  
1) Do ABT only occur in HTA individuals or in all individuals?  
2) Do ABT vary as a function of trait anxiety, such that HTA individuals show greater 
attention to threat than mid or LTA individuals?  
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3) Are anxiety-related attentional biases characterized as facilitated orienting towards 
threat at the first fixations, maintenance of attention following the detection of threat, 
and/or attention directed away from threat (e.g., avoidance)?  
4) Are ABT moderated by time?  
5) Are ABT moderated by the type of negative stimuli, such that images depicting the 
potential for threat would be most related to trait anxiety or do biases occur to 
negative images more generally, including images where harm has already occurred?  
Of interest to our research questions were multiple components of attention, including the 
relative facilitated orienting of attention on the first fixations (i.e., proportion of first 
fixations), the length of time participants continued to gaze at images once they were first 
fixated before they disengaged and shifted attention from the image (i.e., first fixation gaze 
durations), and the relative time spent viewing the images over time (i.e., proportion of 
viewing time). Based on previous research and leading models of anxiety discussed above, 
we expected that HTA individuals would show early facilitated orienting towards threatening 
images on the initial fixations and during the first 500 ms of viewing relative to neutral 
images. Furthermore, we expected that these early attentional biases towards threat would be 
greater in HTA than in the mid and LTA individuals. In accordance with the attention 
maintenance hypothesis (Weierich et al., 2008), we expected that HTA participants would 
demonstrate longer gaze duration biases on threat images (relative to neutral) following the 
first fixations than LTA. Eye movements were recorded for 3000 ms to assess the time 
course of attention and for the potential for attention to be biased away from threatening 
images at later time points as predicted by the vigilance-avoidance hypothesis (Mogg & 
Bradley, 1998). Last, threat (the potential for harm) and harm images (where harm has 
already occurred) were included in this study to evaluate whether anxiety-related attentional 
biases were specific to images of potential threat of physical harm or to negative images of 
injury more generally.  
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2.2 Methods 
2.2.1 Participants 
Participants were sampled from undergraduate students who completed screening 
questionnaires for course credit and met the following inclusion criteria: 1) scored high (≥ 
47) or low (≤ 36) on the State-Trait Anxiety Inventory Trait version (STAI-Trait; 
Spielberger, Gorsuch, Lushene, Bagg & Jacobs, 1983); 2) scored less than 19 on the Beck 
Depression Inventory-II (BDI-II; Beck, Steer, & Brown, 1996), and responded to item 9 on 
the BDI-II with a 0 response assessing suicidal ideation (to control for moderate to high 
depressive symptoms, and to protect potentially vulnerable participants who might find the 
threatening images highly distressing), 3) scored 11 or below on the 20-item version of the 
Marlowe and Crowne Social Desirability Scale (SDS; Strahan & Gerbasi, 1972) and thereby 
less likely to underreport anxiety symptoms (e.g., Derakshan, Eysenck & Myers, 2007), and 
4) had normal or corrected-to-normal vision.  
A total of 185 participants attended the lab to participant in the current study.  Of these, 11 
participants did not have valid eye movement data due to calibration or other technical 
difficulties. Those participants whose STIA-T scores changed from the screening session to 
the lab session more than 2.5 SDs above the mean change (M = - .55, SD = 6.46) were also 
removed to ensure stability of measurement (n = 5).
 1
 The excluded participants did not differ 
from the remaining sample of 168 on age, gender, STIA-Trait or STIA-State, ps < .05.  
Trait anxiety groups were formed by a tertile split on the in lab administration of the STAI-
Trait (M = 39.63, Mdn = 38, SD = 8.71) resulting in 58 HTA, 52 Mid Trait Anxious (MTA) 
and 58 LTA. Participants had a mean age of 18.9 years (SD =1.79), 54% were female, and 
46% identified as White (30% as Asian, 12% as East Indian & 12% as another category). The 
LTA, MTA and HTA groups did not differ significantly in terms of age, F(2, 160) < 1, or 
gender, 2 (4, N = 168)= 5.37, p = .07.
2
  
                                                 
1
 Note that the test-re-test reliability between the screening and in-lab administrations of the STAI-Trait was .77 
2
 This marginal effect was due to a lower number of men (n = 17) in the MTA group relative to the women (n = 
35) while there were more equivalent ratios in the LTA (men n = 31; women n = 27) and HTA (men & women 
n = 29) groups.  
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2.2.2 Materials 
 Self-Report Measures  2.2.2.1
State-Trait Anxiety Inventory (STAI; Spielberger et al., 1983). The state (STAI-State) and 
trait (STAI-Trait) scales each list 20 symptoms of anxiety and participants are instructed to 
rate each according to how they feel in the present moment, and how they generally feel, 
respectively, using a 4-point Likert scale ranging from 0 (almost never) to 4 (almost always). 
The coefficient alphas for the STAI-State and STAI-Trait in the current sample were .92 and 
.93, respectively.  
Beck Depression Inventory – II (BDI-II; Beck et al., 1996). The BDI-II was used to screen 
out participants high in depressed mood and/or suicidal ideation. Participants rated 21-items 
on a 4-point scale on the extent that they have experienced specific depressive symptoms in 
the past 2 weeks. The coefficient alpha in the current sample was .92.  
Marlowe–Crowne Social Desirability Scale (SDS; Crowne & Marlowe, 1960; Strahan & 
Gerbasi, 1972). The 20-item short version of the scale was used to assess the tendency of 
participants to respond in a socially desirable manner on self-report measures. Participants 
rated statements about attitudes and traits as to whether each was a true or false description of 
themselves. The coefficient alpha reliability estimate for the current sample (N = 1850
3
) was 
.70.  
 Apparatus  2.2.2.2
Eye movements were tracked using an SR Research Ltd. EyeLink 1000 (Mississauga, 
Ontario, Canada) desktop mounted eye tracking system that has a single desk-mounted 
camera and IR Illuminator that tracks the pupil and corneal reflections for a single eye at a 
rate of once per millisecond (ms; 1000 Hz). Participants were positioned in a chin and 
forehead rest and situated approximately 63 cm from a 19 inch LCD colour monitor that had 
                                                 
3
 Data for 1850 of the 3788 potential participants was available for these analyses due to a change in when the 
SDS was administered. In the first term of data collection, participants completed the SDS in the lab session. 
However, it was then given in the screening questionnaires in subsequent terms to reduce the collection of 
unusable data. 
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a 1280 X 1024 resolution. Calibration was achieved using a 9-point location procedure with 
an average accuracy rating of .25° - .5° visual angle. Data were extracted using Data Viewer 
Software. The standard settings identifying saccades and fixations were used, such that a 
saccade was considered an eye movement that travels at least 30° per second or with an 
acceleration of at least 8000° per second per second; eye movements that were located on 
screen and did not meet this criteria were classified as fixations.  
 Stimuli 2.2.2.3
Two categories of threat-related images, selected from the International Affective Picture 
System (IAPS; Lang, Bradley & Cuthbert, 1999; See Appendix A), were formed based on 
previous research (Calvo & Avero, 2005) for the current Eye Movement Attention Task 
(EMAT). The threat images were selected as representing physical threat with the potential 
for injury to a person (e.g., a person holding a knife to someone’s throat), while the harm 
images involved physical harm that had already occurred to a person (e.g., someone with 
bruises and a black eye). The neutral control images were selected to match the negative 
images as best as possible in content, colour, and complexity by the researchers.  
The IAPS provides normative ratings for all images on a 9-point scale for affective valence 
(1 = unpleasant and 9 = pleasant) and arousal (1 = low arousal and 9 = high arousal). 
Average valence ratings were 2.3 (SD = .27) for the threat images, 1.9 (SD = .44) for the 
harm images, and 6.0 (SD = 1.1) for the neutral images. Average arousal ratings were 6.5 
(SD = .54) for the threat images, 6.4 (SD = .74) for the harm images, and 4.1 (SD = .68) for 
the neutral images. A MANOVA comparing the image categories (threat vs. harm vs. 
neutral) on valence and arousal ratings yielded a significant effect of image type, F(4, 106) = 
23.16, p < .001, ηp
2 
= .47, that was significant for both valence ratings, F(2, 53) = 156.43, 
MSE = .67, p < .001, ηp
2 
= .86, and arousal ratings, F(2, 53) = 82.94, MSE = .44, p < .001, ηp
2 
= .76. Post-hoc comparisons revealed that the threat and harm images were both significantly 
more negative in valence and arousal than the neutral images, ps < .001, but the threat and 
harm images did not differ significantly from one another on valence or arousal, ps > .05. 
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2.2.3 Procedure  
Participants meeting initial inclusion criteria completed the STAI-Trait and STAI-State, 
followed by the EMAT in the lab. In this task, participants were told that they would view 
image pairs, one involving “injury, violence and death”, and they were to look at these 
images as they wished. In the EMAT, a series of image pairs consisting of one negative 
image (threat or harm) and one neutral image were presented side- by-side (side was 
counterbalanced). Each picture was 512 X 384 pixels and was displayed 80 pixels from the 
center fixation location (2.8° visual angle), on a light-gray background. Each image pair was 
preceded by a fixation cross and once participants had fixated on the cross, the next pair was 
presented in order to ensure that participants’ gaze was fixated in the same center location 
before each image pair was shown. Image pairs were displayed for 3 seconds, followed by a 
500 ms interval before the next fixation cross appeared. Participants completed two practice 
trials, two filler trials and 28 test trials (14 threat and 14 harm image pairs). Before leaving 
the study session, participants were shown a video of babies laughing
4
 to improve their 
affective state and then asked to rate their current state on a 7 point scale (1=very negative; 
7=very positive) to ensure that they were not distressed before leaving. 
2.2.4 Eye Movement Indices 
 First Fixation Probability (FFP) 2.2.4.1
Following the procedures used by Gamble and Rapee (2010) and others (e.g., Calvo & 
Avero, 2005; Hermans et al. 1999), we calculated the probability of first fixation on the 
negative images compared to all initial fixations made on the image-pairs (e.g., frequency of 
first fixations on the threat images / [frequency of first fixations on the threat images + 
frequency of first fixations on the neutral images]). First fixations that were preceded by a 
blink or shorter than 100 ms were not used.  
                                                 
4
 Youtube video of babies laughing 
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 First Fixation Gaze Durations (FFGD) 2.2.4.2
Similar to Garner et al. (2006), we evaluated the maintenance of attention following the first 
fixation by calculating the average first fixation gaze durations (FFGD), or the average 
length of time before participants shifted their gaze off the image (i.e., outside the interest 
area). Time taken to make saccades was not included in this calculation given that visual 
information is not registered during saccades. If analyses indicate a significant effect between 
the negative and neutral images (e.g., bias), then the FFGD scores will be converted into first 
fixation gaze bias scores (FFGB) by subtracting the FFGD for the neutral images from each 
of the FFGD for the threat and harm image types. FFGB scores that are positive would thus 
indicate greater gaze bias on the negative images than the neutral images.   
 Proportion of Viewing Time (PVT) 2.2.4.3
We also followed procedures used by Calvo and Avero (2005) and others (e.g., Wieser et al., 
2009), by dividing the 3 second exposure duration for the image-pairs into six 500-
milisecond intervals, and then calculating the proportion of viewing time on the negative 
images relative to the matched neutral images for each of the 6 time intervals (e.g., viewing 
time of threat images / [total viewing time of the threat images + total viewing time of the 
neutral images]). The proportion of viewing time did not include time spent blinking, nor the 
length of time taken to make eye movements (saccades), since visual information is not 
perceived during these occasions. The six 500 ms intervals are labelled as follows: T1 = 0-
500 ms, T2 = 501-1000 ms, T3 = 1001-1500 ms, T4 = 1501-2000 ms, T5 = 2000-2500 ms, 
and T6 = 2501-3000 ms.  
For both the first fixation probability and the proportion of viewing time, values 
significantly above .5 indicate greater visual attention towards the threat-related images 
relative to the neutral control images (i.e., attentional bias towards threat), while values 
below .5 indicate greater visual attention towards the neutral control images relative to the 
threat-related target images (i.e., attentional bias away from threat). 
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2.3 Results 
2.3.1 Participants 
Multivariate analysis of variance (MANOVA) results confirmed a significant multivariate 
effect of the three trait anxiety groups on self-report measures of trait anxiety (STAI-Trait), 
state anxiety (STAI-State), and depression (BDI-II): F (6, 328) = 39.64, p < .001. Means, 
standard deviations, and results of the independent one-way ANOVAs for the self-report 
measures by trait anxiety group are shown in Table 1. Post-hoc comparisons (Least 
Significant Difference) revealed that all groups differed from one another on all three self-
report measures, ps < .01, in the expected directions.
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Table 1. Study 1: Self-Report Measures by Trait Anxiety Group 
    LTA (n = 58)   MTA (n = 52)   HTA (n = 58)       
Measure   M (SD)   M (SD)   M (SD)   F ηp
2
 
STAI-T 
 
30.69 (3.07) 
 
38.44 (2.75) 
 
49.62 (4.69) 
 
397.87*** .83 
STAI-S 
 
28.98 (5.73) 
 
34.79 (6.29) 
 
39.93 (8.52) 
 
35.75*** .30 
BDI-II  4.12 (3.76)   6.75 (4.35)   10.34 (4.77)  30.44*** .27 
Note. LTA = Low Trait Anxious; MTA = Mid Trait Anxious; HTA = High Trait Anxious; STAI-T =  
State Trait Anxiety Inventory – Trait; STAI-S = State Trait Anxiety Inventory – State; BDI-II = Beck  
Depression Inventory – II. 
*** p < .001 
 
40 
 
2.3.2 Eye Movement Indices 
For the eye movement indices calculated as proportions (i.e., proportion of first fixation, 
proportion of viewing time), analyses were first conducted to establish whether there were 
significant attentional biases present separate for each trait anxiety group and image type. 
Thus, one sample t-tests from .5 were used and we refer to these as the baseline bias 
analyses. Then analyses were conducted to assess whether the degree of attention bias varied 
as a function of trait anxiety group and image type with appropriate follow up analyses to 
evaluate the potential specificity and extremity of ABT as a vulnerability factor for anxiety 
(as advised by Cisler et al., 2009). However, for the FFGD scores, biases were first assessed 
by a within-subjects factor included in an ANOVA given that the scores for the negative and 
neutral images are independent of one another. If this analysis resulted in a significant effect 
involving the bias factor, then bias scores were calculated and an ANOVA was used to assess 
whether the degree of FFGB varied as a function of trait anxiety group and image type, with 
appropriate follow-up analyses. Lastly, if there were significant biases in the FFGD, each 
bias score would be evaluated separately by trait anxiety group and image type from 0, 
similarly to the baseline bias analyses for the proportion indices.  
For each ANOVA involving the eye movement indices, trait anxiety group (low vs. mid 
vs. high) was always a between-subjects factor, image type (threat vs. harm) was a within-
subject factor and time was a within-subjects factor (T1 – T6). When the within-subject 
effects violated the assumptions of sphericity, the effects were adjusted using the 
Greenhouse-Geisser correction (adj. df indicates the adjusted degrees of freedom). Least 
Significant Difference (LSD) comparisons were used for all between-subject post-hoc 
analyses and an alpha of p <.05 was used for all analyses. 
 Proportion of First Fixations 2.3.2.1
The PFF means and standard deviations by trait anxiety group and image type and the 
baseline bias analyses are listed in Table 2. In sum, there were no significant biases involving 
threat or harm images in any of the trait anxiety groups.  
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To determine whether trait anxiety or image type influenced the PFF on the threat-related 
images, a mixed 3 (trait anxiety group: low vs. mid vs. high) x 2 (image type: threat vs. 
harm) repeated measures mixed ANOVA was conducted. There was no significant main 
effect of trait anxiety group, F(2, 165) < 1, a marginal difference between threat and harm 
images, F(1, 165) = 3.68, MSE = .008, p = .057, ηp
2
 = .02, and no significant anxiety group 
by image type interaction, F(2, 165) < 1. Thus, contrary to our hypotheses, trait anxiety had 
no significant effect on initial orienting.
5
   
Next, we followed up these analyses with one-sample t-tests comparing the PFF on the 
threat and harm images against a probability of .5 collapsed across trait anxiety group. These 
analyses revealed no significant bias towards threat images, t (167) = .26, p = .79, but a 
significant (but small) bias away from harm images, t (167) = -2.11, p = .04, that was only 
found when using the power of the full sample.  
 
  
                                                 
5
 When the STAI-Trait is used as a covariate in this analysis rather than a between-subjects factor, the trait 
anxiety effects still do not reach or near significance.  
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Table 2. Study 1: First Fixation Indices by Trait Anxiety Group and Image Type 
      LTA (n = 58)   MTA (n = 52)   HTA (n = 58)   Full Sample (N = 168) 
Index and Image Type M (SD)   M (SD)   M (SD)   M (SD) 
Proportion of First Fixation 
            
Threat .50 (.11) 
 
.50 (.12) 
 
.50 (.11) 
 
.50 (.11) 
 
Harm .48 (.10) 
 
.48 (.10) 
 
.49 (.11) 
 
.48* (.10) 
First Fixation Gaze Durations (ms) 
           
Threat 756.43 (327.91) 
 
720.65 (303.68) 
 
726.83 (294.45) 
 
735.13 (307.67) 
 
Neutral w/Threat 877.68 (357.58) 
 
827.14 (312.24) 
 
774.34 (310.72) 
 
826.36 (329.00) 
 
Harm 699.82 (371.22) 
 
683.27 (372.56) 
 
735.90 (387.36) 
 
707.15 (375.66) 
 
Neutral w/Harm 904.31 (377.69) 
 
919.82 (413.83) 
 
712.62 (292.66) 
 
842.94 (373.19) 
First Fixation Gaze Bias (ms) 
            
Threat -121.25* (455.29) 
 
-106.50' (400.50) 
 
-47.51 (328.02) 
 
-- -- 
 Harm -204.49** (554.57)  -236.56** (597.06)  23.28 (455.41)  -- -- 
Note. LTA = Low Trait Anxious; MTA = Mid Trait Anxious; HTA = High Trait Anxious.  
* p < .05. ** p < .01. ' p < .09 
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 First Fixation Gaze Durations 2.3.2.2
Participants with FFGD scores greater than 3 standard deviations (SD) above the mean per 
image category type (e.g., threat, neutral when shown with threat) were replaced with a value 
at 3 SD to ensure that means were not unduly influenced by outlying values. Two 
participants in each of the neutral image type conditions and 3 participants in each of the 
negative image type conditions were above this cut off and were adjusted accordingly. The 
resulting average FFGD and FFGB scores by trait anxiety group are listed in Table 2. 
To determine whether there were differences between the negative and neutral images 
(i.e., biases) for the FFGD and whether trait anxiety or image type influenced the FFGD on 
the negative images, a mixed 3 (trait anxiety: low vs. mid vs. high) x 2 (image type: threat vs. 
harm) x 2 (negative bias: negative vs. neutral) repeated measures ANOVA was conducted. 
This analysis resulted in a main effect of negative bias, F (1, 165) = 11.94, MSE = 
187211.02, p = .001, ηp
2 
= .07, a marginal interaction involving negative bias and trait 
anxiety group, F (2, 165) = 2.44, MSE = 187211.02, p = .09, ηp
2 
= .03, that were subsumed 
under a 3-way interaction involving negative bias, trait anxiety group and image type, F (2, 
165) = 4.30, MSE = 36004.95, p = .015, ηp
2 
= .05.  
To interpret this interaction, bias scores were calculated for threat and harm images 
separately and a mixed 3 (trait anxiety: low vs. mid vs. high) x 2 (image type: threat vs. 
harm) repeated measures mixed ANOVA was conducted on the FFGB scores. This analysis 
revealed a marginal main effect of trait anxiety group, F (2, 165) = 2.44, MSE = 374422.04, p 
= .091, ηp
2 
= .03 and a trait anxiety group by image type interaction, F (2, 165) = 4.30, MSE 
= 72009.90, p = .015, ηp
2 
= .05. Next, we assessed the effect of trait anxiety group for threat 
and harm image types separately with one-way ANOVAs. For threat images, there was no 
significant effect of trait anxiety group, F (2, 165) < 1, but for harm images this effect 
reached significance, F (2, 165) = 3.94, MSE = 288073.88, p = .02. Post-hoc comparisons 
revealed that the HTA group had significantly less bias (lower FFGB scores) than the MTA 
and LTA groups, ps < .05, but that the MTA and LTA groups did not differ from one 
another, p = .75. Of note, the FFGB bias scores for the MTA and LTA groups were negative, 
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indicating greater FFGD on neutral than harm images. In other words, the MTA and LTA 
groups showed a bias towards neutral images relative to harm images, while the HTA group 
showed no biases in gaze duration.   
Lastly, to test for attentional biases from chance, one-sample t-tests were used from 0 
separately by image type and trait anxiety group. The results are listed in Table 2. In sum, the 
HTA group did not show any significant biases. However, the LTA group showed a bias 
away from threat and harm relative to neutral, while the MTA group showed a bias away 
from harm images and a marginal bias away from threat images, p = .086.  
 Proportion of Viewing Time  2.3.2.3
The PVT means and standard deviations by trait anxiety group, image type and time point are 
listed in Table 3, along with the baseline bias analyses results. In sum, all trait anxiety groups 
show significant biases towards threat and harm images at T2 and T3 (500-1500 ms) and 
only the HTA group’s bias towards harm images at T1 reached significance.   
To assess the attentional biases over time as a function of trait anxiety, we conducted a 
mixed 3 (trait anxiety: low vs. mid vs. high) x 2 (image type: threat vs. harm) x 6 (time: T1 
vs. T2 vs. T3 vs. T4 vs. T5 vs. T6) repeated measures ANOVA on PVT.
6
 This analysis 
revealed a significant main effect of image type, F (1, 164) = 10.48, MSE = 0.2, p < .001, ηp
2 
= .06, with greater bias on harm images (M = .54, SD = .14) than threat images (M = .51, SD 
= .09), and a significant effect of time, F (2.44, 399.37 adj. df) = 35.55, MSE = .05, p < .001, 
ηp
2 
= .18. The within-subjects contrasts indicated a significant time function as high as the 4
th
 
order, F (1, 164) = 7.79, MSE = .009, p < .01, ηp
2 
= .05, but the data, as displayed in Table 3, 
appeared to have two primary bends in the 3 second duration, suggesting a cubic time course, 
F (1, 164) = 72.60, MSE = .019, p < .001, ηp
2 
= .31. These effects were both subsumed under 
an image type by time interaction, F (3.48, 570.47 adj. df) = 3.27, MSE = .015, p = .016, ηp
2 
= 
.02. No effects of trait anxiety group reached significance, all Fs > 1. 
                                                 
6
 Note that 1 participant did not have valid time course data due to technical difficulties and thus, are not 
included in the PVT analyses.  
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Table 3. Study 1: Proportion of Viewing Time by Trait Anxiety Group and Image Type  
    LTA (n = 58)   MTA (n = 52)   HTA (n = 58)   Full Sample (N = 168) 
             Proportion of Viewing Time M (SD)   M (SD)   M (SD)   M (SD) 
Threat 
            
T1 (0-500) .50 (.13) 
 
.50 (.11) 
 
.51 (.10) 
 
.50 (.11) 
 
T2 (501-1000) .58*** (.13) 
 
.55* (.14) 
 
.59*** (.13) 
 
.57*** (.13) 
 
T3 (1001-1500) .55* (.16) 
 
.55* (.16) 
 
.55** (.13) 
 
.55*** (.15) 
 
T4 (1501-2000) .51 (.15) 
 
.51 (.18) 
 
.48 (.16) 
 
.50 (.16) 
 
T5 (2001-2500) .49 (.16) 
 
.46 (.19) 
 
.47 (.18) 
 
.48 (.18) 
 
T6 (2500-3000) .47 (.15) 
 
.47 (.19) 
 
.47 (.19) 
 
.47* (.17) 
Harm 
            
T1 (0-500) .51 (.12) 
 
.52 (.10) 
 
.53* (.10) 
 
.52** (.11) 
 
T2 (501-1000) .63*** (.16) 
 
.61*** (.18) 
 
.64*** (.14) 
 
.63*** (.16) 
 
T3 (1001-1500) .61*** (.19) 
 
.57* (.21) 
 
.60*** (.16) 
 
.59*** (.19) 
 
T4 (1501-2000) .53 (.21) 
 
.50 (.23) 
 
.53 (.20) 
 
.52 (.21) 
 
T5 (2001-2500) .49 (.21) 
 
.47 (.24) 
 
.49 (.21) 
 
.49 (.22) 
 T6 (2500-3000) .47 (.22)  .45 (.23)  .47 (.22)   .47* (.22) 
Note. Note. LTA = Low Trait Anxious; MTA = Mid Trait Anxious; HTA = High Trait Anxious  
* p < .05. **  p < .01. *** p < .001. ' p < .09.
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To interpret this interaction, paired samples t-tests were used to compare the PVT between 
image types at each of the 6 time points. These analyses revealed greater biases towards harm 
than threat images at T2 (501-1000 ms), t(167) = 5.1, p < .001 and T3 (1001 – 1500 ms), 
t(167) = 2.98, p < .01, a similar marginal effect at T1, t(167) = 1.94, p = .055, but no 
significant differences at T4 through T6, ts(167) = -.27 – 1.62, ps > .10.  
Next, to understand the effect of time, a series of one-sample t-tests comparing the 
proportion of time spent viewing the threat and harm images relative to the neutral images 
against a probability of .5 in each time interval was conducted collapsed across trait anxiety 
group. These results are listed in Table 3. In sum, biases towards threat images were shown 
at T2 and T3 and away from threat at T6. For harm images, biases were shown towards harm 
at T1 through T3, and a bias away from harm at T6. These general patterns are consistent 
with a vigilance-avoidance pattern over time. 
Lastly, we calculated the correlations between the eye movement indices and trait and 
state anxiety scores, given our primary interest in the associations between anxiety and 
viewing behaviour when presented with threat and harm images. The results are listed in 
Table 4. The STAI-Trait and STAI-State were positively correlated, r = .64, p <.001. Of 
note, there was a small positive association between trait anxiety and the FFGB for harm 
images, consistent with the ANOVA results reported above. There were also some small 
negative associations between state anxiety and the PVT for threat images at relatively late 
time points (T4 & T5). Thus, the greater the level of state anxiety, the less participants 
looked at threat between 1501 and 2500 ms. Overall however, there were no strong 
associations between anxiety, either trait or state, and ABT. 
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Table 4. Study 1: Correlations among Trait and State Anxiety and Eye Movement 
Indices  
      Anxiety 
Index and Image Type Trait State 
Proportion of First Fixations 
   
Threat -.05 -.02 
 
Harm -.01 -.03 
First Fixation Gaze Durations 
   
Threat -.02 -.03 
 
Neutral w/Threat -.09 -.21** 
 
Harm .04 .00 
 
Neutral w/Harm -.18* -.21** 
First Fixation Gaze Bias 
   
Threat .05 .15' 
 
Harm .16* .14' 
Proportion of Viewing Time 
   
Threat 
  
  
T1 (0-500) .08 .04 
  
T2 (501-1000) .06 .01 
  
T3 (1001-1500) .03 .00 
  
T4 (1501-2000) -.14' -.16* 
  
T5 (2001-2500) -.09 -.19* 
  
T6 (2500-3000) -.06 -.14' 
 
Harm 
  
  
T1 (0-500) .02 -.02 
  
T2 (501-1000) .01 -.05 
  
T3 (1001-1500) -.04 -.07 
  
T4 (1501-2000) -.04 -.08 
  
T5 (2001-2500) -.05 -.10 
  T6 (2500-3000) -.03 -.07 
Note. Trait = State-Trait Anxiety Inventory – Trait;  
State = State-Trait Anxiety Inventory – State.  
* p < .05. ** p < .01. ' p < .08 
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2.4 Discussion 
The purpose of Study 1 was to evaluate the time course of visual selective attention to threat-
related images as a function of trait anxiety in attempts to reveal the nature of anxiety-related 
ABT. We assessed both within-subject and between-subject attentional bias effects and each 
of the research questions and hypotheses will be addressed below.  
Based on the models of anxiety-related ABT and extant literature (e.g., Armstrong & 
Olantunji, 2012; Bar-Haim et al., 207; Mathew & Mackintosh, 1998, Mogg & Bradley, 
1998), it was first hypothesized that HTA participants would show early facilitated orienting 
towards threat-related images on the initial fixations and during the first 500 ms of viewing 
relative to neutral images. Overall, the current data do not support this hypothesis. On the 
first fixations, the HTA group was not more likely to shift their eye movements towards 
threat or harm images than to neutral stimuli. For the relative viewing during the first 500 ms, 
the HTA group showed a small, but significant, bias towards harm images, yet not towards 
threat images. Of note, the LTA and MTA displayed no early facilitated orienting of attention 
to the negative stimuli. Thus, in contrast to some  previous eye movement research (e.g., 
Calvo & Avero, 2005; Gamble & Rapee, 2010; Hermans et al., 1999; Quigley et al., 2012; 
Wieser et al.,  2009) little evidence of facilitated attention to threat in HTA participants was 
found. Similar null results have been found in other published studies for first fixation biases 
(Gerdes, et al, 2008; Rinck & Becker, 2006; Waechter et al., 2014) and duration biases 
within the first 500 ms (Calvo & Avero, 2005 for threat images; Quigley et al., 2012; 
Waechter et al., 2014), with no clear methodological distinction for these mixed results. Of 
note, when such facilitated attention effects have been found, they have been relatively small 
in magnitude (e.g., Calvo & Avero, 2005; Quigley et al., 2012).  
Furthermore, we hypothesized that early ABT threat would be greater in HTA than in 
LTA and MTA participants; however the current data also did not support this prediction. 
There were no significant trait anxiety effects on the tendency to make initial fixations to 
negative images relative to neutral, or on the relative viewing time in the first 500 ms. Other 
studies have also failed to find differences in anxious groups on the first fixation biases 
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(Armstrong et al., 2013; Armstrong et al., 2010 for disgust faces; Garner et al., 2006; 
Schofield et al., 2012; Waechter et al., 2014; Quigley et al., 2012) and duration biases in the 
first 500 ms (Armstrong et al., 2012; Armstrong et al., 2013; Hermans et al. 1999; Rohner, 
2002; Quigley et al., 2012; Waechter et al., 2014), despite others finding such effects 
(Armstrong et al., 2010 for fearful faces; Calvo & Avero, 2005; Mogg & Bradley, 2007; 
Pflugshaupt et al., 2005; Rinck & Becker, 2006; Wieser et al., 2009). Clearly, the eye 
movement literature, like the response time research, has not revealed consistent results that 
would fully support the vigilance hypothesis, indicating that such facilitated orienting biases 
do not likely occur in all conditions and it will be important to identify potential moderators.   
In part, methodological factors may account for some mixed results. The current literature 
has used a range of eye movement tasks (e.g., dot probe, visual search, free viewing), but 
even within the free viewing studies, there are notable differences in samples (e.g., trait 
anxiety, social anxiety, contamination fears, spider fears), threat stimuli (e.g., scenes, faces, 
spiders), control stimuli (e.g., objects versus people), stimulus durations (e.g., 3 – 60 
seconds) and there are no replications yet published on which to base firm conclusions. The 
current study design and stimuli were most similar to Calvo & Avero (2005), however they 
found first fixation biases towards threat and harm images and biases in viewing time in the 
first 500 ms for harm images (not for threat). The different results could be due to 
methodology, such that they displayed the images on a large projection screen that may have 
made the images appear more threatening than those presented on a computer screen, 
particularly for high-anxious participants, and could increase the potential to detect 
observable biases. Nevertheless, other research has found facilitated attention effects using a 
computer screen and similar images (e.g., Quigley et al., 2012). Theoretically, the current 
design should result in trait anxiety related early ABT if HTA individuals show a greater 
preference for viewing threat-related relative to neutral stimuli than LTA.  
Another more likely explanation for these discrepant results in facilitated attention is that 
the reliability of the first fixation indices is poor (Waechter et al., 2014). In the current study, 
the image pairs were presented side-by-side and participants tended to look at the left image 
first, regardless of the image content. The probability that the initial fixations were made on 
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the left image was .76, well above chance levels, p < .001. Previous research has found a bias 
towards threat stimuli when presented in the left hemifield (i.e., threat-neutral), but not in the 
right hemifield (i.e., neutral-threat), suggesting a right hemisphere advantage in processing 
emotional information (e.g., Alpers, 2008; Calvo & Nummenmaa, 2007). However, in the 
current study, there were no significant first fixation biases in either the left or right 
hemifield, suggesting that a laterality effect was not responsible for the large probability of 
looking left. It may be that presenting stimuli on a computer screen, as opposed to a large 
projection screen, as in Calvo and Avero (2005), naturally evokes a left to right visual 
response, thus reducing the likelihood of initial fixations being made to material in the right 
visual field. A similar bias has been found in vertical stimulus presentations towards images 
above a central fixation cross over those below, and such biases are problematic for the 
reliability of early ABT indices (Waechter et al., 2014).  
These results are consistent with research demonstrating that movement of attention is 
more efficient in a top-to-bottom direction and left-to-right direction relative to the opposite 
directions (e.g., Spalek & Hammad, 2004) and the left-to-right bias in shifting attention 
seems to be associated with the direction of text reading and writing rather than a 
hemispheric specialization (Spalek & Hammad, 2005). Thus, free viewing paradigms are 
based on the assumption that participants are equally likely to look left or right, but that is not 
the case. In attempts to reduce this initial bias in attention and improve the ability to measure 
ABT more reliability at the first fixations, future research might benefit from presenting the 
images in an unpredictable fashion (e.g., randomly vertically and horizontally), although this 
approach would not likely eliminate the bias given that it occurs for both images on the left 
and top positions. Rather, ABT to threat may be more reliability measured in a free viewing 
task by attention at later points in time (Waechter et al., 2014).   
Moreover, the hypothesis that HTA participants will demonstrate gaze duration biases on 
threat (relative to neutral) following the first fixations and that these biases will be greater for 
HTA than LTA, as predicted by the attention maintenance hypothesis (Weierich et al., 2008), 
was also not supported. Rather, the current data suggest that HTA show no differences 
between the length of time they gazed at negative and neutral images when they were fixated 
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first, similar to Garner and colleagues (2006; Study 2 only), but the LTA and HTA spent less 
time fixating on negative than neutral images. In other words, non-anxious individuals 
disengaged from negative images sooner than neutral images, whereas anxious individuals 
did not. This trait anxiety (between-group) effect should not be interpreted as anxious 
participants maintaining their attention on threat given the lack of difference between threat 
and neutral stimuli. Rather, examination of the gaze durations (Table 2) suggests that these 
bias results are largely due to LTA and MTA viewing the neutral images longer (when paired 
with negative images) than the HTA rather than differences in how they view the negative 
images. Similarly, the correlational results (Table 4) indicated that state anxiety was 
negatively associated with the first fixation gaze durations on neutral images (when paired 
with threat and harm), but not with negative images, such that greater levels of anxiety was 
associated with less maintenance of attention to neutral images. These results may suggest 
that state anxiety increases a vigilant search for negative images (hypervigilance; Richards et 
al., 2014), shifting attention off of the neutral images more quickly or that low anxiety (trait 
and/or state) delays shifting attention to threat when they first fixate on the neutral stimuli. 
Nevertheless, the current results are not consistent with Weierich and colleagues’ (2008) 
attention maintenance hypothesis. 
Rather, the current data suggest that attention to threat changes over time and the time 
course is consistent with a general vigilance-avoidance pattern, irrespective of trait anxiety 
levels. That is, biases towards threat images reached significance at time segments between 
501 and 1500 ms after the stimuli onset, and then shifted away from threat over time that 
then reached a significant bias away at the final time interval (2501-3000 ms). Similarly, 
significant biases towards harm images were found at the first three time intervals (0-1500 
ms) and then away from harm at the final interval (2501-3000 ms). These results are highly 
consistent with the time course found in a similar studies using threat images (Quigley et al. 
2012) and to fear and disgust faces (Waechter et al., 2014) in our lab, although in these 
studies, the attentional bias away from threat-related stimuli did not reach the required level 
of significance. Other studies have found somewhat similar (Armstrong et al., 2010; Gamble 
& Rapee, 2010; Hermans et al., 1999; Rohner, 2002) or different patterns of attention over 
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time (Armstong et al., 2013; Buckner et al., 2010; Calvo & Avero, 2005; Rinck & Becker, 
2006; Wieser et al., 2009), however due to multiple methodological differences (e.g., anxious 
samples, threat stimuli type, control stimuli type, stimuli arrangements, stimuli durations, 
stimuli interval length) it is difficult to compare across studies.  More direct replication and 
extension studies are needed to clarify the seemingly inconsistent results.  
Lastly, a qualitative comparison of threat and harm images did not reveal any clear 
specificity of ABT to potential threat over negative images in general. Rather, participants 
showed greater biases towards harm images early in viewing (0 – 1500 ms) than to threat 
images. This difference was not found in Calvo and Avero (2005) and given that the image 
types were similar in valence and arousal, it is unclear what might account for this difference 
in viewing behaviour. Calvo and Avero (2005) suggest that threat and harm images likely 
elicit different emotional and physiological responses (Lang, Greenwald, Bradley, & Hamm, 
1993) with threat corresponding to fear and/or anxiety and harm associated with sadness 
and/or disgust. Perhaps harm images that elicit sadness are attended to and processed in more 
detail (e.g., Gasper & Clore, 2002) than those that elicit anxiety (e.g., Jefferies, Smilek, Eich, 
& Enns, 2008) leading to a greater proportion of viewing relatively early in the time course 
of viewing novel images. In the current design, we do not know what emotions were elicited 
by the images, or even whether the images were appraised as negative and/or threatening, 
which would be important to assess in order to understand the current results. Furthermore, in 
the current study, HTA participants did not show significant biases away from harm images 
late in the time course as was found in Calvo and Avero (2005). Rather, there was a very 
small bias away from harm images at the first fixations and small biases away from threat 
and harm images between 2500 – 3000 ms (in the full sample only). While these results 
could indicate some avoidance of threat, the motivation of participants is not known and it 
could simply be that once participants have detected and viewed the emotional image to their 
liking, they shift their attention to the next most salient stimulus, the neutral image. 
Nevertheless, given the discrepant results, further research on the qualitative nature of threat-
related and negative stimuli is needed in order to identify maladaptive attentional processes 
that are specific to threat.   
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In sum, the current results suggest that when viewing threat-related images in a free 
viewing task, there is little evidence to support the vigilance, maintenance or vigilance-
avoidance hypotheses. That is, there were no consistent anxiety-related effects of facilitated 
orienting to threat prior to 500 ms, attention maintenance on threat following the first 
fixations, or avoidance of threat over time (i.e., that varied as a function of trait anxiety). 
However, in general, attentional biases towards negative images were found relatively early 
(500 – 1000 ms) and then reduced over time such that attention was more often directed 
towards the neutral images late in the time course (2501-3000 ms). These results suggest that 
HTA individuals do not simply have a preference for viewing threat-related images relative 
to neutral images more or less than others do when assessed in the current unconstrained 
design. What conditions then are also needed in order for ABT effects to occur? One of the 
most likely factors noted in some leading models of anxiety-related ABT, but not often 
assessed empirically, is the level of state anxiety.  
To date, anxiety-related ABT are generally thought to be associated with trait anxiety with 
relatively minimal consideration to within-subject differences of the current state of anxiety. 
Consequently, ABT has been much more frequently studied as a function of trait factors 
(e.g., trait anxiety, social anxiety) without assessing or manipulating state levels of anxiety 
(Bar-Haim et al., 2007). However, both trait (see Armstrong & Olatunji, 2012 and Bar-Haim 
et al., 2007 for reviews) and state anxiety (e.g., Bradley et al., 2000; Fox et al., 2001; Mogg 
et al., 1997; Quigley et al., 2012) have been associated with greater ABT. Not surprisingly, 
these two constructs are highly related and thus, it is often difficult to separate their relative 
effects. 
Theoretically, some models hypothesize that state anxiety plays an important role in the 
biasing of attention towards threat. For instance, Mogg and Bradley (1998) note that “in the 
absence of stress, there may be little apparent difference between high and LTA individuals 
in their preattentive and attentional biases for aversive stimuli. However, when state anxiety 
or stress levels increase, HTA individuals will become vigilant for threat. This implies that 
the vigilant attentional style is a latent, rather than manifest, vulnerability factor for anxiety” 
(p. 827). Similarly, Matthews & Mackintosh (1998) write that “because attentional bias is 
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supposed to arise from an interaction between existing threat values and current anxiety 
level, we would therefore predict vigilance effects in HTA individuals, but only when state-
anxiety levels are also elevated” (p. 551).  
Despite these theoretical claims, relatively few studies have manipulated state anxiety in 
the assessment of ABT (see Bar-Haim et al., 2007) and even fewer have attempted to 
manipulate state anxiety when assessing eye movement indices of ABT (Garner et al., 2006; 
Mühlberger et al., 2008; Quigley et al., 2012). Garner and colleagues (2006) measured eye 
movement in two studies, first without any manipulation where they did not find evidence of 
anxiety-related ABT. When they added a social-evaluative stress condition, they then found 
some evidence of facilitated orienting towards emotional faces in socially anxious 
participants that differed from those low in social anxiety. As previously noted, these results 
could be due to an interaction between trait (social anxiety) and state (stress) factors or 
simply to state factors alone since the anxiety groups differed in both. Quigley et al. (2012) 
attempted to separate the effects of trait and state anxiety and found that experimental 
induction of state anxiety, relative to a baseline state condition, increased the maintenance of 
attention on threat-related images (relative to neutral images) following the first fixation over 
a 3000 ms time course. Contrary to expectations, these biases were not moderated by trait 
anxiety, suggesting that greater maintenance of attention on threat stimuli may be largely a 
function of state anxiety. However, it is possible that this study did not have sufficient power 
to detect the between-subject differences of trait anxiety given that there were relatively few 
trials (10 threat-neutral images per image set) and some of the trials provided variable results 
(i.e., image set effect, as discussed in Quigley et al., 2012), thus further research is needed to 
clarify the relative contribution of trait and state anxiety. Lastly, Mühlberger and colleagues 
(2008) were not successful in significantly manipulating state anxiety in socially anxious 
participants leaving their results difficult to interpret in this respect. With so few studies 
assessing the influence of state anxiety on the multiple components of attention, it is 
important to assess whether ABT are more likely to be found when trait-anxious participants 
are also in a state of anxiety as indicated by theoretical models (Matthew & Mackintosh, 
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1998; Mogg & Bradley, 1998). Such data could help explain, at least in part, some 
inconsistencies in the literature and help clarify the nature of anxiety-related ABT.    
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Chapter 3 
Study 2: State Anxiety and the Time Course of Attentional Biases to Threat 
3.1 Introduction 
The purpose of Study 2 was to evaluate the research questions outlined in Study 1 when 
participants were in an elevated state of anxiety. That is, we expected that when participants 
increased their level of state anxiety, HTA individuals would show early facilitated orienting 
towards threatening images on the initial fixations and during the first 500 ms of viewing 
relative to neutral images. Furthermore, when in a state of anxiety, these early attentional 
biases towards threat would be greater in HTA than in the mid and LTA individuals, as 
predicted by the vigilance hypothesis. Consistent with the maintenance hypothesis (Weierich 
et al., 2008), we expected that HTA participants would demonstrate longer gaze duration 
biases on threat images (relative to neutral) following the first fixations on threat images, and 
that such a bias in the maintenance in attention would be greater in HTA than LTA 
participants.  
To assess whether biases in attention are specific to negative information or emotional 
images more generally, we included positive images for comparison to the threat and harm 
images. In general, models of anxiety-related ABT (e.g., Mogg & Bradley, 1998) predict that 
because anxiety functions to assist in the detection of threat, attentional biases should result 
specifically for threat-related stimuli rather than emotional stimuli in general (see Calvo & 
Avero, 2005). That is, models suggest the negativity hypothesis over the emotionality 
hypothesis, respectively. While the research often supports this specificity of attention to 
threat (e.g., Bradley et al., 1998, 2000; Fox et al., 2001, 2002; Mogg & Bradley, 1999), other 
studies suggest similar attentional bias effects for positive stimuli as well, consistent with the 
emotionality hypothesis (Calvo & Avero, 2005; Fox et al., 2001, experiment 3; Fox et al., 
2002, experiment 1; Quigley et al., 2012). Given that this research has largely measured 
facilitated orienting (i.e., vigilance), further research is needed to assess the specificity of 
ABT on multiple components of attention over time in order to identify the potential 
maladaptive attentional processes that are particular to threat.   
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Lastly, an additional purpose was to assess participants’ appraisals or ratings of the stimuli 
valance (i.e., negativity) and arousal in order to evaluate whether trait anxiety is associated 
with the extent that participants rate threat-related stimuli as negative and arousing. Models 
of ABT propose that HTA individuals will rate negative images as more negative and 
arousing than LTA and it is this bias in appraisal of stimuli that results in greater ABT (e.g., 
Mogg & Bradley, 1998). 
3.2 Method 
3.2.1 Participants 
One hundred and fifty-four undergraduate students enrolled in psychology courses who 
met the initial inclusion criteria described in Study 1 attended the lab for the current study. 
Of these, 11 participants could not be calibrated on the eye tracker and/or had incomplete eye 
movement data and were removed from the analyses. Participants whose STAI-Trait scores 
changed from the screening session to the lab session more than 2.5 SDs above the mean 
change (M = - 0.59, SD = 5.88) were also removed (n = 5) to ensure stable measurement. The 
excluded participants did not differ from the remaining sample of 138 on age, gender, STAI-
Trait or STAI-State scores, ps > .05.  Trait anxiety groups were formed with a tertile split on 
the STAI-Trait (M = 41.3, Mdn = 40.50, SD = 88.30) resulting in 41 HTA, 53 MTA and 44 
LTA participants. The sample had a mean age of 19.83 years (SD = 2.18) and 65% were 
female.
7
 The LTA, MTA and HTA groups did not differ significantly in terms of age, F(2, 
132) = 1.39, p = .25 or gender, 2 (4, N = 138) = 2.15, p = .71.  
3.2.2 Materials  
 Additional Self-Report Measures 3.2.2.1
The Positive and Negative Affect Schedule (PANAS; Watson, Clark, & Tellegen, 1988) was 
used to assess state affect. This measure contains two scales that assess negative affect (NA) 
and positive affect (PA), each with 10 associated emotion words. Participants rated the extent 
                                                 
7
 The ethnicity profile of the sample was very similar to Study 1.  
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to which they felt each emotion word in that moment on a 5-point scale (1 = very slightly or 
not at all; 5 = extremely). The measure was administered at baseline prior to the anxious state 
induction (pre-induction), after the state induction (post-induction), and following the 
attention task (post-EMAT) (Cronbach’s α for NA: .81, .87, and .90, respectively; PA: .87, 
.89, and .96, respectively). 
 Stimuli  3.2.2.2
As in Study 1, two categories of negative images (threat and harm) were used from the IAPS; 
Lang, Bradley & Cuthbert, 1999; See Appendix B), Fourteen positive images were also 
selected based on the valence ratings. The neutral control images were selected to match the 
negative and positive images as best as possible in content, colour, and complexity. 
Average valence ratings were 2.3 (SD = .27) for the threat images, 2.0 (SD = .47) for the 
harm images, 5.4 (SD = .82) for the neutral images, and 7.6 (SD = .38) for the positive 
images. Average arousal ratings were 6.5 (SD = .54) for the threat images, 6.2 (SD = .76) for 
the harm images, 4.0 (SD = .86) for the neutral images, and 4.6 (SD = .95) for the positive 
images. A MANOVA comparing the image categories (threat vs. harm vs. neutral vs. 
positive) on valence and arousal ratings yielded a significant multivariate effect of image 
type, F(6, 160) = 44.96, p < .001, ηp
2 
= .63, that was significant for both valence ratings, F(3, 
83) = 258.83, MSE = .41, p < .001, ηp
2 
= .91, and arousal ratings, F(3, 83) = 49.10, MSE = 
.67, p < .001, ηp
2 
= .65. Post-hoc comparisons revealed that all the images differed 
significantly from one another, p < .05, except that threat and harm images did not differ 
significantly from one another on valence, p = .32, or arousal, p = .39.  
3.2.3 Procedure 
Participants completed the STAI-Trait, the BDI-II, and the SDS as screening measures. In the 
lab, they completed the STAI-Trait and STAI-State in randomized order and then were 
administered the PANAS. Participants then underwent an anxiety induction using a 
standardized procedure developed by Eich and colleagues (Eich, Ng, Macaulay, Percy, & 
Grebneva, 2007; also see Jefferies et al., 2008). Participants were instructed to think of 
personally-relevant anxious thoughts in detail with the goal of feeling as anxious as possible 
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for a short period of time (5 minutes; See Appendix C for instructions). During this time, 
emotionally arousing music was played.
8
  
Next, participants completed the EMAT as described in Study 1 where they viewed 2 
practice trials, 2 filler trials, and 42 test trials involving one emotional image (threat, harm, or 
positive) paired with a neutral image side-by-side. In order to sustain anxious arousal during 
the EMAT, arousing classical music
9
 was presented through speakers for its duration and the 
PANAS was administered for a third time.  
Participants were then asked to rate 62 images that appeared in the EMAT in terms of how 
each image made them feel while viewing it. The procedures and instructions for rating the 
images were taken from those procedures used to rate the IAPS (Lang et al., 1999). Two 9-
point scales were used to assess the valence (1 = unhappy; 9 = happy) and arousal (1 = low 
arousal; 9 = high arousal) associated with each image. Participants were shown all 14 threat, 
14 harm, and 14 positive images and a random selection of 20 control images used in the 
EMAT. Images were selected and displayed at random for 3 seconds. Following each image, 
each rating scale (valence and arousal) appeared in random order and participants were 
instructed to make ratings using the number pad on a keyboard.  
Lastly, as in Study 1, before leaving the study session, participants were shown a video of 
babies laughing and then asked to rate their current state on a 7 point scale (1=very negative; 
7=very positive) to ensure that they were not distressed before leaving. 
3.3 Results 
3.3.1 Participants  
As expected, MANOVA results confirmed a significant multivariate effect of the three trait 
anxiety groups on self-report measures of trait anxiety (STAI-Trait), state anxiety (STAI-
State), and depression (BDI-II), F (6, 264) = 39.89, p < .001, ηp
2
 = .48. Means, standard 
deviations, and results of the independent one-way ANOVAS for the self-report measures by 
                                                 
8
 Symphony No. 8 in C Minor: 4. Finale: Feierlich, Nicht Schnell by Bruckner, and Mars, The Bringer of War 
by Holst 
9
 Grosse Fuge in B flat Major, Op. 133 by Beethoven 
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Table 5. Study 2: Self-Report Measures by Trait Anxiety Group 
    LTA (n = 44)   MTA (n = 53)   HTA (n = 41)       
Measure   M (SD)   M (SD)   M (SD)   F ηp
2
 
STAI-T 
 
32.14 (3.24) 
 
40.92 (2.73) 
 
51.70 (3.75) 
 
387.07*** .85 
STAI-S 
 
31.57 (7.38) 
 
38.46 (8.83) 
 
42.95 (9.74) 
 
18.48*** .22 
BDI-II  3.75 (2.90)   8.96 (4.48)   9.80 (4.31)  29.66*** .31 
Note. LTA = Low Trait Anxious; MTA = Mid Trait Anxious; HTA = High Trait Anxious; STAI-T =  
State Trait Anxiety Inventory – Trait; STAI-S = State Trait Anxiety Inventory – State; BDI-II =  
Beck Depression Inventory – II. 
*** p < .001
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trait anxiety group are shown in Table 5. Post-hoc comparisons revealed that all groups 
differed from one another on all three self-report measures, ps < .01, in the expected 
directions, except that the MTA and HTA did not differ on their depression scores, p = .32.   
3.3.2 State Induction Manipulation Check 
The means and standard deviations for NA and PA across trait anxiety groups and time are 
shown in Table 6. Four participants had complete missing PANAS data and another four had 
1-2 time points missing due to researcher administration errors and were not included in the 
analyses. Another six participants had 1-2 data points missing that were corrected with mean 
substitution. Analyses were conducted to assess whether NA had increased and PA had 
decreased with the state induction and that the negative affect remained stable across the 
EMAT.  
A 3 (trait anxiety: low vs. mid vs. high) × 3 (time: pre-induction vs. post-induction vs. 
post EMAT) mixed repeated measures mixed ANOVA on the PANAS NA scale revealed a 
main effect of trait anxiety group, F(2, 127) = 3.22, MSE = 71.35, p = .04, ηp
2
 = .05, and of 
time, F(1.7, 214.0 adj. df) = 81.26, MSE = 15.40, p < .001, ηp
2
 = .39. The time by trait 
anxiety group interaction did not reach significance, F(3.4, 214.0 adj. df) = 2.05, MSE = 
15.40, p = .10. Post-hoc analyses indicted that the NA scores for the HTA group (M = 18.33, 
SE = .81) were significantly higher than the LTA (M = 15.54, SE = .74), p = .01, but the 
MTA group did not differ from the HTA or LTA groups, ps >.10. Planned comparisons 
between the adjacent time points revealed that NA increased from pre-induction to post-
induction, t(131) = 11.44, p < .001, and did not change significantly from post-induction to 
post-EMAT, t(129) = .45, p = .66.  
A 3 (trait anxiety: low vs. mid vs. high) × 3 (time: pre-induction vs. post-induction vs. 
post EMAT) mixed repeated measures mixed ANOVA on the PANAS PA revealed a main 
effect of trait anxiety group, F(2, 127) = 3.25, MSE = 92.80, p = .04, ηp
2
 = .05, and of time, 
F(1.74, 221.36 adj. df) = 43.47, MSE = 14.00, p < .001, ηp
2
 = .26. The time by trait anxiety 
group interaction did not reach significance, F(3.5, 221.36 adj. df) < 1. Post-hoc analyses 
indicted that the PA scores for HTA group (M = 20.77, SE = .93) were lower than for the 
  62 
LTA (M = 23.92, SE = .85), p = .01, and marginally lower than the MTA group (M = 22.97, 
SE = .78), p = .072. Planned comparisons between the adjacent time points revealed that PA 
decreased from pre-induction to post-induction, t(131) = 7.09, p < .001, and further 
decreased following the post-EMAT, t(129) = 2.30, p = .02.  
In sum, the anxious state induction had its intended effect on increasing negative affect 
and reducing positive affect, as would be expected with the increase of an anxious mood 
state. Moreover, the mood ratings were stable over the course of the EMAT.  
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Table 6. Study 2: Positive and Negative Affect Scores  
    LTA (n = 43) 
 
MTA (n = 51) 
 
HTA (n = 36)   Full Sample (N = 130) 
Affect Scale and Time Point M (SD) 
 
M (SD) 
 
M (SD)   M (SD) 
Negative Affect 
            
Pre-Induction 12.95 (2.67) 
 
13.65 (4.30) 
 
14.28 (4.53) 
 
13.59 (3.92) 
 
Post-Induction 16.33 (4.91) 
 
18.47 (6.48) 
 
20.89 (6.41) 
 
18.43 (6.20) 
 
Post-EMAT 17.35 (5.79) 
 
18.78 (7.89) 
 
19.73 (6.20) 
 
18.60 (6.81) 
Positive Affect 
            
Pre-Induction 26.79 (7.18) 
 
24.96 (5.39) 
 
22.83 (6.23) 
 
24.98 (6.40) 
 
Post-Induction 22.98 (8.05) 
 
22.31 (5.91) 
 
20.08 (5.06) 
 
21.92 (6.55) 
 Post-EMAT 21.98 (6.78)   21.62 (5.82)   19.39 (5.14)   21.12 (6.03) 
Note. LTA = Low Trait Anxious; MTA = Mid Trait Anxious; HTA = High Trait Anxious. 
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3.3.3 Eye Movement Indices 
The data analysis plan was identical to Study 1. For each ANOVA involving the eye 
movement indices, trait anxiety group (low vs. mid vs. high) was always a between-subjects 
factor, image type (threat vs. harm vs. positive) was a within-subject factor and time was a 
within-subjects factor (T1 – T6). When the within-subject effects violated the assumptions of 
sphericity, the effects were adjusted using the Greenhouse-Geisser correction (adj. df 
indicates the adjusted degrees of freedom). LSD comparisons were used for all between-
subject post-hoc analyses and an alpha of p <.05 was used for all analyses. 
 Proportion of First Fixation 3.3.3.1
The PFF means and standard deviations by trait anxiety group and image type and the 
baseline bias analyses are listed in Table 7. In sum, LTA and MTA showed significant biases 
towards threat, harm and positive images, while the HTA showed biases towards harm and 
positive images, but the bias towards threat was only marginal, p = .076.  
A 3 (trait anxiety group: low vs. mid vs. high) x 3 (image type: threat vs. harm vs. 
positive) mixed ANOVA revealed no significant main effects of trait anxiety group, F (2, 
270) < 1, or image type, F (2, 156) < 1, nor a significant interaction F (4, 270) < 1.
10
 
Therefore, the probability of making the initial fixations to emotional images did not change 
as a function of trait anxiety or image type.  
 
                                                 
10
 When the STAI-Trait is used as a continuous covariate in this analysis rather than a between-subjects factor, 
the trait anxiety effects still do not approach significance.  
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Table 7. Study 2: First Fixation Indices by Trait Anxiety Group and Image Type 
      LTA (n = 44)   MTA (n = 53)   HTA (n = 41)   Full Sample (N = 138) 
Index and Image Type M (SD)   M (SD)   M (SD)   M (SD) 
Proportion of First Fixation 
            
Threat .53** (.08) 
 
.54** (.11) 
 
.53' (.12) 
 
.54*** (.10) 
 
Harm .55** (.11) 
 
.55*** (.09) 
 
.54* (.13) 
 
.55*** (.11) 
 
Positive .55** (.11) 
 
.55*** (.09) 
 
.54* (.13) 
 
.55*** (.11) 
First Fixation Gaze Durations 
            
Threat 887.80 (324.62) 
 
931.22 (287.28) 
 
838.67 (329.43) 
 
889.88 (312.30) 
 
Neutral w/Threat 649.22 (305.21) 
 
540.02 (202.48) 
 
541.19 (209.97) 
 
575.18 (245.47) 
 
Harm 964.27 (431.06) 
 
1055.46 (371.61) 
 
967.33 (435.46) 
 
1000.20 (409.90) 
 
Neutral w/Harm 578.47 (331.99) 
 
528.11 (287.01) 
 
477.18 (314.70) 
 
529.04 (310.43) 
 
Positive 779.26 (310.97) 
 
700.64 (237.89) 
 
669.96 (208.06) 
 
716.59 (257.84) 
 
Neutral w/Positive 565.57 (208.80) 
 
545.72 (140.46) 
 
472.17 (142.53) 
 
530.20 (169.14) 
First Fixation Gaze Bias 
            
Threat 238.60*** (404.10) 
 
391.51*** (269.76) 
 
297.49*** (352.69) 
 
314.70*** (345.54) 
 
Harm 385.80*** (515.00) 
 
527.35*** (460.04) 
 
490.15*** (558.51) 
 
471.16*** (508.25) 
 Positive 213.69*** (218.95)  154.93*** (225.53)  197.79*** (198.58)  186.40*** (215.70) 
Note. LTA = Low Trait Anxious group; MTA = Mid Trait Anxious group; HTA = High Trait Anxious group. Fixation Gaze variables 
in milliseconds.  
* p < .05. ** p < .01. *** p < .001. ' p < .09 
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 First Fixation Gaze Durations  3.3.3.2
The average FFGD and FFGB scores by trait anxiety group are listed in Table 7. Participants 
with FFGD scores greater than 3 SD above the mean per image category type were replaced 
with a value at 3 SD to ensure that means were not unduly influenced by outlying values. 
Eleven values (maximum 4 in one image type) met this criterion and were adjusted 
accordingly (1% of the data).   
To determine whether there were differences between the emotional and neutral images 
for the FFGD and whether trait anxiety or image type influenced the FFGD on the images, a 
mixed 3 (trait anxiety group: low vs. mid vs. high) x 3 (image type: threat vs. harm vs. 
positive) x 2 (emotion bias: negative vs. neutral) repeated measures mixed ANOVA was 
conducted. This analysis resulted in a main effect of emotion bias, F(1, 135 adj. df) = 222.00, 
MSE = 95484.64, p < .001, ηp
2
 = .62, a main effect of image type, F(1.8, 238.45 adj. df) = 
36.26, MSE = 45883.93, p < .001, ηp
2
 = .21, that were subsumed under an emotion bias by 
image type interaction, F(1.67, 225.18 adj. df) = 23.13, MSE = 69209.91, p < .001, ηp
2
 = .15. 
No effects involving trait anxiety group reached significance, including the main effect, F(2, 
135) = 1.79, MSE = 221740.17 p = .17.
11
  
To interpret this interaction, bias scores were calculated (FFGB) for threat, harm and 
positive images separately and a mixed 3 (trait anxiety group: low vs. mid vs. high) x 3 
(image type: threat vs. harm vs. positive) repeated measures mixed ANOVA was conducted 
on the FFGB scores. This analysis revealed a main effect of image type only, F(1.7, 225.18 
adj. df) = 23.13, MSE = 138419.81, p < .001, ηp
2
 = .15. The main effect of trait anxiety group 
did not reach significance, F(2, 135) = 1.17, MSE = 190969.28, p = .31,
12
 nor did the image 
type by trait anxiety group interaction, F(3.3, 225.18 adj. df) = 1.57, MSE = 138419.81, p = 
.19. The FFGB means and standard deviations for the full sample are listed in Table 7. Paired 
                                                 
11
 When STAI-Trait scores were entered as a continuous covariate, there was a significant main effect of trait 
anxiety on the FFGD, F(1, 136) = 4.20, MSE = 219176.75 p = .042, ηp
2
 = .03. We averaged the FFGD across all 
image types, but the correlation with trait anxiety was not significant, r = -.05, p = .53. Correlations between 
trait anxiety and the FFGD separated by image type are listed in Table 9.  
12
 When STAI-Trait scores were entered as a continuous covariate, the main or interactive effects involving trait 
anxiety still did not approach significance.  
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Samples t-test indicated that the FFGB was significantly greater for harm images than for 
threat and positive images, and greater for threat images than for positive images, ps < .001.  
Lastly, to test for attentional biases from baseline, one-sample t-tests were used from 0 
separately by image type and trait anxiety group. The results are listed in Table 7. In sum, all 
trait anxiety groups maintained their viewing on emotional images longer than neutral images 
when first fixated.  
 Proportion of Viewing Time 3.3.3.3
The PVT means and standard deviations and the baseline bias analyses are presented in Table 
8. In sum, all trait anxiety groups showed early biases towards threat and harm images. 
Furthermore, the LTA also showed biases away from threat images at T5 (2001 – 2500 ms) 
and T6 (2501 – 3000 ms). For positive stimuli, the LTA group maintained biases towards 
positive images at all time points (0 – 3000 ms), while the biases for the MTA and HTA 
groups only reached significance at relatively early and late time points.   
A 3 (trait anxiety group: low vs. mid vs. high) x 3 (image type: threat vs. harm. vs. 
positive) x 6 (time: T1 vs. T2 vs. T3 vs. T4 vs. T5 vs. T6) mixed repeated measures ANOVA 
on PVT revealed a main effect of image type, F(1.4, 184.1 adj. df) = 4.82, MSE = .09, p < 
.001, ηp
2
 = .03, main effect of time, F(3.1, 423.03 adj. df) = 50.55, MSE = .03, p < .001, ηp
2
 = 
.27, a marginal image type by trait anxiety group interaction, F(2.7, 184.1 adj. df) = 2.42, 
MSE = .09, p = .073, ηp
2
 = .27
13
, and an image type by time interaction, F(5.1, 693.0 adj. df) 
= 11.70, MSE = .03, p < .001, ηp
2
 = .08. The main effect of trait anxiety group, F(2, 135) = 
2.29, MSE = .10, p = .10
14
, and the 3 way interaction, F(10.27, 693.0 adj. df) <1, both did not 
reach significance.   
Of particular interest to our hypotheses was the marginal trait anxiety group by image type 
interaction. To follow-up, we ran three separate one-way ANOVAs for each of the image 
types comparing the three trait anxiety groups. These analyses revealed a significant effect of 
trait anxiety group on the PVT for threat images only, F(2, 135) = 3.76, MSE = .01, p = .03, 
                                                 
13
 When STAI-Trait scores were entered as a continuous covariate, the image type by trait anxiety group 
interaction reached significance, F(1.4, 185.9 adj. df) = 3.74, MSE = .09, p = .041, ηp
2
 = .03.  
14
 When STAI-Trait scores were entered as a continuous covariate, the main effect of trait anxiety group 
reached significance, F(1, 136) = 4.15, MSE = .10, p = .044, ηp
2
 = .03.  
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but not for harm, F(2, 135) = 1.94, MSE = .02, p = .15, or positive images, F(2, 135) = 1.32, 
MSE = .004, p = .27. Post-hoc analyses indicated that the LTA (M = .50, SD = .12) 
demonstrated significantly less PVT on threat images than both the MTA (M = .55, SD = .08) 
and the HTA (M = .55, SD = .11), while the MTA and HTA did not differ from one another, 
p = .87.  
69 
 
Table 8. Study 2: Proportion of Viewing Time by Trait Anxiety Group and Image Type 
    LTA (n = 44)   MTA (n = 53)   HTA (n = 41)   Full Sample (N = 138) 
Proportion of Viewing Time M (SD)   M (SD)   M (SD)   M (SD) 
Threat 
            
T1 (0-500) .55** (.10) .56** (.10) .55* (.13) .55*** (.11) 
 
T2 (501-1000) .61*** (.14) 
 
.65*** (.09) 
 
.62*** (.13) 
 
.63*** (.12) 
 
T3 (1001-1500) .54 (.17) 
 
.62*** (.12) 
 
.59** (.20) 
 
.58*** (.17) 
 
T4 (1501-2000) .44' (.21) 
 
.51 (.14) 
 
.55 (.18) 
 
.50 (.18) 
 
T5 (2001-2500) .40*** (.19) 
 
.46' (.15) 
 
.50 (.19) 
 
.45** (.18) 
 
T6 (2500-3000) .44* (.20) 
 
.47 (.15) 
 
.49 (.19) 
 
.47* (.18) 
Harm 
           
 
T1 (0-500) .56** (.13) 
 
.56** (.12) 
 
.56** (.13) 
 
.56*** (.12) 
 
T2 (501-1000) .65*** (.18) 
 
.71*** (.14) 
 
.71*** (.17) 
 
.69*** (.16) 
 
T3 (1001-1500) .57* (.21) 
 
.65*** (.19) 
 
.64*** (.22) 
 
.62*** (.21) 
 
T4 (1501-2000) .49 (.23) 
 
.57* (.20) 
 
.53 (.24) 
 
.53 (.22) 
 
T5 (2001-2500) .47 (.25) 
 
.53 (.21) 
 
.53 (.23) 
 
.51 (.23) 
 
T6 (2500-3000) .45 (.27) 
 
.53 (.22) 
 
.52 (.26) 
 
.50 (.25) 
Positive 
           
 
T1 (0-500) .56** (.11) 
 
.55*** (.09) 
 
.55** (.11) 
 
.55*** (.10) 
 
T2 (501-1000) .60*** (.10) 
 
.58*** (.11) 
 
.61*** (.12) 
 
.59*** (.11) 
 
T3 (1001-1500) .56** (.13) 
 
.54* (.12) 
 
.52 (.13) 
 
.54*** (.13) 
 
T4 (1501-2000) .55* (.13) 
 
.53' (.11) 
 
.53 (.15) 
 
.54** (.13) 
 
T5 (2001-2500) .56* (.17) 
 
.53' (.14) 
 
.55* (.14) 
 
.55*** (.15) 
 T6 (2500-3000) .58*** (.14)  .55* (.15)  .56** (.14)  .56*** (.14) 
Note. LTA = Low Trait Anxious; MTA = Mid Trait Anxious; HTA = High Trait Anxious. 
* p < .05. ** p < .01. *** p < .001. ' p < .09 
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Lastly, we calculated the correlations between trait and state anxiety and the eye 
movement indices. The results for the first fixation indices are listed in Table 9 and for the 
PVT in Table 10. The Pearson’s correlation between the STAI-Trait and STAI-State 
completed at baseline was r = .49, p < .001.   
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Table 9. Study 2: Correlations among Trait and State Anxiety and First Fixation 
Indices 
      Anxiety 
Index and Image Type Trait State 
Proportion of First Fixations 
   
Threat .00 .07 
 
Harm -.03 -.08 
 
Positive -.03 -.08 
First Fixation Gaze Durations 
   
Threat -.10 -.05 
 
Neutral w/Threat -.17* -.20* 
 
Harm .03 -.04 
 
Neutral w/Harm -.17* -.11 
 
Positive -.19* -.20* 
 
Neutral w/Positive -.24** -.18* 
First Fixation Gaze Bias 
   
Threat .03 .10 
 
Harm .13 .03 
 Positive -.04 -.10 
Note. Trait = State-Trait Anxiety Inventory – Trait;  
State = State-Trait Anxiety Inventory – State. 
* p < .05. ** p < .01. ' p < .08 
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Table 10. Study 2: Correlations among Trait and State Anxiety and Proportion of 
Viewing Time 
    Anxiety 
Proportion of Viewing Time Trait State 
Threat 
   
T1 (0-500) .02 .15' 
 
T2 (501-1000) .02 .10 
 
T3 (1001-1500) .06 -.03 
 
T4 (1501-2000) .21* .16' 
 
T5 (2001-2500) .21* .12 
 
T6 (2500-3000) .14 .10 
Harm 
   
T1 (0-500) .01 -.03 
 
T2 (501-1000) .19* .09 
 
T3 (1001-1500) .19* .08 
 
T4 (1501-2000) .09 .00 
 
T5 (2001-2500) .12 .03 
 
T6 (2500-3000) .15 .03 
Positive 
   
T1 (0-500) -.06 -.11 
 
T2 (501-1000)  .00 -.01 
 
T3 (1001-1500) -.07 -.14 
 
T4 (1501-2000) -.06 -.02 
 
T5 (2001-2500) -.04 -.10 
 T6 (2500-3000) -.05 -.06 
Note. Trait = State-Trait Anxiety Inventory – Trait;  
State = State-Trait Anxiety Inventory – State. 
* p < .05. ** p < .01. ' p < .08 
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3.3.4 Image Ratings 
The image valence and arousal rating means and standard deviations by trait anxiety group 
and image type are listed in Table 11. Two participants did not have any image ratings due to 
early termination of the study. A 3 (trait anxiety: low vs. mid vs. high) x 4 (image type: threat 
vs. harm vs. positive vs. neutral) mixed repeated measures ANOVA on valence ratings 
resulted in a main effect of image type only, F(1.5, 201.7 adj. df) = 847.10, MSE = 1.53, p < 
.001, ηp
2
 = .86. The main effect of trait anxiety group, F(2, 133) < 1, and trait anxiety by 
image type interaction were not significant, F(3.0, 201.7 adj. df) < 1. Similarly, a 3 (trait 
anxiety: low vs. mid vs. high) x 4 (image type: threat vs. harm vs. positive vs. neutral) mixed 
repeated measures ANOVA on arousal ratings resulted in a main effect of image type only, 
F(1.6, 210.8 adj. df) = 221.25, MSE = 2.02, p < .001, ηp
2
 = .63. The main effect of trait 
anxiety group, F(2, 133) < 1, and trait anxiety by image type interaction were not significant, 
F(3.2, 210.8 adj. df) = 1.27, p = .28.
15
 Planned comparisons revealed that for valence and 
arousal ratings, all image types differed significantly from one another, ps < .001, except that 
the mean arousal rating for positive images was not different than for neutral images, p = .24. 
In sum, participants, regardless of their trait anxiety level, rated harm images more negatively 
than threat, and both threat and harm images more negatively than neutral. Positive images 
were rated as more pleasant than neutral images as expected. Likewise, harm images were 
rated as more arousing than threat images and both harm and threat were more arousing than 
neutral images.  
 
                                                 
15
 When STAI-Trait scores were entered as a continuous covariate, the main or interactive effects involving trait 
anxiety did not approach significance. 
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Table 11. Study 2: Valence and Arousal Image Ratings  
     LTA (n = 44)   MTA (n = 53)   HTA (n = 39)   Full Sample (N = 136) 
Rating and Image Type M (SD)   M (SD)   M (SD)   M (SD) 
Valence 
            
Threat 2.82 (1.06) 
 
2.79 (0.93) 
 
2.87 (0.86) 
 
2.82 (0.95) 
 
Harm 2.16 (0.89) 
 
2.06 (0.86) 
 
2.21 (0.83) 
 
2.13 (0.86) 
 
Positive 6.93 (0.95) 
 
7.11 (0.87) 
 
6.87 (1.10) 
 
6.99 (0.97) 
 
Neutral 5.23 (0.57) 
 
5.06 (0.57) 
 
5.08 (0.70) 
 
5.12 (0.61) 
Arousal 
            
Threat 6.52 (1.19) 
 
6.55 (1.12) 
 
6.21 (1.40) 
 
6.44 (1.23) 
 
Harm 6.82 (1.15) 
 
6.85 (1.20) 
 
6.59 (1.46) 
 
6.76 (1.26) 
 
Positive 4.14 (1.17) 
 
4.38 (1.10) 
 
4.54 (1.35) 
 
4.35 (1.20) 
 Neutral 4.20 (0.85)   4.21 (0.91)   4.36 (1.09)   4.25 (0.94) 
Note. LTA = Low Trait Anxious; MTA = Mid Trait Anxious; HTA = High Trait Anxious. 
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3.4 Discussion 
The purpose of Study 2 was to evaluate the time course of visual selective attention to threat-
related images as a function of trait anxiety while participants were in an elevated state of 
anxiety. Relative to Study 1, increasing state anxiety levels resulted in greater ABT for some 
eye movement indices and confirmed some, but not all, of our hypotheses. Each will be 
addressed in detail below.  
First, the results from Study 2 suggest that when in a state of anxiety, all participants show 
a bias in making their first fixations on emotional (threat, harm and positive) relative to 
neutral stimuli, regardless of trait anxiety. Similarly, all participants were more likely to view 
the emotional images than the neutral during the first 500 ms of viewing. These results 
support the hypothesis that HTA individuals show early biases in facilitated orienting to 
threat, but also indicate that such biases are not specific to this population and are part of a 
more general adaptive defense system that orients initial attention to images that depict 
emotionality over relatively neutral stimuli. These results are consistent with some past 
research (e.g., Nummenmaa et al., 2006; Quigley et al., 2012), but not other data (e.g., Calvo 
& Avero, 2005), including the results of Study 1. Thus, differences in state anxiety may 
account for some inconsistencies in the literature, particularly in regards to indices of 
facilitated attention to threat.  
Furthermore, similar to Study 1, HTA participants did not demonstrate greater facilitated 
attention to threat than LTA and MTA participants as hypothesized. Thus, state anxiety may 
not account for the between-subject mixed results, suggesting that further research is needed 
to assess other factors, such as possible methodological and reliability factors noted in the 
previous discussion. Moreover, the HTA group did not rate the threat images as more 
negative or arousing than the LTA group and thus, a lack of distinctions in the evaluation of 
threat may have contributed to a lack of early ABT specificity in HTA participants, given 
that models infer that biases in attention are fundamentally a result of individual differences 
in threat appraisals (e.g., Bar-Haim et al., 2007; Mogg & Bradley, 1998). Another possible 
explanation for the null trait anxiety effects on initial orienting is that the current threat 
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images were intense enough that all participants appraise them as substantially negative and 
arousing (as suggested by their equal ratings) and thus, deem them to be worth attending to 
equally. Some models suggest that all participants will attend to highly threatening stimuli, as 
would be essential for an effective defense system, but that HTA individuals overly attend to 
relatively mild threat stimuli, while LTA do not (Matthews & Mackintosh, 1998; Mogg & 
Bradley, 1998). Thus, a distinction between HTA and LTA individuals is more likely to 
occur with relatively mildly threatening stimuli (Mogg et al., 2004; Wilson & MacLeod, 
2003). Some studies have varied threat intensity but have generally not found evidence to 
support this notion using response time tasks (e.g., Mogg et al, 2000; Yiend & Mathews 
2001) with only one study using an eye movement task (Calvo & Avero, 2005). 
Nevertheless, Calvo and Avero (2005) varied threat intensity by manipulating the colour of 
the same images (colour versus black-and-white) rather than novel images that varied in 
negativity. Thus, further research is needed to assess the moderating effect of stimuli 
intensity in attempts to explain what factors differentiate HTA from LTA individual on early 
orienting biases.  
Regarding the maintenance of attention, the current data supported the hypothesis that 
HTA participants demonstrate gaze duration biases on threat (relative to neutral) following 
the first fixations when in a state of anxiety, but these biases were not greater for HTA than 
LTA, as predicted by the attention maintenance hypothesis (Weierich et al., 2008). Similarly, 
other research using this index has also not found between group anxiety effects (e.g., 
Armstrong et al., 2012; Garner et al., 2006, Study 1; Quigley et al., 2012) or found anxiety 
group effects that were not consistent with this hypothesis (Garner et al., 2006, Study 2). 
Rather, all participants showed greater maintenance of attention on threat than neutral images 
when state anxious, indicating that such biases, like facilitated orienting, are not specific to 
trait anxious samples. Furthermore, maintenance of attention was also found for harm and 
positive images, suggesting that such biases occur with emotional stimuli in general and are 
not necessarily specific to threat. Nevertheless, while biases to maintain attention on 
emotional stimuli may occur generally, it is not known in the current study whether state 
anxiety is associated with an increase in maintenance to threat specifically (as found in 
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Quigley et al., 2012) or to emotional stimuli more generally given that there was no 
comparison state condition. Moreover, in the current study, participants showed the greatest 
bias in maintenance to harm images, followed by threat and then positive images. These 
differences in viewing behaviour correspond with the valence ratings, such that participants 
rated the harm images as more negative than the threat images and both as more negative 
than the positive images. Thus, appraisals of negativity may account for the extent that 
participants dwell on emotional images.  
Trait anxiety effects were found, however, when assessing ABT over a 3000 ms time 
course. That is, LTA participants showed less bias to view threat images (relative to neutral) 
than MTA and HTA, while such differences were not found for harm or positive images. 
This difference in ABT between LTA and HTA individuals is consistent with models of ABT 
(e.g., Matthews & Mackintosh, 1998; Mogg & Bradley, 1998) and when considering the null 
results in Study 1, suggest that differences between trait anxious groups are more likely to 
result when participants are in a state of anxiety (Matthews & Mackintosh, 1998; Mogg & 
Bradley, 1998) as is suggested by other research (e.g., Garner et al., 2006; Quigley et al., 
2012) and may account for some of the mixed results in the literature.  
Of note, the trait anxiety effect was not moderated by time, however the baseline bias 
analyses suggest that while all participants showed significant early biases towards threat in 
the first 1500 ms, only LTA participants showed a significant bias away from threat between 
2000 and 3000 ms (that was not significant in the MTA or HTA groups, but reached 
significance in the full sample). Thus, this shift in attention away from threat in the LTA 
likely resulted in the significant differences between LTA and HTA over time. That said it 
seems that there is a large variance in viewing behaviour over time and likely important 
individual differences that are not captured by trait anxiety that could account for the 
orientation of attention to threat. For instance, it has been suggested that LTA individuals are 
likely to direct their attention away from mild threat (e.g. Williams et al., 1997) in order to 
regulate their affective state and maintain their low level of anxiety (Cisler & Koster, 2010) 
while others suggest that HTA are likely to avoid threat stimuli over time (e.g., Mogg & 
Bradley, 1998). However, research has not clarified the motivation (e.g., approach and/or 
  78 
avoidance) or emotion regulation strategies used by anxious and non-anxious samples when 
they are presented with threat-neutral image pairs in this context. Recent research has found 
that short-term approach-related goals bias early indices of attention (thought to be relatively 
automatic), even when competing for attention with threat stimuli (Vogt, De Houwer, 
Crombez, & Van Damme, 2013), thus trait and/or state anxiety group differences in 
facilitated attention may be the result of distinctions in seemingly strategic processing (Wells 
& Matthews, 1994). Moreover, it seems highly likely that individuals have a variety of 
strategies for responding to negative stimuli (e.g., Doron, Thomas-Ollivier, Vachon, & 
Fortes-Bourbousson, 2013) and that these goals/strategies may also influence later stages of 
attentional processing (Cisler & Koster, 2010) that can both be assessed more accurately with 
eye movement paradigms. It will therefore be important to evaluate strategic processing in 
addition to pre-attentive processes using eye movement paradigms in order to more fully 
understand controlled as well as more relative automatic (respectively) attentional processes.  
Despite these promising trait anxiety-related bias results over time, it is essential to note 
that the HTA group also reported significantly higher state anxiety than did the LTA group, 
thus the state and trait effects were highly confounded, as is commonly the case in the 
literature (Bar-Haim et al., 2007). Research that has attempted to distinguish the effects of 
trait and state anxiety on ABT has yielded mixed results (Bar-Haim et al., 2007; Chen, 
Lewin, & Craske, 1996; Edwards, Burt, & Lipp, 2006; Egloff & Hock, 2001; MacLeod & 
Mathews, 1988; MacLeod & Rutherford, 1992; Mathews & MacLeod, 1985, Mogg, 
Mathews, & Weinman, 1989; Mogg, Mathews, Bird & Macgregor-Morris, 1990; Mogg, 
Bradley & Hallowell, 1994; Quigley et al., 2012) and have typically used response time tasks 
to assess ABT and thus, are limited in their ability to assess the nature and components of 
ABT over time. It may be that trait and state anxiety have different influences on each of the 
attentional components. For instance, a recent study found that manipulating state anxiety 
increased alerting and orienting of attention to neutral stimuli, whereas trait anxiety was 
associated with deficits in controlling (i.e., disengaging) attention (Pacheco-Unguetti, Acosta, 
Callejas, & Lupianex, 2010) yet to our knowledge only two published studies monitoring eye 
movements have successfully manipulated state anxiety (Garner et al., 2006; Quigley et al., 
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2012) and only Quigley and colleagues compared trait and state anxiety within participants, 
which is necessary to separate the two distinct constructs (e.g., Ree, French, MacLeod, & 
Locke, 2008).  
Garner and colleagues (2006) found some evidence of facilitated orienting towards 
emotional faces in socially anxious participants compared to those low in social anxiety, but 
only when under a social-evaluative stress condition (Study 2). These results could be due to 
an interaction between trait (social anxiety) and state (stress) factors, or simply to state 
factors alone given that the anxiety groups differed in both. Quigley and colleagues (2012) 
found that experimental induction of state anxiety increased the maintenance of attention on 
threat-related images (relative to neutral images) following the first fixation over a 3000 ms 
time course. Contrary to expectations, these biases were not moderated by trait anxiety, 
which suggest that greater maintenance of attention on threat stimuli is largely a function of 
state anxiety. Nonetheless, it is conceivable that the design in Quigley et al., (2012) did not 
have sufficient power to detect the between-subject differences of trait anxiety since there 
were relatively few trials (10 threat-neutral images per image set) and some of the trials 
provided variable results (i.e., image set effect, as discussed in Quigley et al., 2012). Also, 
ABT in the state anxiety condition was compared to an uncontrolled baseline mood state, 
which could vary greatly. A calm mood state comparison would be preferable. Such 
methodological factors could account for the null trait anxiety results and further research is 
needed to clarify the roles of trait and state anxiety on ABT.  
Determining the relative, and potentially interactive, effects of trait and state anxiety on 
the components of ABT is important for the refinement of theoretical models of anxiety-
related ABT. Early theories proposed various roles of trait and state anxiety in ABT 
(Broadbent & Broadbent, 1988; Matthews & Mackintosh, 1998; Mogg & Bradley, 1998; 
Williams et al., 1988, 1997). For instance, Williams and colleagues (1988, 1997) posited an 
interaction between trait and state anxiety, such that state anxiety increases the extent to 
which a situation or stimuli will be appraised as threatening, whereas trait anxiety determines 
the allocation of attention towards or away from the source of threat. They argued that under 
conditions of high state anxiety, HTA individuals will attend to threat whereas LTA 
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individuals will avoid threat (Egloff & Hock, 2001; Williams et al., 1988, 1997), although it 
was later contended that this pattern may only be true for relatively mild threat, as all 
individuals, regardless of trait anxiety levels, are likely to attend to severe threat (Matthews 
& Mackintosh, 1998; Mogg & Bradley, 1998; Wilson & MacLeod, 2003). Nevertheless, 
researchers have theorized that both trait and state anxiety contribute to more threatening 
appraisals of stimuli in general, and therefore individuals high in both trait and state anxiety 
are most likely to show an ABT (Matthews & Mackintosh, 1998; Mogg & Bradley, 1998) as 
was found in the current study when assessed over a 3000 ms time course.  
More recent theories of ABT have focused on the mechanisms and components of ABT 
(e.g., Bar-Haim et al., 2007; Cisler & Koster, 2010), but have not given consideration to the 
relative influences of trait and state anxiety on these different components. This omission 
reflects the lack of extant studies that have been designed to systematically compare the 
effects of both trait and state anxiety on the components of ABT over time (Bar-Haim et al., 
2007). More research is thus needed to increase our knowledge of how trait and state anxiety 
influence attention to threat and elucidate which components of ABT are observed in all 
individuals in a state of anxiety and which are characteristic of HTA individuals that may 
indicate possible vulnerability factors in the development and persistence of anxiety 
disorders.  
The distinction between trait and state anxiety-related ABT also holds significant 
treatment implications. There has been a proliferation of studies of attention bias 
modification (ABM) for the treatment of anxiety disorders over the past decade (Hakamata et 
al., 2010; Hallion & Ruscio, 2011). Despite this enthusiasm, these studies have produced 
conflicting findings and a recent meta-analysis concluded that ABM procedures have only a 
small effect on the actual modification of attention (g = 0.29) and on reduction of anxiety 
symptoms (g = 0.13 for posttest and g = 0.26 for symptoms following a stressor; Hallion & 
Ruscio, 2011). These results suggest that there is a need for improvement of ABM treatments 
in order to produce larger and more robust effects on ABT and anxiety symptoms. 
Refinement and improvement of ABM treatments will require greater knowledge of the 
components, mechanisms, and moderators of ABT. One possibility is that ABM procedures 
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could be altered to better target the components of ABT that are linked to trait anxiety, which 
are more likely to be the processes that contribute causally to anxiety disorders rather than 
targeting state anxiety-linked components of ABT, that are more likely to be a product of 
anxiety.  
In sum, the current data indicate that elevating state anxiety in participants results in 
significant biases in initial orienting and greater maintenance of attention on emotional 
images in general and in all participants, irrespective of their trait anxiety level. HTA 
participants showed greater ABT than LTA on the relative overall viewing time specific to 
threat images (not harm or positive) when averaged across the 3000 ms and only when in a 
state of anxiety (i.e., in Study 2, but not Study 1). However, the current design does not allow 
for the separation of trait and state anxiety effects and their relative influence on ABT over 
time which may have important theoretical and clinical implications for the understanding 
and treatment of anxiety. Moreover, identifying the attentional processes associated with trait 
anxiety or a vulnerability to anxiety disorders is of central importance, thus further evaluation 
of factors that may distinguish HTA from LTA individuals, is needed. A study that 
manipulates anxious states and that varies threat intensity in the assessment of ABT over 
time is therefore warranted. 
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Chapter 4 
Study 3: Distinguishing the Roles of Trait and State Anxiety 
on Attentional Biases 
3.5 Introduction 
Study 3 was designed to differentiate and examine the unique and interactive effects of trait 
and state anxiety on attention to emotional images in a free viewing eye movement paradigm. 
More specifically, we were interested in evaluating the following research questions: 
1. What are the relative contributions of trait and state anxiety on the components and 
time course of ABT?  
2. Are anxiety-related ABT moderated by threat intensity, such that all participants 
show attentional biases to highly threatening stimuli, but HTA individuals (relative to 
LTA) will show greater biases to mild threat stimuli?  
3. Are the contributions of trait and state anxiety on the time course of attentional biases 
specific to threat-related stimuli or to emotional information (i.e., positive stimuli) 
more generally?  
4. Does participants’ motivation to direct attention towards or away from threat predict 
ABT over time?  
Thus, in part, the current study is a replication and extension of Quigley et al. (2012), with 
a number of methodological refinements to improve the power of the study to detect effects 
of trait anxiety on ABT, including: 1) the separation of mild and highly threatening stimuli; 
2) an increase in trials from 10 to 20 per condition; 3) an increase in the number of 
participants; 4) an increase in trial duration from 3000 to 5000 ms to allow for the assessment 
of attention components over a greater period of time; and, 5) the inclusion of a calm mood 
state induction to contrast with the state anxiety induction.  
We hypothesized that all participants will show early attentional biases in facilitated 
orienting (on the first fixations and in first 500 ms) towards emotional information in general 
(e.g., Nummenmaa et al., 2006) and that elevated state anxiety would increase the 
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maintenance of attention on threat stimuli specifically over time, consistent with a mood 
congruent effect (Bower, 1981). In accordance with Mogg and Bradley (1998) and others 
(e.g., Bar-Haim et al., 2007), we expected that trait anxiety would interact with threat 
stimulus type (mild vs. high threat), such that high anxious participants would show a greater 
early ABT to mild threat images than LTA participants, where no such trait effects would be 
found for high threat images. Given the inconsistencies in the literature, no further 
hypotheses regarding the role of trait and state anxiety were made. However, there are 
several possible general outcomes to note. A main effect of trait anxiety on ABT would be 
consistent with general cognitive models of anxiety (e.g., Beck & Clark, 1997) as would 
additive and interactive effects between trait and state anxiety on ABT (e.g., Matthews & 
Mackintosh, 1998, Mogg & Bradley, 1998; Williams et al., 1988, 1997). Furthermore, trait 
and/or state anxiety may interact with time, such that they differentially influence how 
participants allocate their attention to threat as they have more time to engage strategic 
processing (e.g., avoidance). 
Another purpose of the study was to explore whether motivation to look towards and 
away from threatening stimuli is associated with trait and/or state anxiety and ABT. We 
expected a positive association between motivation to look towards negative images and 
ABT, while motivation to avoid negative images would be negatively associated with ABT.   
3.6 Method 
3.6.1 Participants  
Participants were undergraduates who completed screening questionnaires for course credit 
and who met criteria similar to the previous two studies, but with some minor changes to the 
self-report measures: 1) scored high (≥48) or low (≤26) on the State- Trait Inventory of 
Cognitive and Somatic Anxiety (STICSA-Trait; Ree et al., 2008), 2) scored less than 9 (85
th
 
percentile) on the Depression subscale of the Depression Anxiety Stress Scales (DASS-21: 
Lovibond & Lovibond, 1995), 3) scored 11 or below on the Marlowe and Crowne Social 
Desirability Scale (SDS; Strahan & Gerbasi, 1972), and 4) had normal or corrected-to-normal 
vision. Similar to the previous studies, participants were excluded if they showed high 
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symptoms of depression for ethical reasons and high social desirability given the associations 
with underreporting anxiety symptoms (e.g., Derakshan et al., 2007).  
A total of 184 undergraduates participated. Sixteen participants could not be calibrated on 
the eye tracker (n = 7) or had technical difficulties (n = 9). Four participants were excluded 
due to a change in their STICSA-Trait score greater than 2.5 SDs above the mean change (M 
= 9.28, SD = 6.79) between the screening and lab sessions. The excluded participants did not 
differ in age, gender, or trait anxiety (STICSA-T) from the remaining sample of 164 
participants, ps > .05.  
3.6.2 Materials  
 Self-Report Measures 3.6.2.1
The State-Trait Inventory of Cognitive and Somatic Anxiety (STICSA; Ree et al., 2008) 
STICSA-Trait was used to determine trait anxiety groups and the STICSA-State was used to 
assess state anxiety at 5 time points: 1) at baseline, 2) block 1 post-state induction, 3) block 2 
pre-state induction, 4) block 2 post-state induction, and 5) at the end of block 2. The 
STICSA-Trait and State versions each contain 21-items that assess the cognitive and somatic 
symptoms of anxiety as a personality trait (“in general”) and as a affective state (“how you 
feel right now…”), respectively. The Cronbach’s alpha for the STICSA-Trait was .94 and the 
STICSA-State ranged from .92 to .94 across time points.  The State-Trait Anxiety Inventory 
(STAI; Spielberger, Gorsuch, Lushene, Vagg, & Jacobs, 1983) Trait version was included to 
provide comparisons with Study 1 and 2 and previous literature (Cronbach’s α = .93). 
However, the STICSA-Trait was chosen as the primary measure of trait anxiety in the current 
study given that is it less confounded with depression (Grös, Antony, Simms, & McCabe, 
2007). Depressive symptoms were assessed by the 7-item subscale of the Depression Anxiety 
and Stress Scale (DASS-21; Lovibond & Lovibond, 1995; current Cronbach’s α = .88)16 and 
social desirable responding was assessed by the 20-item version of the Marlowe–Crowne 
Social Desirability Scale (SDS; Crowne & Marlowe, 1960; Strahan & Gerbasi, 1972; current 
                                                 
16
 We changed from the BDI-II to the DASS in the current study to reduce the items needed in the screening 
measures.  
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Cronbach’s α = .71) during the screening session. Finally, participants were asked to rate the 
extent that they were motivated to look “towards” and “away from” each image category 
(negative, positive, neutral); ratings were made on a 7-point scale (1 = not at all, 7 = a lot).
17
   
 Stimuli.  3.6.2.2
As in the previous two studies, the images for the eye movement tasks were selected from the 
IAPS (Lang et al., 1999; see Appendix D). However, in the current study, 80 threat images 
were selected that involved the potential for injury to a person (e.g., a person holding a knife 
to someone’s throat). No harm images were used. The threat images were categorized as 
either mild or high threat based on the normative valence ratings and were both divided into 
two image sets that were counterbalanced across two blocks. For comparison, 40 positive 
images were selected with 20 in each set. All emotion images were paired with neutral 
images and matched as best as possible in content, colour, and complexity.  
Average valence ratings were 2.40 (SD = .31) for the high threat images, 3.51 (SD = .30) 
for the mild threat images, 7.54 (SD = .40) for positive images and 5.30 (SD = .71) for 
neutral images. Average arousal ratings were 6.34 (SD = .50) for high threat, 5.32 (SD = .47) 
for the mild threat images, 5.25 (SD=.89) for positive and 3.46 (SD = .73) for neutral images. 
A MANOVA comparing the image categories (high threat vs. mild threat vs. positive vs. 
neutral) on valence and arousal ratings yielded a significant effect of image category for both 
valence, F(3, 236) = 669.14, MSE = .31, p < .001, ηp
2
= .90, and arousal ratings, F(3, 236) = 
220.27, MSE =.48, p < .001, ηp
2
= .74. Post-hoc comparisons indicated that all image types 
differed significantly from one another on valence and arousal, all ps <.001, except that the 
mild threat images did not significantly differ from the positive images on the mean arousal 
ratings, p = .64.
18
  
                                                 
17
 The 20-item Attentional Control Scale (ACS; Derryberry & Reed, 2002) was administered, but was not 
associated with any of our eye movement indices and thus, removed from the dissertation. 
 
18
 When stimulus set was included in the MANOVA, there were no main or interactive effects of stimulus set, p 
> .95.  
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3.6.3 Procedure 
In the lab, participants completed the STICSA-Trait, STAI-Trait in random order on a 
computer followed by the STICSA-State on paper. The study was separated into two blocks 
that were counterbalanced across participants (n = 82 in each), each involving a state 
induction (calm or anxious) followed by an EMAT. The state induction was the same 
standardized procedure used in Study 2 (Eich et al., 2007) with the addition of a calm state 
induction for comparison with the anxious state (see Appendix C). Participants were 
instructed to think of personally-relevant calm or anxious thoughts in detail for 5 minutes 
with the goal of feeling as calm or anxious as possible while calm or emotionally arousing 
music was played.
19
  
Following both state inductions, participants completed the STICSA-State before 
beginning the EMAT. Participants were told that they would view image pairs, some 
involving “violence, threat, and weapons,” and they were to look at these images as they 
wished. In each block, participants viewed two practice trials and 60 test trials consisting of 
one emotional and one neutral image presented simultaneously (20 high threat-neutral, 20 
mild threat-neutral and 20 positive-neutral). Half of the image pairs were presented side-by-
side and the other half were presented one above the other, in a semi-random fashion.
20
 This 
presentation style was used to reduce the predictability of the image locations, such that 
participants may be less likely to initiate fixations towards the left and top images first (e.g., 
Waechter et al., 2014). Each picture was 512 X 384 pixels and was displayed 80 pixels from 
the center fixation location (2.7° visual angle for the horizontal positioning and 2.5° visual 
angle for the vertical positioning), on a light-gray background. Before the image pair was 
presented, participants were required to fixate on a centrally located cross. Image pairs were 
displayed for 5 seconds, followed by a 500 ms interval before the next fixation cross 
                                                 
19
 Calm induction music was Venus, The Bringer of Peace by Holst; anxious induction music included the 
Symphony No. 8 in C Minor: 4. Finale: Feierlich, Nicht Schnell by Bruckner and Mars and The Bringer of War 
by Holst. 
20
 No more than 3 trials were allowed to have the same presentation arrangement consecutively.  
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appeared. Throughout the EMAT, calm or anxious music was played in order to assist with 
maintaining the assigned affective state.
21
  
Following the EMAT, participants completed the STICSA-State. They then followed the 
same state induction procedures for the alternative state (calm or anxious), completed a post 
STICSA-State measure, and then viewed another novel 60 image-pairs in a second EMAT. 
When done, participants completed the final STICSA-State measure. 
Before leaving the session, participants were asked about their level of motivation for 
looking towards and away from each image type (e.g., negative, positive, neutral). They were 
then shown the same video of babies laughing as in Study 2
 
 and asked to rate their current 
affective state on a 7 point scale (1=very negative; 7=very positive) to ensure that they were 
not distressed.  
3.7 Results 
3.7.1 Participants 
Participants had a mean age of 20.22 years (SD = 3.7) and 68.9% were female.
22
 The 
participants were divided into trait anxiety groups based on a tertial split on the in-lab 
STICSA-Trait score (M = 41.95, Mdn = 42.00, SD = 10.70), resulting in 55 participants in 
the LTA group, 55 in the MTA group and 54 in the HTA group. As expected, a MANOVA 
revealed a significant multivariate effect of the three trait anxiety groups on self-report 
measures of trait anxiety (STICSA-Trait and STAI-Trait), state anxiety (STICSA-State) and 
depression (DASS-depression subscale), F(8, 314) = 33.16, p < .001. Mean scores, standard 
deviations, and results of the independent one-way ANOVAs for the self-report measures by 
trait anxiety group are shown in Table 12. Post-hoc comparisons indicated that the three trait 
anxiety groups differed on all measures in the expected directions.
23
  
  
                                                 
21
 Calm music included Ave Maria by Bach and Peer Gynt Op.23, No. 13, Act 4 Prelude, Morning by Grieg; 
anxious music was Grosse Fuge in B flat Major, Op. 133  by Beethoven.  
22
 The ethnicity profile of the sample was very similar to Study 1 and 2.  
23
 Two participants in the HTA did not have complete self-report data and were excluded in the current 
analyses.  
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Table 12. Study 3: Self-Report Measures by Trait Anxiety Groups. 
    LTA (n = 55)   MTA (n = 55)   HTA (n = 52)       
Measure   M (SD)   M (SD)   M (SD)   F ηp
2
 
STICSA-T 
 
30.20 (3.58) 
 
41.51 (3.27) 
 
54.48 (5.330 
 
461.26*** .85 
STAI-T 
 
28.05 (4.79) 
 
35.93 (8.440 
 
51.00 (8.23) 
 
134.66*** .63 
STICSA-S 
 
25.47 (4.780 
 
31.04 (7.870 
 
41.11 (9.60) 
 
58.25*** .42 
DASS - Depression   1.47 (1.550   3.78 (2.950   5.45 (2.36)  38.10*** .32 
Note. LTA = Low Trait Anxious; MTA = Mid Trait Anxious; HTA = High Trait Anxious; STICSA-T = State Trait Inventory of 
Cognitive and Somatic Anxiety - Trait; STAI-T = State Trait Anxiety Inventory – Trait; STICSA-S = State Trait Inventory of 
Cognitive and Somatic Anxiety – State; DASS-Depression = Depression Anxiety Stress Scales - Depression subscale. 
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3.7.2 State Induction Manipulation Check 
In the current study, the STICSA-State was used to assess the effectiveness of the state 
anxiety induction in order to assess anxiety more specifically than general negative affect (as 
in Study 2).
24
 Mean substitution was used for 6 participants who were missing 1-2 data 
points. A 3 (trait anxiety: low vs. mid vs. high) x 2 (state anxiety order: calm/anxious vs. 
anxious/calm) x 5 (time: block 1 pre-induction vs. block 1 post-induction vs. block 2 pre-
induction vs. block 2 post-induction vs. post EMAT) repeated measures mixed ANOVA 
revealed a 3-way interaction relevant to our purpose, F(5.86, 460.140 adj. df) = 10.64, MSE = 
25.72, p < .001, ηp
2 
= .12. The means and standard errors are displayed in Figure 1.  
 
  
                                                 
24
 One participant had no STICSA-State data and was not included in the current analyses. 
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Figure 1. Study 3: STICSA-State Scores over Time  
STICSA-State scores over time by state induction condition and trait anxiety group. Error 
bars are +/- 1 standard error. Pre-1 = baseline before 1
st
 state induction (calm or anxious); 
Post-1 = after 1
st
 state induction; Pre-2 = before 2
nd
 state induction; Post-2 = after 2
nd
 state 
induction; Post-EMAT = after the 2
nd
 eye movement attention task. Conditions calm/anxious 
indicate participants who had the calm state induction in block 1 and the anxious state 
induction in block 2, while anxious/calm indicates the reversed arrangement.  
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To interpret this interaction, we ran five 3 (trait anxiety: high vs. mid vs. low) by 2 (state 
anxiety condition order: calm/anxious vs. anxious/calm) univariate ANOVAs on each of the 
5 time points (block 1 pre-induction, block 1 post-induction, block 2 pre-induction, block 2 
post-induction, post EMAT). These analyses revealed a significant main effect of trait 
anxiety group at all time points, ps <.001. Post-hoc comparisons revealed that state anxiety 
scores were significantly greater for the HTA compared to the MTA and LTA and for the 
MTA relative to the LTA at all time points. There was also a significant main effect of state 
anxiety condition order at all time points ps <.001, except at baseline as expected, p = .53. 
Lastly, the trait anxiety group by state anxiety condition order only reached significance at 
block 1 post-induction, F(2, 157) = 11.57, MSE = 58.56, p < .001, ηp
2 
=.13, and block 2 pre-
induction, F(2, 157) = 3.63, MSE = 68.77, p <.05, ηp
2 
= .04. These interactions are the result 
of greater differences between the state anxiety conditions as trait anxiety increases (see 
Figure 1) that have little relevance to our manipulation check. 
Most importantly, to assess whether state anxiety levels changed significantly from the 
pre-induction to post-induction, we conducted paired-samples t-tests separately for state 
anxiety condition and trait anxiety group given their interactive effects. All comparisons 
revealed changes in state anxiety in the expected directions, ps <.001. That is, HTA, MTA 
and LTA participants all showed an increase in state anxiety in the anxious state condition 
and a reduction in state anxiety in the calm state condition. Thus, the state induction 
procedures resulted in their desired effects.   
3.7.3 Eye Movement Indices 
The data analysis plan was similar to Study 1 and 2 with the addition of the within-subjects 
effect of state anxiety induction (calm vs. anxious). However, baseline bias analyses would 
not be conducted for the eye movement indices separately for trait anxiety group and state 
anxiety condition (as well as for all 10 time points for the PVT) given the excessive number 
of analyses involved that are not of primary interest to our hypotheses. Rather, the repeated 
measures mixed ANOVAs would be sufficient to answer the research questions in the current 
design. Follow-up analyses will be conducted to assess for the presence of biases from a 
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baseline separated by only the factors that are shown to have a significant influence on the 
attention bias indices.  
 Proportion of First Fixations (PFF).  3.7.3.1
A mixed 3 (trait anxiety group: low vs. mid. vs. high;) x 2 (state anxiety: calm vs. anxious) x 
3 (image type: high threat vs. mild threat vs. positive) repeated measures ANOVA on PFF 
revealed a main effect of image type, F(2, 322) = 11.04, MSE = .007, p <.001, ηp
2 
= .06, such 
that the PFF was greater towards positive images (M = .55, SD =.06) than high threat images 
(M = .53, SD .06) and mild threat images (M = .52, SD = .06), ps < .05, and high threat 
images was greater than mild threat, p = .01. No other effects reached significance.   
Given that there was only a main effect of image type, the PFF were collapsed across trait 
anxiety groups and state anxiety conditions and were assess for the presence of attentional 
biases against .5. The analyses revealed significant biases towards high threat, t(163) = 6.87, 
p <.001, mild threat, t(163) = 3.64, p <.001, and positive images, t(163) = 9.18, p <.001. The 
results are illustrated in Figure 2.  
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Figure 2. Study 3: Proportion of First Fixation Scores  
Proportion of first fixation scores collapsed across trait and state anxiety by image type. Error 
bars are +/- 1 standard error.* p < .05 for one-sample t-test from .5. 
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 First Fixation Gaze Bias (FFGB) 3.7.3.2
FFGD scores greater than 3 standard deviations (SD) above the mean per image category 
type were replaced with a value at 3 SD to ensure that means were not overly influenced by 
outlying values. Twenty-two values (maximum 3 in one image type) met this criterion and 
were adjusted accordingly (1% of the data).   
To determine whether there were significant biases and whether trait anxiety, state anxiety 
and image type influenced the FFGD, a mixed 3 (trait anxiety group: low vs. mid vs. high) x 
2 (state anxiety: calm vs. anxious) x 3 (image type: threat vs. harm vs. positive) x 2 (emotion 
bias: negative vs. neutral) repeated measures ANOVA was conducted. This analysis resulted 
in a main effect of image type, F(1.9, 305.0 adj. df) = 7.83, MSE = 481947.20, p < .001, ηp
2 
= 
.05, a main effect of emotion bias, F(1, 161) = 279.45, MSE = 39195156.17, p < .001, ηp
2 
= 
.63, a state anxiety by emotion bias interaction, F(1, 161) = 3.67, MSE = 79463.27, p < .001, 
ηp
2 
= .02, and an image type by emotion bias interaction, F(1.9, 307.1 adj. df) = 25.37, MSE = 
80499.66, p <.001, ηp
2
= .14, that was all subsumed under a 3 way interaction involving state 
anxiety, image type and emotional bias, F(2, 322) = 4.25, MSE = 65110.49.71, p = .015, ηp
2 
=.03. No effects of trait anxiety group approached significance.  
In order to interpret this interaction, FFGB scores were calculated and a 2 (state anxiety: 
calm vs. anxious) x 3 (image type: high threat. vs. mild threat vs. positive) repeated measures 
ANOVA on FFGB scores revealed a main effect of image type, F(1.9, 310.9 adj. df) = 25.19, 
MSE = 127645.33, p <.001, ηp
2 
= .13 and a marginal main effect of state anxiety, F(1, 161) = 
3.66, MSE = 159293.47, p = .058, ηp
2 
= .02, that were subsumed under a significant image 
type by state anxiety interaction, F(2, 326) = 4.26, MSE = 129579.27, p =.02, ηp
2 
= .03.  
To assist in interpreting the image type by state anxiety interaction, paired-samples t-tests 
to assess the FFGB scores between the state anxiety conditions for each image type revealed 
that the FFGB was significantly greater in the anxious state than in the calm state only for the 
high threat images, t(163) = 3.02, SE = 44.91, p <.01, and not for mild threat, t(163) = .84, SE 
= 45.03, p =.41 or positive images, t(163) = .84, SE = 32.53, p =.40 (see Figure 3). Thus, 
state anxiety increased the maintenance of attention specifically on high threat stimuli 
relative to neutral images.  
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In order to assess whether this greater bias towards high threat images when in a state of 
anxiety relative to a calm state is a result of longer durations on high threat images once first 
fixated and/or shorter durations on neutral images, paired samples t-tests were used to 
compare the FFGD for the high threat images and the matched neutral images separately 
between state anxiety conditions. These results indicated a marginal increase of the duration 
of gaze on high threat images, t(163) = 1.82, SE = 39.11, p = .07 (calm: M = 1040.13, SD = 
524.50; anxious: M = 1111.38, SD = 575.04), and a significant reduction in gaze durations on 
the matched neutral images, t(163) = - 2.54, SE = 25.40, p = .01 (calm: M = 714.38, SD = 
397.17; anxious: M = 649.97, SD = 353.16), between the calm and anxious states. Thus, state 
anxiety appears to both, in part, extend the time that participants dwell on high threat images 
if they fixated on them first and reduce the time one spends viewing neutral images when 
they are paired with high threat, likely facilitating a shift of attention to threat images when 
the neutral images are fixated first.  
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Figure 3. Study 3: First Fixation Gaze Bias 
First fixation gaze bias scores by image type and state anxiety condition. Error bars are +/- 1 
standard error. * indicates significant difference between state anxiety conditions, p < .05. 
 
  
* 
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To assess for attentional biases in the FFGB, one-sample t-tests were conducted for each 
image type separated by state anxiety condition relative to 0 (no bias). The results indicated 
greater FFGB for emotional images compared to neutral images in both the calm and anxious 
state conditions, ts(163) = 6.81 to 12.42, ps <.001.  Thus, participants showed greater 
maintenance of attention following the first fixations on high threat, mild threat, and positive 
emotional images relative to neutral images, independent of state anxiety levels.  
 Proportion of Viewing Time (PVT) 3.7.3.3
A mixed 3 (trait anxiety group: low vs. mid vs. high) x 2 (state anxiety: calm vs. anxious) 
x 3 (image type: high threat vs. mild threat vs. positive) x 10 (time: T1 vs. T2 vs. T3 vs. T4 
vs. T5 vs. T6 vs. T7 vs. T8 vs. T9 vs. T10) repeated measures mixed ANOVA revealed a 
main effect of state anxiety, F(1, 162) =18.01, MSE = .08, p <.001, ηp
2 
=.10, main effect of 
image type, F(1.25, 20071 adj. df) = 33.18, MSE = .19, p <.001, ηp
2 
= .17, a main effect of 
time, F(3.53, 568.69 adj. df) = 40.27, MSE = .04, p <.001, ηp
2 
= .20, a state anxiety by image 
type interaction, F(1.82, 293.73 adj. df) = 17.44, MSE = .06, p <.001, ηp
2 
= .10, state anxiety 
by time interaction, F(4.35, 700.47 adj. df) = 4.92, MSE = .02, p <.001, ηp
2 
= .03, and an 
image type by time interaction, F(4.70, 757.11 adj. df) = 29.96, MSE = .05, p <.001, ηp
2 
= 
.16, that were all subsumed under a state anxiety by image type by time interaction, F(8.995, 
1448.14 adj. df) = 3.02, MSE = .02, p = .001, ηp
2 
= .02. There were no significant effects 
involving trait anxiety.
25
 The means and standard errors for the PVT by state anxiety and 
time for high and mild threat images are depicted in Figure 4 and for positive images in 
Figure 5.   
  
                                                 
25
 The same results for trait-anxiety were found when using STICSA-Trait scores as a covariate rather than a 
between-subjects factor for all analyses (PFF, FFGB and PVT).   
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Figure 4. Study 3: Proportion of Viewing Time for Threat Images 
Proportion of viewing time by threat image type (mild vs. high) and state anxiety condition 
over time (5000 ms). Time intervals are in 500 ms intervals. Error bars are +/- 1 standard 
error.  
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Figure 5: Study 3: Proportion of Viewing Time for Positive Images 
Proportion of viewing time of positive images by state anxiety condition over time (5000 
ms). Time intervals are in 500 ms intervals. Error bars are +/- 1 standard error. 
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To understand the nature of the 3-way interaction, three separate 2 (state anxiety: calm vs. 
anxious) x 10 (time: T1 vs. T2 vs. T3 vs. T4 vs. T5 vs. T6 vs. T7 vs. T8 vs. T9 vs. T10) 
repeated measures ANOVAs were conducted for the high threat, mild threat and positive 
image types.  
For high threat images, this analysis resulted in main effects of state anxiety, F(1, 161) = 
21.73, MSE = .08, p <.001, ηp
2 
= .12, and time, F(2.92, 470.59 adj. df) = 48.43, MSE = .05, p 
<.001, ηp
2 
= .23, and a state anxiety by time interaction, F(4.35, 699.52 adj. df) = 4.03, MSE 
= .02, p = .002, ηp
2 
= .02. To further evaluate this interaction, paired-samples t-tests were 
used at each time point to assess for differences in PVT as a function of state anxiety. All 
time points showed significantly greater PVT when in a state of anxiety than when calm, 
ts(163) = 2.11 to 4.52, ps <.05, except at the first time point, t(163) =.18, p =.86. 
For mild threat images, this analysis resulted in main effects of state anxiety, F(1, 161) = 
16.95, MSE = .09, p < .001, ηp
2 
= .10, and time, F(3.22, 518.59 adj. df) = 30.97, MSE = .04, p 
<.001, ηp
2 
= .16, and a state anxiety by time interaction, F(4.71, 757.87 adj. df) = 6.29, MSE 
= .02, p < .001, ηp
2 
= .04. Paired sample t-tests at each time point showed significantly 
greater PVT when in a state of anxiety than when calm beginning at T4 (1501-2000 ms) 
through to T10 (4501-5000 ms), ts(163) = 2.13 to 4.49, ps <.05, but not at T1-T3, ps > .22. 
For the positive image however, this analysis revealed only a main effects of state anxiety 
F(1, 163) = 8.42, MSE = .03, p =.004, ηp
2 
= .05 and time, F(3.91, 636.69 adj. df) = 16.73, 
MSE = .03, p <.001, ηp
2 
= .09, such that participants viewed positive images slightly less 
when in an anxious state (M =.57) than a calm state (M =.59), and the proportion of time 
viewing positive images relative to neutral images increased over time (e.g., T1 M = .55; T10 
M = .62). 
To assess for attentional biases, one-sample t-tests were used to compare the PVT to .5 for 
each state (calm and anxious) at each time point by image type collapsed across trait anxiety 
group. For high threat images in a calm state, these analyses indicated biases towards threat 
at the first four time points (0-2000 ms), ts(163) = 2.95 to 14.63, ps <.005 and then away 
from threat on the last three time points (3501-5000 ms), ts(163) = -2.25 to -2.63, ps <.03. 
For high threat images in an anxious state, these analyses indicated biases towards threat at 
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the first six time points (0-3000 ms), ts(163) = 2.68 to 18.12, ps <.01, as well as for T8 and 
T9 (3501 – 4500 ms), ts(163) = 2.19 to 2.30, ps <.03. For mild threat images in a calm state, 
the analyses indicated biases towards threat at the first three time points (0-1500 ms), ts(163) 
= 2.49 to 9.39, ps <.02, followed by biases away from mild threat at T5 to T10 (2000 – 5000 
ms), ts(163) = - 2.43 to -4.00, ps <.02. For mild threat images in an anxious state, biases 
reached significance towards threat at the first four time points (0 – 2000 ms) and then at T6 
(2501-3000 ms), ts(163) = 2.16 to 10.21, ps <.04 only. For positive images, all time points 
indicated bias towards positive images when in a calm and anxious state, ts(163) = 4.85 to 
12.54, ps <.005.   
Lastly, we calculated the correlations between trait and state anxiety and the eye 
movement indices when in a calm and anxious state. The results for the first fixation indices 
are in Table 13 and those for the PVT are listed in Table 14. The Pearson’s correlation 
between the STICSA-Trait and STICSA-State completed at baseline was r = .69, p < .001 
and between the STICSA-Trait and STAI-Trait was r = .82, p < .001. 
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Table 13. Study 3: Correlations among Trait and State Anxiety and First Fixation 
Indices 
      Anxiety Scale and Anxious State 
   
STICSA-T STAI-T STICSA-S 
Index and Image Type Calm Anxious Calm Anxious Calm Anxious 
Proportion of First Fixations 
       
High Threat .03 .03 -.02 .08 .02 .05 
 
Mild Threat -.07 .12 -.04 .13 -.04 .18* 
 
Positive -.04 .01 -.06 .04 -.08 .10 
First Fixation Gaze Durations 
       
High Threat .04 .05 .09 .07 .15* .06 
 
Neutral w/High Threat -.11 -.07 -.09 -.08 .01 .03 
 
Mild Threat -.03 .06 .03 .08 .12 .14' 
 
Neutral w/Mild Threat -.01 -.01 -.03 -.04 .07 -.01 
 
Positive .00 .01 -.02 .01 .10 .07 
 
Neutral w/Positive .01 -.06 .04 -.04 .16* -.02 
First Fixation Gaze Bias 
       
High Threat .14' .11 .18* .15' .17* .05 
 
Mild Threat -.02 .08 .07 .14' .06 .19* 
  Positive -.01 .09 -.08 .07 -.03 .14' 
Note. STICSA-T = State Trait Inventory of Cognitive and Somatic Anxiety - Trait;  
STAI-T = State Trait Anxiety Inventory - Trait; STICSA-S = State Trait Inventory of 
Cognitive and Somatic Anxiety - State; STICSA-S for the calm and anxiety conditions  
were the measure post calm and anxiety inductions, respectively. 
* p < .05. ** p < .01. ' p < .09 
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Table 14. Study 3: Correlations among Trait and State Anxiety and the Proportion of 
Viewing Time 
      Anxiety Scale and Anxious State 
   
STICSA-T STAI-T STICSA-S 
Proportion of Viewing Time Calm Anxious Calm Anxious Calm Anxious 
 
High Threat 
      
  
T1 (0-500) .01 -.03 -.02 .04 .02 -.05 
  
T2 (501-1000) .04 .04 .05 .06 .01 -.04 
  
T3 (1001-1500) .05 .13 .09 .06 .05 .06 
  
T4 (1501-2000) .06 .10 .08 .10 .06 .12 
  
T5 (2001-2500) .04 .01 .04 .04 .03 .09 
  
T6 (2500-3000) .04 .00 .04 .03 .05 .06 
  
T7 (3001-3500) -.01 -.02 .05 .03 .03 .01 
  
T8 (3501-4000) -.03 -.01 .04 .02 .03 .06 
  
T9 (4001-4500) .00 -.05 .07 .00 .05 .06 
  
T10 (4501-5000) -.02 -.04 .02 -.02 -.04 .05 
 
Mild Threat 
      
  
T1 (0-500) .00 .11 .03 .11 .03 .16* 
  
T2 (501-1000) -.07 .09 .02 .09 .01 .17* 
  
T3 (1001-1500) -.06 -.03 -.01 -.04 -.01 .01 
  
T4 (1501-2000) -.06 -.09 -.02 -.09 -.02 -.02 
  
T5 (2001-2500) -.07 -.07 -.05 -.07 -.04 .03 
  
T6 (2500-3000) -.02 -.03 .01 -.02 -.02 .08 
  
T7 (3001-3500) .02 .05 .08 .06 .04 .14' 
  
T8 (3501-4000) -.03 -.01 .05 .07 .03 .09 
  
T9 (4001-4500) .08 -.07 .12 .02 .09 .02 
  
T10 (4501-5000) .02 -.05 .08 .00 .10 -.01 
 
Positive 
      
  
T1 (0-500) -.01 -.01 -.03 .04 -.09 .10 
  
T2 (501-1000) .05 -.04 .05 -.03 -.02 -.01 
  
T3 (1001-1500) -.05 -.13 -.06 -.09 -.02 -.12 
  
T4 (1501-2000) -.13 -.03 -.18* .04 -.14' .00 
  
T5 (2001-2500) -.07 .06 -.10 .04 -.15' -.05 
  
T6 (2500-3000) .06 .04 .07 -.01 -.03 -.04 
  
T7 (3001-3500) .09 -.05 .10 -.06 .02 -.05 
  
T8 (3501-4000) .07 -.09 .08 -.08 .01 -.05 
  
T9 (4001-4500) .06 -.08 .02 -.02 -.07 -.01 
  T10 (4501-5000) .02 -.05 -.01 .00 -.11 -.05 
Note. STICSA-T = State Trait Inventory of Cognitive and Somatic Anxiety - Trait; STAI-T = State Trait 
Anxiety Inventory - Trait; STICSA-S = State Trait Inventory of Cognitive and Somatic Anxiety - State; 
STICSA-S for the calm and anxiety conditions was the measure post calm and anxiety inductions, respectively. 
* p < .05. ** p < .01. ' p <.09       
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3.7.4 Motivation Ratings 
Three participants were missing data on the motivational ratings for negative images for 1-6 
data points; all present data was included in the analyses. Only the motivational ratings 
towards (M = 4.15, SD = 1.47) and away from negative images (M = 4.29, SD = 1.63) were 
analyzed given our primary interest in motivation towards threat stimuli. The association 
between the motivation to look towards and away from threat images was r = - .37, p <.01 
indicating a small to moderate association, but not redundancy in measurement.  
The correlation coefficients among the motivation ratings towards and away from 
negative images and eye movement indices are presented in Table 15. In general, the 
motivation ratings towards and away from negative images were not significantly associated 
with early indices of ABT, but were associated with many indices over time. Associations 
among the trait anxiety measures (STICSA-T and STAI-T) and motivating ratings were 
assessed and only the STIA-T and motivation to look towards threat reached significance, r = 
.21, p < .01 (see Nelson, Purdon, Quigley, Carriere, & Smilek, in press for more motivation 
analyses). These results suggest that the greater the trait anxiety, the more motivated they 
were look toward threat, but not away from it.   
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Table 15. Study 3: Correlations among Motivation Ratings and Eye Movements Indices 
        Anxious State 
    
Calm 
 
Anxious 
    
Motivation 
Index and Image Type   Towards Away   Towards Away 
Proportion of First Fixations 
       
High Threat 
 
.11 -.01 .16* -.03 
 
Mild Threat 
 
.08 -.01 
 
.04 -.13 
First Fixation Gaze Durations 
      
 
High Threat 
 
.27*** -.16* 
 
.33*** -.23** 
 
Mild Threat 
 
.29*** -.17* 
 
.27** -.16* 
First Fixation Gaze Bias 
      
 
High Threat 
 
.17* -.14' 
 
.29*** -.21** 
 
Mild Threat 
 
.25** -.17* 
 
.23** -.14' 
Proportion of Viewing Time 
      
 
High Threat 
      
  
T1 (0-500) 
 
.08 0 
 
.10 .03 
  
T2 (501-1000) 
 
.08 .03 
 
.13 .03 
  
T3 (1001-1500) 
 
.18* -.22** 
 
.27*** -.21*** 
  
T4 (1501-2000) 
 
.23** -.24** 
 
.39*** -.30*** 
  
T5 (2001-2500) 
 
.28*** -.28** 
 
.40*** -.34*** 
  
T6 (2500-3000) 
 
.33*** -.28*** 
 
.33*** -.35*** 
  
T7 (3001-3500) 
 
.34*** -.32*** 
 
.32*** -.37*** 
  
T8 (3501-4000) 
 
.39*** -.36*** 
 
.39*** -.38*** 
  
T9 (4001-4500) 
 
.38*** -.37*** 
 
.45*** -.36*** 
  
T10 (4501-5000) 
 
.34*** -.35*** 
 
.49*** -.39*** 
 
Mild Threat 
      
  
T1 (0-500) 
 
.10 .02 
 
.02 -.14' 
  
T2 (501-1000) 
 
.13 .01 
 
-.04 .00 
  
T3 (1001-1500) 
 
.31*** -.14' 
 
.17* -.17* 
  
T4 (1501-2000) 
 
.38*** -.22** 
 
.35*** -.37*** 
  
T5 (2001-2500) 
 
.35*** -.28** 
 
.31*** -.40*** 
  
T6 (2500-3000) 
 
.36*** -.35*** 
 
.29*** -.37*** 
  
T7 (3001-3500) 
 
.29*** -.38*** 
 
.31*** -.42*** 
  
T8 (3501-4000) 
 
.26*** -.36*** 
 
.32*** -.44*** 
  
T9 (4001-4500) 
 
.28*** -.32*** 
 
.30*** -.43*** 
  T10 (4501-5000)   .30*** -.31***  .36*** -.44*** 
* p < .05. ** p < .01. *** p < .001. ' p < .09 
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3.8 Discussion 
The purpose of Study 3 was to directly compare the relative contributions of trait and state 
anxiety on multiple components of ABT over time, including the moderation of trait anxiety 
and ABT by threat intensity, and to explore the role of motivation on ABT. Each purpose and 
the corresponding hypotheses will be discussed below.  
3.8.1 Trait and State Anxiety 
Overall, the results indicated that all participants engaged in early facilitated orienting to, and 
maintenance of attention on, emotional stimuli (high threat, mild threat and positive images) 
relative to neutral stimuli. That is, participants were more likely to make their first fixations 
on emotional images, to maintain their gaze on emotional images, and spend the first 500 ms 
of viewing emotional images relative to neutral images, regardless of trait or state anxiety 
levels. These results are consistent with research (e.g., Calvo & Lang, 2004; Nummenmaa et 
al., 2006; Quigley et al., 2012) suggesting that facilitated attention to emotional stimuli is 
normative and likely adaptive in defending against harm. However, these results are not 
consistent with the hypothesis that HTA individuals show early (at or before 500 ms) 
facilitated biases to orient towards threat while LTA show no ABT (Bar-Haim et al., 2007). 
This discrepancy may be due to differences in methodology, issues of reliability (e.g., 
Waechter et al., 2014) and/or the precision of attentional bias indices over time given that the 
majority of research finding no biases in LTA groups has used response time tasks that infer 
attentional focus (Bar-Haim et al., 2007), whereas research demonstrating biases in LTA 
individuals has tended to assess eye movements that allow for the identification of the exact 
fixation locations over time (e.g., Quigley et al., 2012). Nevertheless, even the eye movement 
results are mixed (e.g., Study 1; Calvo & Avero, 2005) and further research is needed to 
clarify factors that can account for these varied results.   
Although the current study demonstrated that all participants attend to threat-related 
stimuli (relative to neutral), the data did not indicate a significant moderating effect of threat 
intensity on trait anxiety and early ABT to support the hypothesis that HTA individuals show 
greater facilitated attention towards relatively mild threat stimuli (but not high threat) than 
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LTA (Mogg & Bradley, 1998; Wilson & MacLeod, 2003). Rather, all participants, regardless 
of trait or state anxiety levels, showed greater facilitated orienting biases (e.g., proportion of 
first fixations) towards high threat images relative to mild threat images, consistent with 
other research assessing threat intensity (Koster et al., 2006; Mogg et al., 2000
26
; but not in 
Yiend & Mathews, 2001). Given the relative nature of high versus mild threat stimuli, it is 
possible that we are not able to fully test this hypothesis adequately. Nevertheless, the data to 
date do not support the notion that trait anxiety effects on ABT are more likely to result from 
mild rather than more severe threat stimuli, and thus do not explain the mixed trait anxiety 
results across studies. 
Moreover, despite the methodological advancements in the current study (i.e., larger 
number of trials, more participants, greater trial duration, calm mood state comparison), the 
results did not reveal any significant effects of trait anxiety on ABT. Rather, state anxiety 
alone was associated with greater maintenance of attention on high threat images following 
the first fixation and for threat stimuli in general over time, consistent with an associative 
network model (Bower, 1981). These results are also consistent with other studies that 
demonstrated associations between state anxiety and ABT (e.g., Bradley et al., 2000; Fox et 
al., 2001; Mathews & MacLeod, 1985; Mogg et al., 1997) however, they suggest that state 
anxiety is not associated with all components of ABT, but to the maintenance of attention 
over time once threat stimuli are detected. These results corroborate those of Quigley et al. 
(2012), which also indicated a state anxiety-linked attentional bias in the maintenance of 
threat over time and the absence of any significant trait anxiety effects. Thus, given the 
methodological improvements of the current study and the replication of past results, we can 
have greater confidence that the null trait anxiety effects are not simply due to inadequate 
statistical power or other methodological issues addressed in our current design.  
There are at least two possible explanations for the present findings regarding the relative 
contributions of trait and state anxiety to ABT. The first is that threat-related attentional 
                                                 
26
 Although Mogg et al., (2000) found an interaction involving threat intensity and trait anxiety on ABT, the 
results did not fully support the pattern of ABT predicted by Mogg & Bradley, 1998.  Analyses to assess bias 
scores from chance levels were not included and thus, do not allow one to conclude whether biases were present 
or not.  
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biases are largely a phenomenon of state anxiety rather than trait anxiety. Other published 
eye tracking studies have also failed to find trait anxiety or anxiety disorder specific effects 
on the first fixations or in the first 500 ms of viewing (e.g., Armstrong et al., 2013; Buckner 
et al., 2010; Derakshan & Koster, 2010; Garner et al., 2006; Gerdes et al., 2009; Rohner, 
2002; Schofield et al., 2012; Quigley et al., 2012; Waechter et al., 2014) and at later points in 
time (Calvo & Avero, 2005, for threat images; Derakshan & Koster, 2010; Gamble & Rapee, 
2010; Waechter et al., 2014). Moreover, although Quigley et al. (2012) is the only previous 
study to assess and observe a state anxiety effect on ABT using continuous eye movement 
over time, a number of studies using response time paradigms have categorized participants 
according to state anxiety and have also provided support for a state anxiety effect on ABT 
(e.g., Bradley et al., 2000; Fox et al., 2001; Mathews & MacLeod, 1985; Mogg et al., 1997). 
Individuals who are high in trait anxiety are by definition likely to experience state anxiety 
more frequently and to a greater extent than LTA individuals, and therefore trait and state 
anxiety are highly confounded in previous research that has not measured or manipulated and 
compared both types of anxieties. Thus, it is possible that trait anxiety and anxiety disorder 
specific effects on ABT observed in previous studies (e.g., Armstrong et al., 2013; Garner et 
al., 2006; see Bar-Haim et al., 2007 and Armstrong & Olatunji, 2012 for reviews) may have 
actually been produced by state anxiety.  
A second possible explanation for the present findings is that state and trait anxiety 
differentially influence the various components of ABT, such that trait anxiety is 
predominantly related to the control of attention and general distractibility (Eysenck, 1997). 
The delayed disengagement hypothesis argues that the attentional biases observed in trait 
anxiety are due to delayed or difficulty with disengagement of attention from threat once it 
has been attended (Fox et al., 2001; Fox et al., 2002; Koster et al., 2006; Koster, Crombez, 
Van Damme, Verschuere & De Houwer, 2004). Thus, this hypothesis proposes that HTA 
individuals have difficulty controlling their attention in the presence of threatening distractor 
stimuli. Similarly, the attentional control theory suggests that HTA individuals have a general 
deficit in controlling attention, regardless of the nature of the stimuli (Eysenck, 1997, 
Eysenck et al., 2007). The present study employed a free viewing paradigm and participants 
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were not required to disengage or control their attention. There were, however, small 
associations between greater scores on the STAI-Trait and longer maintenance of attention 
following the first fixation on threat images (FFGB scores). This index of ABT is the most 
similar to other attentional bias tasks (e.g., the dot-probe task, spatial cueing) which typically 
require participants to disengage from an image in order to respond to a cue. Nevertheless, 
the current study was designed to assess the preferences of participants to engage and 
disengage from threat relative to neutral images, and thus was not designed to test the ability 
of participants to disengage attention from threat.   
Perhaps, as discussed in Quigley et al., (2012), tasks that require participants to disengage 
their attention from threat or that involve greater attentional control ability may be more 
influenced by trait anxiety. This hypothesis is supported by neuroimaging studies that have 
found trait anxiety to be associated with reduced activation of brain regions involved in the 
control of attention (e.g., prefrontal cortex; Bishop, 2009; Bishop, Jenkins, & Lawrence, 
2007) and state anxiety to be associated with increased activity in regions involved in the 
detection and evaluation of threat (e.g., amygdala; Bishop, Duncan, & Lawrence, 2004). 
Similarly, Pacheco-Unguetti et al. (2010) found that state anxiety was related to an increase 
in functioning of the alerting and orienting functions of attention and trait anxiety was related 
to deficient control of attention. In addition to its theoretical relevance, this possibility would 
also have important treatment implications, as ABM approaches that train disengagement 
from threat or that improve attentional control ability in the presence of threat may be more 
effective for the treatment of anxiety disorders than approaches that train individuals to not 
attend to threat and/or attend to neutral or positive information. Future research should 
evaluate the effects of trait and state anxiety on attention using a range of tasks where eye 
tracking can directly assess viewing behavior, particularly paradigms that require participants 
to control or disengage their attention (e.g., antisaccade task) to determine whether trait and 
state anxiety are differentially associated with attentional control in general (i.e., involving 
neutral stimuli) and specifically in the presence of threat. Further implications of this 
research will be considered in the general discussion below. 
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3.8.2 Motivation 
Another purpose of the current study was to begin to evaluate participants’ motivation and 
strategic processing when presented with threat-neutral image pairs in order to assess 
whether deliberate “top down” processing significantly influences the allocation of attention 
over time in a free viewing task. In the current study, participants ratings of motivation to 
look towards negative images was significantly associated with greater ABT on several 
indices of bias over time for high and mild threat images, while motivation ratings to look 
away from negative images were negatively associated with ABT, as expected. In other 
words, the more participants wanted to visually engage with or avoid the threat images, the 
more they did so. Relatedly, applied strategies to avoid threat (relative to no identified goal) 
have been shown to reduce ABT and subsequent distress (Johnson, 2009), but it is generally 
not known what participants intrinsic motivations are in this context and how such 
motivations may influence attention over time. Overall, the current data suggest that people 
vary in their motivation direction and intensity and that these ratings reliably predict viewing 
behaviour (unlike trait anxiety).  
More specifically, motivation ratings had little or no effect on the initial orienting to threat 
(except a small positive association with motivation towards threat and high threat images) or 
in the first 1000 ms of viewing when assessed over time. These results are consistent with 
data suggesting that strategic instructions to avoid threat are less likely to reduce early 
indices of ABT (Nummenmaa et al., 2006; but also see Vogt et al., 2013).
27
 Rather, such 
strategies may be more likely to result in a vigilance-avoidance pattern over time (Mogg & 
Bradley, 1998), such that early detection of threat is followed by a shift of attention away 
from threat once strategic processing is engaged. The results from the FFGD and FFGB 
scores are consistent with this notion and indicate significant associations between 
motivation ratings and gaze durations/biases in the expected directions. The average FFGD 
on high threat images was over 1000 ms, more than enough time for strategic processing to 
occur, thus those with greater motivation to avoid threat showed early vigilance (as was 
                                                 
27
 It is also highly possible that these null results are due to poor reliability of early indices of bias (Waechter et 
al., 2014).  
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found in all participants on average) followed by less time viewing threat once first fixated. 
Nevertheless, the vigilance-avoidance pattern was not found for HTA individuals as theory 
would suggest (Mogg & Bradley, 1998) and motivation to look towards threat images (not 
away) was only weakly associated with trait-anxiety. These results likely suggest that HTA 
individuals use a variety of strategies (e.g. monitoring, avoidance) to cope with their state 
anxiety and more research is needed to evaluate strategic as well as relatively automatic 
attentional processing over time (Cisler & Koster, 2010) in order to understand how 
attentional deployment may function to regulate emotion (e.g., Todd, Cunningham, 
Anderson, & Thompson, 2012).  
3.8.3 Limitations 
There are several specific limitations in this study to note. Limitations that apply to all 
three studies will be considered in the general discussion below. First, in the current study, 
the image types differed significantly in their IAPS arousal ratings and therefore, emotion 
and arousal were confounded. It is possible that state anxiety increases attention to arousing 
stimuli more generally rather than high threat stimuli specifically. This limitation applies to 
most other ABT research and is difficult to bypass given that threat stimuli are typically both 
negative and arousing by definition. Nevertheless, it would be valuable for future studies to 
control levels of arousal across emotional image types (e.g., high threat, high positive) to 
determine whether anxiety-related attentional biases are specific to negatively arousing (i.e., 
highly threatening) stimuli or extend to positively arousing (i.e., exciting) stimuli as well. 
Secondly, motivation to attend to and avoid negative information were measured by single 
items administered retrospectively; given the promising results, it will be important to assess 
motivation in greater depth with multiple items that can be shown to be valid and reliable. 
Furthermore, the ratings were made after the EMAT and thus, could simply be post-hoc 
reports of what participants did in the task, rather than their intrinsic motivation. Assessing 
motivation in advance of viewing behaviour would address this limitation. 
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3.8.4 Summary 
In sum, the present study found that the induction of state anxiety increased the 
maintenance of attention towards threat following the first fixation and over time from 500 to 
5000 ms while trait anxiety was not largely shown to be associated with indices of ABT in 
the free viewing task.  The role of state anxiety on the components of ABT appears to have 
been overlooked thus far and deserves greater consideration in future research and in 
theoretical models of ABT. Similarly, while motivation and goal directed behaviours have 
been incorporated into models of ABT (e.g., Bar-Haim et al., 2007; Matthews & Mackintosh, 
1998; Mogg & Bradley, 1998), relatively little research has assessed their role. Further 
research on the components, mechanisms and moderators of ABT is essential to 
understanding the nature of such biases and how they contribute to emotional distress in 
order to most effectively use strategies to alter attentional processes in the treatment of 
anxiety disorders. 
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Chapter 5 
General Discussion 
3.9 Summary of Research  
The central purpose of the current research was to clarify the nature of anxiety-related ABT 
in order to identify potential maladaptive attentional processes that may contribute to the 
development and persistence of anxiety disorders. In general, the current data indicated that 
some components of attention (e.g., facilitated attention, delay in disengagement) show 
biases involving threat in all participants and that in general, state anxiety, but not trait 
anxiety, increased the maintenance of attention specifically to threat over time. Given that 
such attentional biases were not specific to HTA individuals, it seems that these biases are 
more normative rather than maladaptive. Therefore, the current data do not support the 
majority of current theories of ABT, but have identified a significant confound in the extant 
literature that when evaluated in future research, could considerably advance our 
understanding of the specific mechanisms and attentional processes associated with both trait 
and state anxiety in those with anxiety disorders. The current results will be briefly discussed 
in terms of the central tenants of the theoretical models, the vigilance hypothesis, 
maintenance hypothesis, and vigilance-avoidance hypothesis (Weierich et al., 2008), 
followed by theoretical and clinical implications.  
The current research indicates that facilitated orienting of attention to threat is likely a 
normative process (e.g., Calvo & Lang, 2004; Nummenmaa et al., 2006) that occurs in most 
participants (on average) despite levels of state and/or trait anxiety, and transpires for 
emotional stimuli (negative and positive) in general. Of note, biases in initial orienting to 
threat and in the first 500 ms of viewing, when found, were relatively small and our ability to 
reliably measure this attentional processes with a free viewing eye movement task is likely 
poor (Waechter et al., 2014), making it difficult to interpret such small and null results. 
Nevertheless, while vigilance for emotional stimuli was found, these data do not support the 
specificity of the vigilance hypothesis for HTA populations proposed by many models of 
ABT (e.g., Bar-Haim et al., 2007; Beck & Clark, 1997) and the null results are not explained 
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by differences in threat intensity (mild vs severe threat; Matthews & Mackintosh, 1998; 
Mogg & Bradley, 1998). Moreover, given that there was no significant interaction involving 
trait and state anxiety involving indices of facilitated attention as expected, Williams and 
colleagues (1988; 1997) interaction hypothesis was also not supported.   
Similarly, a delay in disengagement of attention from threat was found when state anxiety 
was elevated in all participants and more specifically, state anxiety was shown to enhance the 
maintenance of attention to threat following the first fixation and over time (up to 5000 ms), 
consistent with the delayed disengagement hypothesis (Fox et al., 2001) and a general mood 
congruent effect (Bower, 1981). However, a delay in disengagement was not largely 
associated with trait anxiety when state anxiety was controlled for (Study 3), or specific to 
HTA, thus the current data do not support the specificity of the maintenance hypothesis 
(Weierich et al., 2008).  
Lastly, the current results indicated that ABT does shift over time and thus, measuring 
indices of bias at one point in time is not sufficient for understanding the full phenomenology 
of attentional orienting to threat. When state levels of anxiety were not manipulated (Study 
1), there was a general pattern of relative attention towards threat-related images followed by 
greater attention towards the neutral images, consistent with a vigilance-avoidance pattern. 
However, such a pattern was not specific to HTA individuals, as suggested by the vigilance-
avoidance hypothesis (Mogg & Bradley, 1998). Rather, when state anxiety levels were 
elevated (Study 2), LTA participants showed some indication of biases away from threat 
images later in the time course (as did the full sample), but this viewing behaviour did not 
differ significantly from other participants and is generally not supported in the literature 
(e.g., Bar-Haim et al, Quigley et al., 2012). In contrast, it seems that participants varied 
substantially in their viewing behaviour over time and that this behaviour was not predicted 
well by trait anxiety, but by motivational factors, consistent with arguments made by Wells 
and Matthews (1994) and more recent research (e.g., Vogt et al., 2013) that has begun to 
assess the influence of goals and strategic processing on ABT. 
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The most clear and striking finding from the current program of research about the nature 
of anxiety-related ABT is that state anxiety increases the maintenance of attention following 
the first fixation and between 500 and 5000 ms of viewing threat-related, but not positive 
images. In Study 3, when in a calm mood state, participants showed a general vigilant-
avoidant pattern of attention to threat over time, similar to Study 1; however, when in an 
anxious state, biases to threat were maintained over time, rather than shifting to the neutral 
images (on average). Notably, in Study 2, when state anxiety was elevated, a significant trait 
anxiety effect was found for viewing threat images when averaged over the full time course, 
such that HTA individuals showed a greater ABT than LTA, as predicted by models of ABT 
(e.g., Matthews & Mackintosh, 1998; Mogg & Bradley, 1998). However, results of Study 3 
indicated that this trait anxiety effect was largely the result of state anxiety alone, rather than 
additive effects of trait and state, or an interaction, as proposed by some theories (e.g., Mogg 
& Bradley, 1998; Williams et al., 1997). Thus, these results suggest that trait anxiety effects 
in ABT could be accounted for, at least in part, by state anxiety given that most studies do 
not assess for both types of anxieties (Bar-Haim et al., 2007). Such a result has substantial 
implication for current theories of ABT, as well as for clinical treatments that are based on 
these theoretical models. 
3.10 Theoretical and Clinical Implications 
If biases in the maintenance of selective attention to threat are largely associated with state 
anxiety, rather than trait anxiety, this notion would have important theoretical implications 
for the causal role of attention in anxiety disorders. That is, a state anxiety-linked ABT would 
suggest that this bias is most likely a result of being state anxious, rather than a cause of 
anxiety disorders. The current data suggests that all individuals attend to threat on the first 
fixations and then maintain their attention on threat, particularly when in a state of anxiety. 
Given that the majority of individuals do not have pathological anxiety or go on to develop 
an anxiety disorder, ABT may play a weaker role in the development of anxiety disorders 
than previously thought, or may only lead to an anxiety disorder in conjunction or interaction 
with other risk factors. It could be that biases in the maintenance of attention are more 
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involved in the persistence of anxiety, such that individuals with anxiety disorders experience 
greater and more frequent states of anxiety and consequently demonstrate greater biases in 
the maintenance of attention, which in turn maintains or exacerbates anxious states (Eysenck, 
1997). These possibilities deserve consideration in future research and in theoretical accounts 
of anxiety-related ABT.  
Consequently, attentional bias modification (ABM) treatments that attempt to alter ABT 
are based on the notion that such biases cause anxiety disorders (e.g., MacLeod, Rutherford, 
Campbell, Ebsworthy, & Holker, 2002). If a bias in the maintenance of attention on threat is 
a result of being state anxious, ABM treatments may target a consequence rather than a cause 
of anxiety. Even if such biases are involved in the maintenance or exacerbation of anxiety 
states in individuals with anxiety disorders, it is not clear that the reduction of ABT would 
address the root cause of the anxiety problem, although it may be helpful for symptom 
management or in combination with other treatment approaches. If ABT leads to 
pathological anxiety only in conjunction or interaction with other risk factors, this would 
suggest that treatments for anxiety disorders would need to focus on these other risk factors 
in addition to ABT, and that ABM may only be effective for certain individuals who exhibit 
an ABT and for whom an ABT was a vulnerability factor for their anxiety disorder. These 
potential issues with ABM may help explain, in part, the unreliable and relatively weak 
outcomes of such treatments on the reduction of anxiety symptoms (Hallion & Ruscio, 2011; 
Neubauer, van Auer, Murray, Petermann, Helbig-Lang, & Gerlach, 2013; Rapee, MacLeod, 
Carpenter, Gaston, Frie, Peters, & Baillie, 2013; also see Clarke, Notebaert, & MacLeod, 
2014). Moreover, a large portion of the early literature focused on whether ABT were 
relatively early and automatic or late and controlled (for reviews see McNally, 1995 and 
Teachman, Joormann, Steinman, & Gotlib, 2012; for a discussion about the problems with 
this dichotomy see Anderson, 2011) with the implication being that more automatic 
processes would be less amenable to cognitive and verbally mediated treatments than more 
strategic biases (see Mobini & Grant, 2007). For instance, McNally (1995) concluded that 
anxiety disorders involve attentional processes that are largely automatic in that they are 
involuntary and sometimes unconscious and thus, treatments that attempt to use strategic 
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processing to alter such ABT (e.g., cognitive therapy) would largely be ineffective. Rather, 
behavioral interventions, such as in vivo exposure treatments, would be more effective in 
reducing ABT and consequently, the resulting fear and anxiety (e.g., Öhman & Soares, 
1994). In general, research has shown that indices of ABT (as measured by dichotic listening, 
Stroop and dot-probe tasks) are significantly reduced following Cognitive-Behavioral 
Therapy (CBT; see Tobon, Ouimet, & Dozois, 2011 for a review), yet no study to our 
knowledge  has assessed ABT pre and post CBT using eye movement indices that can more 
clearly identify the nature of the biases. Moreover, no research to date has compared 
behavioral to cognitive therapy, nor assessed the relative influence of trait and state anxiety 
on ABT over the course of treatment. It may be that the reduction in ABT following 
treatment is due to a reduction in state, rather than trait, anxiety.  
Furthermore, more recent research has begun to assess whether ABT predicts treatment 
outcome using CBT approaches and found that greater vigilance (Price, Tone, & Anderson, 
2011; as measured by a dot-probe task) and slower disengagement from negative faces 
(angry and disapproving faces as measured by a spatial cueing task) predicted better 
treatment outcomes for those with social anxiety disorder (Niles, Mesri, Burklund, 
Lieberman, & Craske, 2013). Niles and colleagues (2013) suggested that participants who 
maintain their attention on threat, rather than avoid it, may have shown greater attention to 
their feared stimuli during the exposure exercises and consequently, profited more from the 
behavioral treatment. Nonetheless, research has not yet assessed attentional direction in this 
way during exposure treatments and would be an important direction for further research. 
While these recent attempts to extend experimental findings on ABT to assist in the treatment 
of anxiety disorders have been promising, the inconsistencies and limitations in the current 
experimental literature restrict our ability to clearly identify the central maladaptive 
attentional processes that contribute to the development and maintenance of anxiety disorders 
that would be favorable targets for psychological interventions.  
The results of the exploratory analyses assessing associations between motivation and 
ABT point to a promising area that may advance our understanding of anxiety-related 
attentional biases. That is, vulnerability to anxiety disorders may not be the result of where 
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attention is deployed, but why attention is directed where it is. Anxiety is generally thought to 
be associated with avoidance goals (e.g., Dickson & MacLeod, 2004) and behaviours (see 
Dymond & Roche, 2009 for a review) in order to protect one from harm. However, 
individuals with anxiety disorders and HTA individuals have greater expectancies of harm 
(see Taylor & Fedoroff, 1999 for a review of expectancy theory), even in the presence of 
safety cues (Liao & Craske, 2013), and thus, may place greater importance on avoiding 
negative outcomes and be more motivated to engage in a wide range of coping behaviours 
(monitoring, gaze aversion, physical escape) that reinforce their negative expectancies. Of 
note, general avoidance behaviours do not necessarily suggest that one would avert eye gaze 
from a threat since monitoring it could assist in avoiding harm. Consistent with this notion, 
trait anxiety was associated with motivation to attend toward negative stimuli, albeit weakly, 
but not to avoid negative images. What we want to know is what is it about the (trait or state) 
anxious individuals’ experience that directs selective attention when presented with threat 
relative to other stimuli? As argued by Anderson (2011), attention is a consequence or an 
outcome of something (i.e., motivation, anxiety, emotion regulation), rather than a cause. 
Likewise, manipulating attentional direction may not be a viable mechanism or cause for 
ameliorating anxious symptoms, but rather a “place holder for that something” (p. 4, 
Anderson, 2011) that explains the empirical differences (e.g., ability to inhibit and/or control 
visual orienting; Amir & Conley, 2014). The current program of research suggests that 
simply the direction of attention on its own, to the extent that it is directed towards and away 
from threat over time, is not likely a direct cause of anxiety or anxiety disorders and we must 
begin to look more closely at what motivates anxious individuals and how motivation may 
influence behavioural, cognitive and emotional responses to threat, including attentional 
processes, that together contribute to and maintain anxious states and anxiety disorders. 
3.11 Limitations and Directions for Future Research 
Although the current program of research has numerous strengths, it also has several 
limitations that warrant further discussion and that highlight important areas for further 
research. First, Waechter and colleagues (2014) have found that the reliability of eye 
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movement indices for first fixations and early time epochs is poor, which may account for the 
negative findings regarding the indices of early facilitated orienting. Although the 
randomization of stimulus location in Study 3 was designed to reduce participant’s tendency 
to look at the left or top images first, the reliability of this approach has not yet been assessed 
and further research on the reliability of eye movement indices in general is needed.  
Second, it is important to note that the “threatening” stimuli were simply static images. It 
may be the case that when presented with stimuli that represent more realistic threats (e.g., 
live spiders for people afraid of spiders) and fear schema are fully activated, that viewing 
patterns may more closely follow those proposed by models of ABT (e.g., Beck & Clark 
1997; Eysenck, 1992;  Mogg & Bradley, 1998). Furthermore, participants were presented 
with only two images at a time, knowing that threat images would be present, whereas 
environments generally are much more complex with multiple competing stimuli that one 
cannot as easily predict will contain potential threats. Future research would benefit from 
using more complex stimulus displays and experimental paradigms where threat is 
unexpected and more unpredictable (Richards et al., 2014) to emulate more real world 
experience. 
It is also worthy to consider that vigilance and avoidance may have much to do with the 
extent to which the individual appraises the imminence and severity of the threat as well as 
their capacity to flee or fight (e.g., Craske, 1999). If one is afraid of spiders and a spider 
appears in the room, it may capture attention if it is on the move, is very close, or is 
especially fearsome looking. However, if the spider stays at a distance and does not move, it 
may be less anxiety-provoking to ignore it. However, if one lacks the capacity for attentional 
control, such regulatory attempts may fail. It may be the case that attention retraining is 
successful in reducing anxiety (e.g., Amir, Beard, Taylor, Klumpp, Burns, & Chen, 2009) 
less because it overrides actual attentional biases and more because it helps individuals 
develop greater attentional control in the later stages of attentional processing (Koster, Baert, 
Bockstaele, & De Raedt, 2010). Thus, whereas bottom-up deployment of attention may 
depend to a large extent on detecting salient emotional stimuli, top-down deployment of 
attention may depend, at least to some extent, on the appraisal of the imminence, severity, 
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and control one has over the threat, as well as the capacity to master attentional deployment, 
which in turn may help account for inconsistencies in findings across studies. In future 
research it might be worthwhile to match eye movements with stream of consciousness 
verbalizations in addition to further assessment of threat appraisal and motivation to monitor 
versus avoid the stimuli as used in the current program of research. 
Relatedly, as discussed in Study 3, the free viewing paradigm did not require participants 
to control or disengage their attention from threat, and thus it is unknown whether trait 
anxiety effects would have been observed if attentional control, or the ability to disengage 
from threat, was assessed more directly. Further research is needed to disentangle the effects 
of trait and state anxiety on attention to threat during controlled attention tasks (e.g., anti-
saccade tasks). If trait anxiety is associated with a difficulty disengaging attention from 
threat, above and beyond the effect of state anxiety, then this result would suggest that a 
mechanism likely involved in trait anxiety-related ABT, and perhaps anxiety disorders, 
involves distractibility and the difficulty focusing attention on a goal/task when potential 
threat is present (Eysenck, 2007) rather than simply a preference to attend to threat. 
Moreover, a recent theoretical distinction between selective attention and hypervigilance 
may account for the mixed results in the literature and improve our understanding of anxiety-
related ABT beyond the current models (Richards et al., 2014). That is, facilitated attention 
may result from a preference for processing threat (i.e., selective attention) or an alertness for 
threat signals (i.e., hypervigilance) that occurs more generally, even before threat is present. 
These two processes rely on separate attentional systems (orienting versus alerting, 
respectively), differ in mechanisms (e.g., broadening versus narrowing of attention, 
respectively) and result in distinct eye movement behaviours based on specific conditions 
(presence or absence of threat and task-relevance of threat) that indicate specific attentional 
outcomes, such as facilitated attention (common to both constructs), delayed disengagement 
(specific to selective attention) and difficulties focusing attention on a task (specific to 
hypervigilance). Richards and colleagues (2014) argue that eye movement research 
supporting anxiety-related selective attention of threat to date is mixed at best, while other 
research (e.g., using visual search and distraction paradigms) has more clearly indicated that 
  121 
trait and clinical anxiety is associated with greater hypervigilance, as indicated by a 
broadening of attention and fewer eye movements or excessive and rapid scanning and 
numerous eye movements, that overall, increase distractibility and reduce attentional control 
(Eysenck et al., 2007). Interestingly, they suggest, as does Gerdes and colleagues (2008), that 
there may be an “unspecific hypervigilance followed by a specific disengagement deficit” (p. 
7). That is, anxious individuals show hypervigilance for all stimuli, irrespective of threat 
value if threat is possible, and then once detected, there is a deficit in disengaging threat 
stimuli specifically, rather than stimuli in general. While this theory does not articulate 
distinctions in relative roles of trait and state anxiety on these attentional processes, it does 
provides a broader framework for understanding potential maladaptive attentional processing 
associated with anxiety and links the processes to observable eye movement behaviours that 
can be empirically tested in combination with state and trait anxiety effects. For instance, is 
hypervigilance associated with state anxiety, trait anxiety, or an interaction between the two? 
Finally, the current study used an undergraduate sample that varied in levels of trait 
anxiety given that the effect sizes of ABT appear to be similar to clinical samples (e.g., Bar-
Haim et al., 2007). However, further research is needed to assess the relative contribution of 
trait and state anxiety in a clinical sample with diagnosed anxiety disorders relative to non-
anxious controls in order to extend the current research to the populations we are most 
interested in understanding and treating. 
3.12 Conclusion 
In brief, the current program of research indicates that elevating state anxiety can cause 
attention to be biased more towards threat once it has been fixated and thus, anxious mood 
states influence the maintenance of attention on threat over time. Once manipulating and 
controlling for state anxiety, the current research found no substantial effects of trait anxiety 
on ABT in a free viewing task that would indicate potential maladaptive attentional processes 
likely to contribute to the development and persistence of anxiety disorders. In other words, 
there was no support for the hypothesis that trait anxiety, or a trait vulnerability to anxiety 
disorders, is associated with a general preferences in orienting of attention towards threat-
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related stimuli relative to neutral stimuli any more so than other people who are in a similar 
state of anxiety. Rather, maladaptive attentional processes associated with anxiety disorders 
are likely much more complex and may only occur in specific situations, such as when threat 
stimuli are task-irrelevant and interfere with a conflicting task/goal (e.g., Eyesenck et al., 
2007). In order to understand what factors put someone at risk of developing and maintaining 
an anxiety disorder over time, state anxiety must be accounted for in future theory and 
research design, while attempting to identify the conditions that contribute to trait anxiety 
related ABT. Once such maladaptive attentional processes are clearly identified, then more 
effective treatments can be developed to specifically target these central processes with the 
goal of ameliorating anxiety-related distress and disorders. 
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Appendix A 
Test Stimuli for Study 1 
Table 16. Study 1: Test Stimuli 
Threat Neutral 
 
Harm Neutral 
2683 7496 
 
3010 4510 
2811 2512 
 
3064 4542 
3500 2595 
 
3100 4500 
3530 2397 
 
3140 4530 
6212 8460 
 
3170 2050 
6242 2395 
 
3181 2025 
6312 2396 
 
3301 2280 
6313 4599 
 
3550 2500 
6315 4700 
 
9250 2579 
6350 2160 
 
9252 4533 
6510 2650 
 
9410 8010 
6560 4605 
 
9415 2594 
6570 6570.2 
 
9420 2360 
9423 2560 
 
9635.1 9635.2 
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Appendix B 
Test Stimuli for Study 2 
Table 17. Study 2: Test Stimuli 
Threat Neutral   Harm Neutral   Positive  Neutral 
2683 7496 
 
3010 4510 
 
2070 2250 
2811 2512 
 
3064 4542 
 
2080 9070 
3500 2595 
 
3100 4500 
 
2165 2214 
3530 2397 
 
3140 4530 
 
2209 2480 
6212 8460 
 
3170 2050 
 
2304 2271 
6242 4100 
 
3181 2025 
 
2311 2312 
6312 2396 
 
3301 2280 
 
2340 2383 
6313 8050 
 
3550 2500 
 
2370 2570 
6315 2485 
 
9250 2579 
 
2530 2850 
6350 2372 
 
9252 4533 
 
2550 2516 
6510 6250.2 
 
9410 8010 
 
7325 2840 
6560 4605 
 
9415 2594 
 
8180 8160 
6570 6570.2 
 
9420 2495 
 
8380 8060 
9423 2560   9635.1 9635.2   8461 2870 
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Appendix C  
Mood Induction Instructions  
Before we begin the visual task I am going to ask you to get into a mood that makes you as 
[anxious or calm] as you feel comfortable. You can do this by thinking about an event in 
your life where you felt especially (same mood word). I know that this may not be the easiest 
thing to do, but it is very important for our research. 
I've done this a few times myself so I'll tell you a few things about it. I found that since I 
was the one asking myself to become (same mood word) by thinking about events in my own 
life, I was very much in control of the mood. I could intensify, lessen, and later even end the 
mood quite easily by changing my thoughts. 
I'll begin by turning on some music that people usually find helpful for getting into mood 
that makes them feel (same mood word). While you are listening to the music, please think 
about a particular event from your past where you were especially (same mood word).  
While you are listening to the music I'd like you to relive this event.  When I did this, I 
thought about the time...(give a personal example).  It is important to remember that the more 
detail you can re-create in your mind about the event, the more intensely you'll re-live that 
same feelings. 
But I also want to reassure you that I will take time at the end of the session to make sure 
you are feeling normal again before you leave today. Remember that the goal is to feel as 
(same mood word) as possible for this short period of time. I know this may not be easy, but 
are you willing to try?  
I'll leave you alone now with the music and your thoughts (dim room lighting). Please 
relax in the chair while you think about these events and put your feet up if you like. I'll be 
coming back in in a few minutes. Please try to stay focused on the events you are re-living. If 
you want to stop at any time, don't hesitate to tell me.  
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Appendix D 
Test Stimuli for Study 3 
Table 18. Study 3: Test Stimuli for Image Set 1 and 2 
Image Set 1 
      
        
High Threat Neutral   Mild Threat Neutral   Positive Neutral 
2683 7496 
 
1111 7080 
 
1722 7320 
2811 2512 
 
1270 7950 
 
1811 5510 
3180 2830 
 
1301 1510 
 
2050 2240 
3500 2595 
 
2120 2230 
 
2165 2214 
3530 2397 
 
2661 5520 
 
2209 2480 
6210 7110 
 
2681 2410 
 
2216 2320 
6243 2215 
 
3280 2280 
 
2303 2487 
6315 4700 
 
4621 2570 
 
2340 2383 
6350 2500 
 
6020 7235 
 
2550 2516 
6510 2221 
 
6211 2518 
 
4640 2510 
6530 2515 
 
6241 7090 
 
5780 5740 
6540 9700 
 
6410 9210 
 
5831 8465 
6570.1 4536 
 
6610 7035 
 
5910 7590 
6571 7030 
 
6840 5455 
 
8162 5395 
6821 4617 
 
9120 9360 
 
8185 8280 
6838 2580 
 
9160 2600 
 
8200 2490 
9620 5390 
 
9404 7620 
 
8350 4571 
9630 7170 
 
9417 7150 
 
8496 2520 
9911 7234 
 
9592 7050 
 
8497 2270 
9921 5410   9912 7140   8501 5720 
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Image Set 2 
       
        
High Threat Neutral   Mild Threat Neutral   Positive Neutral 
6212 8050 
 
1051 1313 
 
1710 5534 
6230 5533 
 
1200 1910 
 
2070 2250 
6242 2880 
 
1220 1616 
 
2080 9070 
6260 7025 
 
2100 2200 
 
2304 2271 
6300 7060 
 
2130 2385 
 
2391 7550 
6312 2396 
 
2682 2440 
 
2530 5875 
6313 4598 
 
2691 2485 
 
4641 7490 
6360 2575 
 
2692 5535 
 
5621 7207 
6370 8320 
 
6190 7503 
 
5626 7920 
6550 7190 
 
6200 7020 
 
5830 7705 
6560 2630 
 
6244 2210 
 
7325 2840 
6830 2381 
 
6561 8010 
 
7330 5500 
6834 2749 
 
6800 7004 
 
7580 5250 
9520 1850 
 
6940 7710 
 
8170 5900 
9560 1450 
 
7361 7031 
 
8190 7211 
9600 7491 
 
9230 2620 
 
8210 8311 
9800 2495 
 
9470 7500 
 
8370 7096 
9810 7495 
 
9584 7040 
 
8380 8060 
9910 7595 
 
9594 7100 
 
8461 2870 
9920 7217   9621 7130   8531 7285 
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